National Library of Canada
Canadian Theses Service
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada
Service des thèses canadiennes

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, tests publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30.

NL-339 (r. 88/04)

Canada

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

SOVIET COMMUNICATION: ACTIVE MEASURES AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

BY

KEENAN HARRY HOHOL

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS

IN

EAST EUROPEAN AND SOVIET STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF SLAVIC AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

EDMONTON, ALBERTA
SPRING 1988

Permission has been granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author (copyright owner) has reserved other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her written permission.

L'autorisation a été accordée à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur (titulaire du droit d'auteur) se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation écrite.

ISBN 0-315-42833-3

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

RELEASE FORM

NAME OF AUTHOR: Keenan Harry Hohol

TITLE OF THESIS: Soviet Communication: Active Measures and Information Management

DEGREE: Master of Arts

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED: 1988

Permission is hereby given to THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientitic purposes only.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

Keenan Hohol
(Student's signature)

9204 Ottewell Rd
(Student's permanent address)

Edmonton AB T6B2C7

Date: April 22, 1988

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled SOVIET COMMUNICATION: ACTIVE MEASURES AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT , submitted by KEENAN HARRY HOHOL in partial fulfillment for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS in EAST EUROPEAN AND SOVIET STUDIES.

Mark Motte
....
Supervisor

Peter A Rolland
....

Stephen Riggins
....

....

Date: 18 April 1988

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my grandfather Ivan Serna, who cherished freedom and hated dishonesty.

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the importance the Soviet leadership attaches to the management of information, and more specifically, to analyze an important instrument of Soviet foreign policy known as "active measures." The Soviet leadership uses the term active measures to refer to a variety of techniques designed to plant disinformation, ideas, and arguments favourable to the Soviet Union in foreign societies, in a way that disguises the fact that the source is an official Soviet outlet. Active measures constitute a highly clandestine and subversive attempt to influence foreign public opinion and the decision-making elites so that they reinforce the attainment of Soviet foreign policy objectives.

There are four major parts in this work. After the introduction, the second chapter analyzes the organization and administration of the Soviet domestic media system in order to note the importance the Soviet leadership attaches to the management of the flow of information. In the third chapter, there is a discussion of Soviet foreign policy, followed by a discussion of the major premises of Soviet active measures. The discussion illustrates how the Soviet leadership applies the lessons it has learned from domestic politics abroad. Chapter four, the keystone section of this thesis, examines the key components of the apparatus which designs and implements active measures, and then, it describes the various techniques that constitute active measures. Chapter five is an initial attempt to assess the relative impact of the overall Soviet attempt to influence foreign opinion; the chapter contains original research focussed on an analysis of the western media's coverage of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) controversy from July to December of 1987. Finally, chapter six summarizes the major findings of the thesis, examines the implications of Soviet active measures, and considers possible countermeasures against the Soviet attempt to influence foreign opinion.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Prof. M. Mote for his support and guidance, his concern for objective study, and for consistently reminding me that the aim of any thesis is, of course, to learn. I would also like to thank Prof. S. Riggins for his guidance with respect to chapter 5, and Prof. P. Rolland for serving on my thesis committee. In addition, this thesis could not have been possible without the generous support of Prof. R. L. Busch, Prof. B. Medwidsky, and the Department of Slavic and East European Studies, and I am very grateful for their efforts on my behalf.

Naturally, I would like to extend thanks and appreciation to my parents, Dr. Harry and Alexandra Hohol, and to the remainder of my family and my friends who all provided me with the love and encouragement I needed to continue my studies. I would also like to extend thanks to Micheal Zukiwsky for computing the diagrams in chapter 2.

Finally, I wish to extend special thanks to Cathrine Gauk, for without her love, patience, and support the writing of this thesis would have been immeasurably difficult.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. Introduction 1

II. The Soviet Media System 7

Sources 7

The Place of Functions of the Media 8

Soviet Media Organization and Administration 13
  The Politburo 13
  The Secretariat 14
  The Propaganda Department 15
  The Role of Other Departments 18
  The Ministries 19
  News Agencies 20
  Chief Editors and the Editorial Process 21
  The Writers 24
  Formal Censorship 25
  Broadcasting and Other Forms of Media 27

Conclusions 30

III. Active Measures: A Foreign Policy Instrument 39

Soviet Foreign Policy 40

Targets 49

Soviet Active Measures: Fundamentals 52
  The Environment 53
  Cumulative Effect 63

Conclusions 66

IV. Active Measures: Apparatus and Techniques 73

Apparatus 73
  The Politburo 73
  The International Department 75
  The Propaganda Department 78
  Committee for State Security (KGB) 80
  Auxiliary Services 82
  Concluding Remarks on Apparatus 84

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

CHAPTER PAGE

Classic Active Measures Techniques 85
  Disinformation 86
  Manipulation of the Foreign Media 92
  Forgery 98
  Agents of Influence 104
  International Front Organizations 108
  Use of Foreign Communist Parties 114
  Friendship and Cultural Societies 116
  Clandestine Radio Broadcasting 117

Costs 119

Conclusions 122

V. The US Strategic Defense Initiative and the Media 132

Background 132

Research Design and Some Quantitative Results 139

Thematic Structure 144
  Headlines 146
  Leads 148
  Perspective 149

Style 150

Rhetoric 152
  Exaggeration 152
  Contrast 154
  Militarization of Space 155

The Case of Lawrence Martin 156

Conclusions 160

VI. Summary 167

Bibliography 175

Appendix 183

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1. Communist Party Agencies for the Mass Media 16

2. Administrative and Functional Structure of Soviet Broadcasting 29

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

I Soviet Active Measures Budget, 1979 120

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the importance the Soviet leadership attaches to the management of information, and more specifically, to analyze an important instrument of Soviet foreign policy known as "active measures" (aktivnye meropriatiia). The Soviet leadership uses the term active measures to refer to a variety of techniques designed to plant disinformation, ideas, and arguments favourable to the Soviet Union in foreign societies, in a way that dismisses the fact that the source is an offical Soviet outlet. Active measures constitute a generally clandestine attempt to influence foreign public opinion and the decision-making elites so that they reinforce the attainment of Soviet foreign policy objectives.

A typical western reader, on being told about Soviet active measures, will probably have an instinctive reaction that registers suspicion--if not outright disbelief: the suggestion that the Soviet government might be engaged in such activities may sound more like a paranoid dream or a fairy tale rather than an allegation to be taken seriously. However, the evidence provided by Soviet defectors, the periodic exposure of Soviet forgeries and agents of influence, and the record of Soviet behavior verify the authenticity of Soviet active measures. Though the secret world of active measures often strains one's imagination more than the most bizarre fiction, active measures are, unfortunately, a reality.

Soviet active measures may be conducted by the political techniques of oral and written disinformation, manipulation of the foreign media, forgery, agents of influence, Soviet international front organizations, foreign communist parties, Soviet binational friendship and cultural societies, and clandestine radio broadcasting. Active measures can also have military and paramilitary dimensions such as military arms and logistical support, political-military training, advisory assistance, and deployment of forces.[1] The focus of this thesis, however, rests on the various political active measures techniques.

The Soviet Union designs and employs active measures to support Soviet strategic objectives and policies. As will become clear in the body of the thesis, the Soviet Union, guided in part by Marxist-Leninist ideology, is continually trying to shift the world correlation of forces to the Soviet Union's advantage. Though the Soviet Union is generally cautious in its attempts to increase Soviet power and influence, i.e., to create a world socialist system under Soviet hegemony, the Soviet Union relentlessly wages a dramatic ideological battle against the capitalist world. In this respect, active measures function as an indispensable adjunct to the conduct of Soviet foreign policy by traditional diplomatic, military, and economic means.

Soviet active measures function as political instruments of foreign policy in three main ways. First, active measures secretly lobby for issues that are in the Soviet Union's best interest. Second, active measures attempt to confuse foreign opinion about Soviet global ambitions by placing distorted, biased, and patently false information in foreign communication systems. By creating a state of confusion, the Soviets hope to undermine the political resolve of nations to protect their interests against Soviet encroachments. Finally, because Soviet foreign behavior rarely, if ever, reflects Soviet pronouncements about peace, international security, and harmony among all nations, active measures help in the general attempt to justify Soviet foreign and domestic behavior.

With respect to the major strategic functions of Soviet active measures, it should be emphasized that it is not the purpose of this study to recommend censorship, inspire panic, or promote heightened animosity toward the Soviet Union. Instead, it is one of the purposes of this study to bring attention to an important instrument of Soviet foreign policy that has, until recently, been largely overlooked by scholarly literature and the mass media. The failure to acknowledge that active measures function as an important dimension of Soviet foreign policy can only hinder the on-going effort in the West to understand the nature of Soviet foreign policy in general. An objective and realistic understanding of Soviet foreign policy is necessitated, of course, by the fact that the Soviet Union is a major global power that sustains the world's largest peace-time military force and has advanced nuclear capabilities that must be contended with.

The body of this thesis is divided into five main parts. Chapter 2 examines the Soviet organization and administration of the Soviet domestic media system. The Soviet media system is analyzed in order to demonstrate the importance the Soviet leadership attaches to the management of information in the USSR. Having noted how the Soviet leadership manages information to maintain its authoritarian rule in chapter 2, chapter 3 proceeds to examine how the leadership applies the lessons it has learnt from domestic politics abroad. In chapter 3, a brief discussion of the nature of Soviet foreign policy is provided first, in order to articulate the major policy objectives active measures endeavor to accomplish. Then, the fundamental principles of active measures are outlined. Chapter 4 examines the key components of the apparatus which designs and implements active measures, and then, it describes the various techniques that are utilized for the implementation of active measures.

Chapter 5 is an analysis of the western media's coverage of the United States' Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) over a six month period between July and December, 1987. The analysis is undertaken in order to determine whether or not the western media provide an hospitable climate for Soviet views. The analysis of the western media is relevant to the overall theme of Soviet active measures because it indicates that the Soviet Union is provided with a environment receptive to clandestinely placed Soviet disinformation and propaganda as well as offical Soviet pronouncements which are disseminated overtly. The chapter broadens the scope of our study of Soviet influence on foreign opinion in the sense that it goes beyond the examination of active measures as such. If we take active measures to be those efforts designed to influence foreign opinion through the activities of clandestine agents in western information networks, then it becomes clear that other means of manipulation are available. The Soviets deliberately play to the known predilections of western media, by designing and releasing news and opinion that will likely be picked up by the western media. The analysis in chapter 5 concludes, however, that regardless of the precise manner of Soviet efforts to exert influence on foreign opinion, Soviet efforts appear to show signs of success.

Finally, chapter 6 summarizes the major findings of the thesis, examines the implications of Soviet active measures, and considers ways that the effects of Soviet active measures might be understood, as one step in achieving a clearer picture of Soviet foreign policy activities.

ENDNOTES

[1] On the paramilitary dimensions of Soviet active measures see Dennis L. Bark, ed., The Red Orchestra (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986); Chapman Pincher, Secret Offensive (London: Sigwick and Jackson, 1986), pp. 278-302; Richard H. Shultz, "Soviet Support for Insurgent Movements," Political Communication and Persuasion 4 (Fall 1987), pp. 43-46; John J. Dziak, "Soviet Intelligence and Security Services in the 1980's: The Paramilitary Dimension," in Roy Godson, ed. Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Counterintelligence (Washington: National Strategy Information Center, 1980), pp. 95-124.

CHAPTER II

THE SOVIET MEDIA SYSTEM

The area of communications is one of increasing importance in the modern world. Communications are particularly important in the Soviet Union. The media in the Soviet Union play a crucial role in shaping the social, political, and economic environment of the Soviet Union in its entirety. The Soviet media are important instruments of political persuasion and control that the Soviet leadership implements to facilitate its authoritarian rule.

In a country like the Soviet Union, which spans over eleven time zones, has a population which exceeds 260 million and is divided into over one hundred different ethnic groups, a highly centralized and hierarchical domestic media system is necessary to manage the flow of information. In the discussion that follows the organization and administration of the Soviet domestic media system will be examined. The discussion will demonstrate the great importance the Soviet leadership attaches to the management of information.

Sources

The majority of sources relevant to the study of the Soviet media system have appeared in relatively recent times. Of the more dated sources, information revealed by the Smolensk Archive has provided crucial ground-breaking information to the study of the Soviet political system during the 1930's.[1] Although the Smolensk Archive provides great insight into the workings of the Soviet media system, its applicability to the contemporary Soviet media is limited.

More contemporary information comes from a quite different source. A great deal of knowledge about the Soviet media has been obtained from the large wave of Soviet emigration to the West since the 1950's. A record of proceedings of a symposium on Soviet censorship (entitled The Soviet Censorship) held in the late 1960's stands as one of the most valuable contributions of information about the Soviet media system offered by the emigres.[2] In more recent times, the Rand Corporation undertook a massive project in 1978-81 to interview fifty-six Soviet emigres who were formerly involved in the media process as writers, journalists, editors, censors, and government and Party officials.[3] The results of this project were subsequently published, and undoubtedly constitute one of the most systematic and conclusive studies on the Soviet media system to date. Although many gaps still remain in our knowledge of the Soviet media system, the information provided by Soviet emigres has significantly increased our knowledge in this area of study.

The Place of Functions of the Media

Before examining the organization and administration of the Soviet media system, it is important to provide a brief description of Soviet media theory. Ellen Mickiewicz notes that "the guidelines and parameters of the political doctrine of Marxism-Leninism impart a specific shape and texture" to the Soviet communications system.[4] Marxism-Leninism requires that the media have distinctive functions as well as clear limitations.

The Soviet media have the responsibility of transmitting a consistent set of messages to the public about Marxist-Leninist ideology and its specific relation to life within the Soviet Union and abroad. The continual saturation of Soviet society with these messages ensures its ideological and political indoctrination. In this capacity, the Soviet media perform a control function.

Hopkins maintains that the Soviet media differ radically from those of the West.[5] Although the western media are clearly influenced by limitations imposed by the market economy, patterns of ownership, organizational structure, and the doctrines of the general leadership, the western media are nonetheless expected to act as the voice of the people, groups, and interests, and are expected to protect the populace from the arbitrary powers of the state. The Soviet media primarily serve as powerful instruments of political persuasion and control. They have an overriding inclination to defend, explain, and promote the policies and views of the Soviet leadership while trying to downplay, discredit, and even eliminate alternate views. This fact is corroborated by Yegor Ligachev, CPSU Chief of Ideology, who noted that:[6]

> ...the Soviet press is actively facilitating the process of restructuring, democratization and openness, is energetically combating everything that is outmoded and unsuitable, and is affirming the positive elements of our life. The CPSU Central Committee is providing all-out assistance and support to the press...

In order for the media to perform a control function for the Soviet leadership it is imperative that first, the media structure be pervaded and controlled by the Party. This principle was stated explicitly by Lenin in 1905:[7]

> Newspapers must become the organs of the various party organizations, and their writers must by all means become members of these organisations. Publishing and

> distributing centers, bookshops and reading rooms, libraries and similar establishments must all be under party control.

Though Lenin wrote these remarks about Party control of the media before the Bolsheviks assumed power, Lenin and all subsequent Soviet leaders adopted the principle as policy upon their assumption of power. Second, it is imperative that Marxist-Leninist ideology as interpreted (in this instance, interpretation is a dynamic process) by the Party be a strict guide for the media. All news and information disclosed by the media must be presented from a pure, ideological perspective. Finally, it is crucial that every attempt be made to insulate Soviet society from alternative sources of information.[8]

The CPSU's control of the media is justified by Soviet political theory. The CPSU obtains its power from the masses and in doing so legitimizes its rule. Accordingly, the CPSU gains the right to control the media because it is expected to act as a vanguard and spokesman for the masses. Hopkins notes that whenever the CPSU announces a new policy or decision in the media, a typical lead begins, "All the Soviet people unanimously approve of..." [9] What is being conveyed in leads such as this, of course, is that the Soviet leadership unswervingly serve the needs and desires of the masses.

Despite the logic of the argument above, the critical observer recognizes that Soviet theory fails to match Soviet deeds. The Soviet media clearly function as instruments of political persuasion and control for the Soviet leadership and thereby impose significant restrictions on the Soviet citizen's freedom of conscience and right to information. Yet, this too is justified by Soviet political theory.

Lenin wrote that "absolute freedom is a bourgeois anarchist phrase...one cannot live in society and be free from society."[10] Therefore, despite the restrictions the media impose on Soviet society, the masses are as free as they need to be in the ideological context--they are free of "bourgeois individualism".

The CPSU determines the content, tone, and distribution of the media. In general, only items which faithfully project the views and policies of the CPSU appear in the media. Information and ideas that contradict the official CPSU line are either downplayed, do not appear at all, or are exposed in the Soviet media as erroneous or as bourgeois propaganda.

With respect to ideas and information that contradict the policies and views of the CPSU, the Soviet leadership is faced with a peculiar dilemma in contemporary times. The Soviet public is increasingly being exposed to alternative sources of information because of communications technology like transistor radios, home video-recorders, portable tape recorders, photocopy machines, and computers. As a result, the Soviet leadership is finding it increasingly difficult to insulate Soviet society from what it perceives as undesirable information. To combat opposing ideas and information the contemporary Soviet media seem to have adopted a policy of first, propagandizing the policies and views of the CPSU and second, exposing and openly negating ideas and information that contradict the Party line. Yegor Ligachev clearly describes this policy:[11]

> The press, television and radio have significant possibilities...at the present stage in the development of society, it is very important...to conduct vigorous propaganda of the new and positive elements that appear

> in life...to skillfully propagandize restructuring in all its diversity and complexity....At the same time, the intrigues of lying bourgeois propaganda, which has brought up substantial forces to undermine Soviet people's faith in the rightness of the Communist Party's course and the reality of the restructuring that has gotten under way on a broad scale, must be exposed.

In addition to control, the Soviet media perform what Mickiewicz calls a socialization function.[12] In a broad sense the media act as educators. They provide the masses with the information, skills, and instructions they need to behave properly in Soviet society. The task of socialization assigned to the media consists of two dimensions. First, the media are expected to shape the ethical and moral outlook of the Soviet population by conveying what the CPSU defines as model ethical and moral behavior.[13] Soviets are informed by the media that they must demonstrate collectivism and cooperation, ideological consciousness, partiinost' (party spirit), "responsible criticism," and self-criticism.[14] In most recent times, Mikhail Gorbachev has charged the media with the task of showing to the masses examples of how to assist in the process of perestroika (restructuring):[15]

> We are well aware that there are people who are utterly devoted to restructuring. They are the heroes of our time. They must be shown in such a way that they teach people by their example and stir them to the struggle for revolutionary transformation in society.

The second dimension of socialization the Soviet media must implement is the mobilization of the public to participate in efforts to achieve the economic, social, and political goals of the Soviet leadership. For example, in the 1930s Stalin utilized the media to mobilize the Soviet population for industrialization and collectivization. During World War Two the media were called upon to mobilize the nation physically and spiritually in a time of war. And currently, the Soviet press is being used to mobilize Soviet society for the radical reforms envisioned by the policies of glasnost', perestroika, and democratization. It should be clarified that the media do not have a free hand as a result of the policy of glasnost'. Instead, the media are used as tools to implement the policy in the manner proposed by the CPSU.

Since the Soviet media perform the two primary functions of political control and socialization, they can be seen as important instruments of Soviet authoritarian rule. By charging the media with these two tasks the Soviet leadership demonstrates that it realizes the value of managing the flow of information. This fact will become particularly evident in the following section which examines the organization and administration of the Soviet media system.

Soviet Media Organization and Administration

The Politburo

The Party's control over the media is implemented in the same hierarchical manner it controls the Soviet political system in its entirety. At the top of this hierarchy is the Politburo. With respect to the media, first, the Politburo determines the organisational structure of the Soviet media system. Second, it decides overall media policy and changes it when it deems it necessary to do so. For example, it was the Politburo which decided to print Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich in 1962.[16] Of course, Nikita Khrushchev must have played a major role in the Politburo's decision. More recently, in February of 1987 the Politburo decided to allow the publication of Pasternak's Dr. Zhivago.[17]

The Politburo's third responsibility with respect to the media is to make all the top personnel appointments in the Party supervisory structure, and in the media as well.[18] This system of personnel appointments, commonly discussed under the heading of the nomenklatura system, ensures a loyal base of support for the Politburo in the media and facilitates the Politburo's control of the media and virtual monopoly of information. The top media personnel positions include the Propaganda Secretary and the head of the Propaganda Department at central and republic levels, and the chief editors, deputy editors, editorial secretaries (managing editors), and censors of the central media organs.[19]

The Secretariat

The members of the Politburo must delegate the supervision of the media to other bodies. Dzirkals notes that it is the Secretariat of the Central Committee which supervises the media for the Politburo.[20] Due to the emphasis the Party places on ideology and propaganda in the press, the secretaries for ideology and propaganda (Egor Ligachev and Aleksandr Iakovlev respectively) figure prominently in overseeing the Secretariat's operations for the General Secretary. The Secretariat's supervision of the media is carried out directly through the chiefs of all the various Departments of the Central Committee. The Secretariat must also confirm personnel appointments (which are still subject to the Politburo's approval) in addition to the responsibility for controlling the use of the media by the leadership.[21]

The Propaganda Department

Of all the Central Committee Departments the most important in terms of media control is the Propaganda Department. Although other Departments participate in supervising the media in the field relevant to their expertise, the Propaganda Department invariably has the final say. The Propaganda Department is responsible for the implementation of the Party's policies, that is, it plays a role as the overall administrator of the media.[22] As Figure 1 illustrates, the Propaganda Department's control is quite extensive, extending from the all-union level through to the _raion_ (district) and _gorkom_ (city council) levels. At the all-union level, the Department is divided into five sectors dealing with: Newspapers, Magazines, Radio and Television, Printing Plants, and Publishing and Distribution.

In its role as administrator, the Propaganda Department is responsible for the appointment of editors, that is, it makes recommendations for appointments which must be confirmed by the next highest Party authority.[23] The Department is also responsible for the dissemination of Party media policy, the allocation of resources to press organs, the coordination of information inputs, distribution, and finally, monitoring the media's performance.[24]

How does the Propaganda Department go about performing these tasks? The information obtained from emigres indicates that the Propaganda Department has a pincer-like control over the media. That is, control is excercised from above and below. As already indicated, chief editors (and broadcast planners) of the central media are appointed. Apparently, they are chosen for their loyalty to the Party

FIGURE 1[26]
COMMUNIST PARTY AGENCIES FOR THE MASS MEDIA


CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF PROAGANDA
SECTORS
NEWSPAPERS
MAGAZINES
RADIO/TV
PRINTING PLANTS
PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTION
REPUBLIC CENTRAL COMMITTEES
DEPARTMENTS OF PROPAGANDA & AGITATION
SECTORS
PRESS
RADIO/TV
OTHERS?
OBLAST PARTY COMMITTEES
DEPARTMENT OF PROPAGANDA & AGITATION
SECTOR FOR PRESS, RADIO, AND TV
CITY PARTY COMMITTEES
SECTOR FOR PRESS, RADIO, AND TV
RAION PARTY COMMITTEES
SECTOR FOR PRESS, RADIO, AND TV
PRIMARY PARTY UNITS
PRINTED AND WALL NEWSPAPERS

and their ability to recognize what constitutes a contradiction to the Party line. As Ellen Mickiewicz points out, formal journalism education has very little to do with the appointment of top media personnel.[25] Thus, to assist the chief editors in accomplishing their goals with the highest degree of responsiveness to Party dictates, the Propaganda Department holds bi-weekly meetings with the editors. In these meetings both the latest policy directives and media performance are discussed.[27]

The nature of the Propaganda Department's guidance from above is directly proportional to the degree of importance the Party warrants a given issue. Undoubtedly, Party life, speeches, foreign affairs, domestic ethnic affairs, and military affairs generate far more concern from the Party than family issues or the poor quality of footwear an enterprise produces. In the former instances, the nature of guidance the Party provides can be very specific.[28] The Propaganda Department may submit obligatory articles for print, as was the case when _Trud_ was ordered to publish a series of anti-Zionist articles.[29] Such compulsory content is always published, of course, because the media are monitored by the Party.

The bottom part of the Propaganda Department's pincers are the _kuratory_ (monitors).[30] These individuals may be viewed as being on-site advisors to the media. Whenever an editor is unsure of the content of an article, the _kurator_ is called upon to provide his opinion. In his capacity as a monitor, the _kurator_ also provides feedback to the chief editor on media performance. The Propaganda Department, then, leaves very little room for the media to make mistakes or misinterpret the Party's directives. Should such anomolies occur, it is not due to a lack of Party control.

The Role of Other Departments

Although the Propaganda Department is the most important Central Committee body for controlling the media, other Departments participate in the process as well. This may occur in two ways. First, the Propaganda Department may solicit advice from another Department in its area of expertise and expect it to oversee media operations in its field. For example, the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy (MPA) is called upon to oversee the military press, and to give advice to the Propaganda Department about what should or should not appear in the press on military affairs.[31] Second, a given Department may assist chief editors of specialized and Party organs directly. To use the example of the MPA, advice may be given about a set of aerial photos that might be considered strategically important to the military.

As one might well imagine, departments may come into conflict with one another over how an issue should be presented in the media. How are these conflicts resolved? As previously indicated, Dzirkals ascertained that the Propaganda Department has the final say in all matters. However, Dzirkals also claims that inter-departmental conflict may even go to the Secretariat and Politburo to be resolved.[32] The conclusion from this must be that the information known about this problem to date is insufficient to provide a conclusive answer, but also, that the matter of information is a concern for the highest authorities.

The Ministries

Responsible for the day to day adminstration of the Soviet Union, the ministries and state committees also have an interest in what appears in the media. Can they have an effect on media content? Apparently they can, even though the Party's concerns come first. All articles and broadcasts relating to the operations of specific ministries require a "visa" from the related ministry's press department.[33] If coverage of a particular issue is not to a ministry's liking, it simply refuses to issue a visa until the report is revised appropriately.

This being the case, how does one account for the criticism of ministries (e.g., for not fulfilling the plan, inefficiency, and corruption) that appears in the Soviet media from time to time? Much to the consternation of those who equate this criticism with western pluralism, the criticism in general seems to be solicited by the leadership. To illustrate, the Central Committee will contact the Propaganda Department which then orders the chief editor of a newspaper to run a critique of a ministry in a forthcoming issue.[34] In this manner, a visa is simply not required to print a critique. Such a procedure explains the presence of criticism in the Soviet press. Similarly, one would have to guess that the ministries' press releases must be subject to the approval of the Propaganda Department and Central Committee.

The specific role of the numerous ministries and state committees could not be adequately examined here because of the need for brevity (but see below a discussion of the State Committees for Radio and

Television, and Cinematography). It is sufficient to note that in addition to the twenty-two Central Committee Departments, their presence in the media indicates an important aspect of Soviet power in general. Control is not exercised simply in a linear fashion. Within the hierarchy of controls there is a vast network of coordination and overlap. Conflict does occur, and the study by Dzirkals gives examples; but, it is a kind of conflict peculiar to the Soviet system, and should not be confused with western notions of pluralism.

News Agencies

Another important extension of the leadership's control over the media are the news agencies. Though central media such as Pravda and Izvestiia have foreign news departments of their own, and can obtain light information (sport, fashion, photography) from the Novosti (APN) Press Agency, for hard news, TASS remains the most important agency. The function of TASS is "to disseminate in the USSR and abroad political, economic, and other information and official documents characterizing the situation in the Soviet Union and in foreign countries."[35] TASS is the major source of information for all Soviet media. As Markham notes, TASS is "the gatekeeper of information" to Soviet media and the world.[36]

TASS is officially attached to the Council of Ministers, but in practice it is directed by the Central Committee and the Propaganda Department.[37] Therefore, TASS speaks for the Party. Having a large staff of approximately 3000 foreign correspondents (in addition to its domestic staff in every Republic), the agency is closely integrated with the KGB both for the purposes of espionage and active measures.[38]

It is well known that TASS produces a variety of reports. First, there are the reports that all Soviet media receive. Second, there is "White TASS" which is a more detailed news report sent to government ministries, Party headquarters, and editors. Finally there is "Red TASS" which consist of special bulletins sent only to the Party elite.[39] Interestingly enough, Hedrick Smith states that most of this information, often perceived as intelligence, would really only be ordinary news in a western newspaper.[40]

Just how much weight TASS reports hold in the individual media organs is indicated by the fact that the Soviet media are obliged to use TASS reports. Moreover, the actual text of TASS reports cannot be altered by the media. If a report must be abridged for lack of space or time, whole paragraphs may be excluded, but the content of those remaining may not be changed in any way. The supremacy of TASS reports is so well-established that the formal censorship agency Glavlit is not required to examine them.[41]

Chief Editors and the Editorial Process

In any Soviet newspaper or periodical the chief editor (editor-in-chief) is the most influential person in the organ's operations. As Dzirkals maintains, the chief editor's purpose is to carry out the line set by the Central Committee Propaganda Department. Although he is unquestionably the one who rules the newspaper, the newpaper "is by no means the editor's fief."[42] The chief editor's power is manifested in his control over the hiring of the organ's staff. Just as the top leadership selects its subordinates on the basis of loyalty, the chief editor duplicates this at the operational level, albeit with slightly more consideration for professional ability. The chief editor also controls incentive for his staff, that is, he may issue special passes, provide extra funds, give special assignments and affect the status of individuals (e.g., appointing a journalist to head an editorial department in the newspaper).[43] Finally, the chief editor is the ultimate authority within the editorial collegium as to whether a story may be printed and if so, in what form.

In many respects, the chief editor's position is rather difficult. A writer's only responsibility is compliance, but the chief editor must try to balance compliance with the attempt to make his newpaper provocative and interesting. Obviously, the chief editor's success in this task is regulated by his access to information about the latest Party line. This information can come from both formal and informal sources. To begin with the latter, the editor's access to information is proportional to the level of the newspaper he oversees, and the type of Party organizations with which he is affiliated. For example, the chief editors of Pravda, Izvestiia, and Sovetskaia Rossiia (Victor Afanasiev, Petr Alexeev, and Mikhail Nenashev respectively in 1982) obtain first-hand information by attending the weekly Central Committee Secretariat meetings, an opportunity warranted by the prestige of their newpapers.[44] The chief editor of a local newspaper, however, has significantly fewer information sources even if they be at the raikom or gorkom level. As a result, the chief editors at these levels must rely on: (1) the information provided by the central press organs, and (2) the formal sources of information which all editors rely on.

Some of these formal sources have already been identified as the Central Committee Departments, ministries, news agencies, and the Propaganda Department's kuratory. In addition, chief editors must attend bi-weekly meetings and meetings called on special occasions (e.g., May Day celebrations, or , an offical's death) at the Propaganda Department of their level. In these meetings the editors are informed of the latest nuances and are advised as to what to stress in future issues or broadcasts as the case may be.[45] The nature of this advice can be quite specific as the account of one meeting illustrates:[46]

> The editors were informed that a decree on public drunkeness was due to appear...They were told to increase their coverage of public complaints about drunkeness to give the appearance that the decree was a response to public demand.

The final source of information is the vertushka. This is a telephone connection to the Central Committee which can be used in crisis situations.[47]

Having gained access to a variety of information about Party directives, the chief editor then delegates his authority to an editorial board or collegium (consisting of the chief editor, deputy editors, a managing editor, department heads, and perhaps Party advisors) which go about the business of directing the creation of the daily press. The editorial board has a daily meeting called a letuchka, during which reports are given by the various department heads, criticism is heard, dummy copies of layouts are examined, and plans for issues are approved (three days ahead).[48] At first glance this seems an enormous work load, yet, one must remember that the Soviet daily newpaper rarely consists of more than six to eight pages.

The Writers

The variety of controls already indicated provide ample reason for the writer (journalist, script-writer, author) to stay close to the Party line. The Party's control over employment is an extremely powerful instrument for minimizing dissent. Rather than be expelled from one's profession and lose the privileges that may have been associated with it, a writer must become his own critic, if only for the sake of survival. One Soviet emigre, Natalia Belinkova, felt that censorship is essentially a state of mind for the writer, and this is far more powerful than the official censorship of Glavlit.[49] What Belinkova is referring to, of course, is self-censorship. The practise of self-censorship is a form of non-institutionalized control that derives from the journalist's ideological and journalistic education. In the Soviet media there appears to be a growing reliance on the fact that "educated" journalists know what to write and what not to write.[50] Of course, self-censorship is not the product of journalistic education alone. Article 70 of the Soviet Penal Code (which carries the charge of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda") takes over where education leaves off.[51] Should a writer be tempted to transcend the boundaries imposed by the Soviet leadership, even by very esoteric means, surely, the traditionally arbitrary application of Article 70 must inspire considerable restraint.

This does not mean that writers abstain from criticism in the media. As Gorbachev notes: "openness, criticism, and self-criticism are fundamental policy."[52] However, the motto "Criticize But Don't Generalize" must also be considered when discussing criticism in the

Soviet media.[53] Essentially, the motto means that one may address specific societal problems such as corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, or the lack of domestic necessities, but this must be done in the spirit of partiinost'. The Soviet political system in general must not be criticized. As Gorbachev notes:[54]

> ...criticism should always be Party criticism and grounded in truth, and this depends on the editor's Party spirit (partiinost')....
>
> Criticism means responsibility, and the sharper it is the more responsible it should be, since a given article is not a personal self-expression nor a reflection of one's own complexes or ambitions but a public undertaking. In criticizing, the press and television should spur people to serious reflections and to work, not to write refutations.

With this in mind, self-censorship contributes to the unusual harmony noted in the Soviet press. Any criticism that does appear "has the effect of increasing popular acceptance of the idea that the Soviet system is sound, and that it is only a few officials who are bad."[55]

Formal Censorship

The general idea behind formal censorship is quite clear: "It would be useless to conduct propaganda on a mass scale if at the same time it was allowed to be undermined by discordant news and views."[56] As we have already established, censorship is carried out by the editors and by the writers themselves. These appear to be the most powerful sources of censorship in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, an official censorship agency does exist, and it is the last step an article must take before being printed, or a broadcast released. This agency is called Glavlit, or more precisely, the Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in the Press. Like the Propaganda

Department, it too pervades the system at every level. For example, Glavlit operates at the all-Union level, Oblit at the district level, and Gorlit at the city level.[57]

Although Glavlit is formally attached to the Council of Ministers, it is closely regulated by the Propaganda Department, and many of its 70,000 censors have had KGB experience.[58] The KGB takes a special interest in articles which show an unwillingness to present the Party's views, and more importantly, the KGB closely monitors the vast amount of letters that Soviet citizens write to the media.

Glavlit's function has changed little since the Stalinist period, although its importance has decreased with the development of self-censorship. Essentially, its function is of a technical nature. Glavlit's mandate is to prohibit the printing or broadcast of any material: (1) containing anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, (2) revealing state secrets, (3) arousing nationalistic or religious fanaticism, and (4) of a truly pornographic character (i.e., which may include avante garde art and literature).[59] The censor is able to determine exactly what falls into these categories by referring to the _perechen'_ (the Index on Information Not to be Published in the Open Press).[60] Though little direct evidence about the _perechen'_ is available, detailed excerpts from the Polish censorship agency are available.[61] What these excerpts reveal about the _perechen'_ is that it is prepared by Glavlit, the Propaganda Department, and the KGB, and it is revised on a regular basis. The censor's duty is simply to ensure that none of the taboos indicated in the _perechen'_ make their way into the open press.

Although the degree of censorship varies according to the type of work to be examined (e.g., a periodical or novel will experience far more scrutiny than a daily newspaper), the censor will normally read a story twice, once before printing and once after to ensure that no changes occurred following the first approval. In this manner the Soviet press achieves a level of accuracy envied even by the western media. However, mistakes and misprints do occur and at times, there is some question as to whether they are really mistakes. The omission of the "l" in glavnokomanduyushchy (which changes its meaning from chief-commander to excrement-commander) is an oft-cited example of an apparent error, the genesis of which is debatable.[62] In any event, the great excitement that arises in the West when such mistakes occur points to the fact that the Soviet media are controlled so tightly that such mistakes constitute minute gains that Soviet dissidents are forced to be satisfied with.

Broadcasting and Other Forms of Media

The broadcast media are undoubtedly the most important media innovations of the twentieth century. Their ability to reach audiences over vast distances, to communicate with the illiterate or those who simply have little desire or opportunity to read, make the broadcast media the most important instruments of mass communication. The post-Stalin leaders, in particular Mikhail Gorbachev, have acknowledged this fact and have vastly increased their use of this medium.[63] Radio broadcasts are accessible virtually everywhere in the Soviet Union, and as of 1976, 86 percent of the USSR was receiving television transmission.[64]

The United State's own experience with the effect of television on society during the Vietnam conflict illustrates the following point. Just as the broadcast media can be powerful instruments of persuasion, they can also be the greatest threat to a government's policies, even its stability. For this reason, the Soviet leadership places a great deal of energy into controlling the broadcast media. As Figure 2 illustrates, the broadcast media are supervised by the State Committee of Radio and Television Broadcasting which, as in the case of all Soviet media, receives its directives from the Propaganda Department. The Committee is divided into operational sectors, and areas of dissemination or transmission.

The State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting approves all production and programming plans. Along with Glavlit, it approves final scripts, and monitors all broadcasts.[65] Its ability to keep up on the latest nuances of the Party line is enhanced by the Committee Chairman, who is a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.[66] The control over broadcasts is virtually exclusive in contemporary times because most broadcasts are pre-recorded (the exception being the daily news), and unlike the western broadcast media, the Soviets are extremely apprehensive about giving special events live-coverage for to do so would unquestionably relinquish some control. Finally, the nomenklatura process previously mentioned (see p. 13) is also at work in the broadcast media system, although here, due to the technological complexity involved in broadcast media, the personnel definitely require a greater degree of expertise than in the printed media.

FIGURE 2[68]

ADMINISTRATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE OF SOVIET BROADCASTING


CENTRAL (ALL UNION) COMMITTEE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
DEPARTMENT OF PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION MOSCOW
SOVIET COMMITTEE OF RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING
PROGRAM PUBLISHING HOUSE
RECORDING PLANT
TECHNICAL SUPPLIES DEPT.
TECHNICAL AGENCY FOR AIRWAVES REGULATION AND EQUIPMENT
FOREIGN BROADCASTING
• SECTORS
• FUNCTIONAL DEPTS.
CENTRAL BROADCASTING (NATIONAL AND RUSSIAN REPUBLIC)
• SECTORS
• FUNCTIONAL DEPTS.
• AREA EDITORIAL BOARDS
PARTY BROADCASTING COMMITTEES FOR
• 14 OTHER REPUBLICS
• REGIONS
• TERRITORIES
• LARGE CITIES
LOCAL BROADCASTING
• SECTORS
• FUNCTIONAL DEPTS.
• LOCAL EDITORIAL BOARDS
--- POLICY CONTROLS
— ADMINISTRATIVE - FUNCTIONAL CONTROLS

Cinema and theater are supervised in a fashion similar to the broadcast media. Cinema is supervized by the State Committee for Cinematography and Theater by the Ministry of Culture's Central Repertory Committee.[67] In both cases the scripts and final products are viewed by the committees, Glavlit, the Propaganda Department, and perhaps even Politburo members. The censorship exercised over these arts is very extensive. Sidney Monas notes that there are at least eighteen levels of censorship for film.[69] This is because the visual medium of film can be very esoteric, using symbolism, special effects, gestures, and even silence to convey meaning. The same, of course, can be said of theater.

Besides censorship, the Party dictates what type of material should be presented by cinema and theatre. As Mickiewicz notes, Soviet cinema and theatre perform a socialization function for the Party. They provide examples for the audience on how to behave in Soviet society, they continually extol the virtues of communism, and they praise the victories Soviet society has achieved since the Bolshevik Revolution. In general, Soviet cinema and theatre are far more ideological and instructive than they are entertaining--though at times they can be both.[70]

Conclusions

The organization and administration of the Soviet media system as described above are characteristic of the highly centralized and authoritarian Soviet political system in general. The Soviet media system is centralized in two main ways. First, there is the formal centralization of government control bodies which generate from the all-Union center, i.e., the central print and broadcast media, which serve as examples for the subordinate media centers on the periphery. Second, and more important, there is the centralized Party supervision of the media which parallels the governmental media structure. All media policy is determined by the Party, which organizes itself in such a way as to pervade the media in both unilinear and criss-crossing patterns.

This dual control structure enables the leadership to have nearly absolute control over what appears in the media. Theoretically, before an article is printed it could undergo censorship by: the writer (self-censorship), the writer's department head, the editorial collegium, the chief editor, the Propaganda Department kurator, the Glavlit censor, related Ministries, State Committees and Central Committee Departments, the KGB, and perhaps even members of the Secretariat and Politburo. In most instances, however, self-censorship is sufficient to curb dissent. Finally, as previously mentioned, the leadership's control over the employment of media staff, the Party supervisory apparatus, and top personnel appointments (the nomenklatura process) provides almost total assurance that the media serve the interests of the CPSU. As Arkady Belinkov stated so well: "Indeed, it is not the Soviet censorship that has destroyed one of the greatest literary traditions any nation has ever produced--it is the Soviet dictatorship."[71]

It should be mentioned that despite the Soviet leadership's virtual monopoly of information and absolute control over the media, the Soviet public is nonetheless exposed to unsanctioned or unofficial ideas and information. This exposure is the result of two important conditions. The first condition is bureaucratic inefficiency. In reference to the Soviet media system Hopkins states:[72]

> ... given the human nature of bureaucracy ... the opportunities for distortion, inefficiency, error, empire building, personal favoritism, and policy sabotage exist to a considerable extent.

The second condition is the increasing access the Soviet public has to alternative sources of information. Alternative sources of information exist in many different forms. Perhaps the most obvious source is information brought into the Soviet Union by foreign tourists, students, and diplomats. Hannah identifies the following as further alternative sources of information: inter-personal communications (e.g., rumour, gossip), samizdat (self-published material), tamizdat (published abroad), magnitizdat (tape recordings), and foreign broadcasting aimed at the Soviet Union (e.g., Radio Liberty, Voice of America, and BBC Russian service).[73] Shanor attempts to complete the list by noting that transistor radios, video recorders, portable tape recorders, photocopy machines, and computers also serve as alternative sources of ideas and information for the Soviet populace.[74]

Though there are many important alternative sources of information for the Soviet public, it would be erroneous to assume that they are sufficient to offset the impact of the official Soviet media. The organization and administration of the Soviet media described above demonstrates that the Soviet leadership is able to exert abnormal influence and control over the ideas and information that shape the Soviet public's perception of the world. The relative conformity of Soviet society, and the success the Soviet leadership has demonstrated in preventing mass dissent, illustrate this point. The attention the

Soviet leadership gives to managing the flow of information within Soviet borders contributes significantly to the maintenance of the Soviet authoritarian political system. As will be demonstrated in the remainder of this thesis, the Soviet leadership applies the lessons it has learnt from domestic politics abroad as well.

ENDNOTES

[1] The Smolensk Archive is a collection of CPSU archives captured by the Germans in World War Two. After the war the archives were sent to the United States. The archives have been examined in part by Merle Fainsod. On the history and background of the archive see Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 3-15.

[2] Martin Dewhirst and Robert Farrell, eds., The Soviet Censorship (Metuchen: Scarecrow Press, 1973).

[3] Lilita Dzirkals, Thane Gustafson, and Ross A. Johnson, The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, R-2869, September 1982), pp. iii, 89.

[4] Ellen Mickiewicz, "Political Communication and the Soviet Media System," in Soviet Politics: Russia After Brezhnev, ed. Joseph L. Nogee (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), p. 35.

[5] Mark Hopkins, Mass Media in the Soviet Union (New York: Western Publishing Company, 1970), p. 20.

[6] "Conference in the CPSU Central Committee," (original in Russian: Pravda, 17 September 1987, p. 2) Current Digest of the Soviet Press 39, no. 37 (14 October 1987), p. 1.

[7] V. I. Lenin, "Party Organization and Party Literature," in On Literature and Art, V. I. Lenin (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1967), p. 21.

[8] See Jonathon Eyal, "Recent Developments in the Jamming of Western Radio Stations Broadcasting to the USSR and Eastern Europe," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, Supplement 8/87 (23 September 1987).

[9] Hopkins, Mass Media in the Soviet Union, p. 40.

[10] V.I. Lenin, "Party Organization and Party Literature," p. 26.

[11] "Skillfully Propagandize the New," (original in Russian: Pravda, 24 February 1987, p. 2) Current Digest of Soviet Press 39, no. 7 (18 March 1987), p. 8.

[12] Mickiewicz, "Political Communication and the Soviet Media System," pp. 35-38.

[13] Ibid., p. 35.

[14] Hopkins, Mass Media and the Soviet Union, p. 34.

[15] "Conviction is the Bulwark of Restructuring," (original in Russian: *Pravda*, 14 February 1987, pp. 1-2) *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 39, no. 7 (18 March 1987), p. 6.

[16] Dzirkals, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication*, p. 10.

[17] "On the Eve of the Poet's Centennial," (original in Russian: *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, 25 February 1987, p. 6) *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 39, no. 9 (1 April 1987), pp. 1-3, 13.

[18] Dzirkals, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication*, p. 10.

[19] Hopkins, *Mass Media and the Soviet Union*, p. 140.

[20] Dzirkals, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication*, p. 11.

[21] For details of the appointment or *nomenklatura* system see Bohdan Harasymiw, *Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union* (London: MacMillan Publishers, 1984).

[22] Dzirkals, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication*, p. 13.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ellen Mickiewicz, "The Functions of Communications Officials in the USSR: A Biographical Study," *Slavic Review* 43 (Winter 1984), pp. 644-46.

[26] Hopkins, *Mass Media and the Soviet Union*, p. 145.

[27] Dzirkals, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication*, p. 15.

[28] Ibid., p. 16.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid., pp. 23-25.

[32] Ibid., p. 19.

[33] Ibid., p. 31.

[34] Ibid., p. 32.

[35] Anthony Buzek, *How the Communist Press Works* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1964), p. 187. The acronym TASS stands for *Telegrafnoe Agenstvo Sovetskovo Soiuza* (Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union).

[36] James W. Markham, Voice of the Red Giants (Iowa: Iowa University Press, 1967), p. 126.

[37] Buzek, How the Communist Press Works, p. 186.

[38] Stanislav Levchenko, "Soviet Active Measures Directed Toward Western Media," Political Communication and Persuasion 4 (Fall 1987), p. 46.

[39] Dewhirst and Farrel, The Soviet Censorship, p. 68.

[40] Hedrick Smith, The Russians, rev. ed. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1984), pp. 474-75.

[41] Dewhirst and Farrel, The Soviet Censorship, pp. 68-69.

[42] Dzirkals, The Media and Intra-Elite Communication, p. 43.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ned Temko, "Soviet Insiders: How Power Flows in Moscow," Christian Science Monitor, 23 February 1982.

[45] Dzirkals, The Media and Intra-Elite Communication, pp. 46-47.

[46] Ibid., p. 47.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Buzek, How the Communist Press Works, pp. 212-13.

[49] Dewhirst and Farrel, The Soviet Censorship, p. 76.

[50] It should be mentioned that glasnost' does slightly obscure the distinction between acceptable and unnacceptable press material. Linda Feldman concludes that this makes the task of self-censorship more difficult than ever before for the Soviet journalist. See Linda Feldman, "Revelations Amid the Rhetoric: Glasnost' At One Soviet Paper," Christian Science Monitor, 15 September 1987, pp. 9-10.

[51] Hopkins, Mass Media in the Soviet Union, pp. 129-34. Article 70 of the Soviet Criminal Law Code holds the extremely ambiguous charge of "anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation" which is used by the Soviet leadership to silence various forms of dissent. For a discussion of Soviet law and dissent see Olympiad S. Ioffe, Soviet Law and Soviet Reality (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), pp. 48-93.

[52] "Conviction is the Bulwark of Restructuring," (original in Russian: Pravda, 14 February 1987, pp. 1-2) Current Digest of the Soviet Press 39, no.7 (18 March 1987), p. 6.

[53] Smith, The Russians, p. 494.

[54] "Conviction is the Bulwark of Restructuring," Current Digest of the Soviet Press 39, no. 7 (18 March 1987), p. 6.

[55] Smith, The Russians, p. 495.

[56] Buzek, How the Communist Press Works, p. 131.

[57] Dzirkals, The Media and Intra-Elite Communication, p. 39.

[58] Ibid., pp. 37-38.

[59] Hopkins, Mass Media and the Soviet Union, p. 123.

[60] Dewhirst and Farrel, The Soviet Censorship, p. 55.

[61]. See George Schopflin, ed., Censorship and Political Communication in Eastern Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 32-99.

[62] Sidney Monas, "Censorship, Film, and Soviet Society: Some Reflections of a Russia-Watcher," Studies in Comparative Communism 17 (Fall/Winter 1984/85), p. 172.

[63] Recent analysis of Soviet television indicates that although television took up glasnost' later than the print media, it has been utilized to endorse Gorbachev's policy more effectively than the print media. See Viktor Yasmann, "Glasnost' and Soviet Television in 1987," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (31/88, 28 January 1988), pp. 1-5.

[64] Ellen Mickiewicz, "The Functions of Communications Officials," p. 641.

[65] Dzirkals, The Media and Intra-Elite Communication, p. 37.

[66] Ibid., p. 36.

[67] Ellen Mickiewicz, Media and the Russian Public (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), pp. 76, 90.

[68] Markham, Voices of the Red Giants, p. 116.

[69] Monas, "Censorship, Film, and Soviet Society," p. 170.

[70] Mickiewicz, Media and the Russian Public, pp. 73-102.

[71] Cited by Dewhirst and Farrel, The Soviet Censorship, p. 2.

[72] Hopkins, Mass Media and the Soviet Union, p. 148.

[73] Gayle Durham Hannah, Soviet Information Networks (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1977), pp. 41-55. Ginsburg makes this point also. See Aleksandr Ginsburg, "Vnachale byl 'Golos'....," Russkaia Mysl', 19 February 1988, pp. 1-2.

[74] Donald R. Shanor, Behind the Lines: The Private War Against Soviet Censorship (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), pp. 148-72.

CHAPTER III

ACTIVE MEASURES: A FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENT

The Soviet leadership appreciates the importance of information with respect to its contribution to the preservation of Soviet authoritarian rule and Soviet power in general. The leadership has learned the value of information from its experience in domestic politics, in particular, from the Soviet Union's highly centralized domestic communication system.

The lessons the Soviet leadership has learned from domestic politics are applied abroad as well. The leadership goes to great lengths to exert influence on foreign communication systems and foreign opinion. The purpose of these efforts is to create favourable conditions for the attainment of Soviet foreign policy.

Though the Soviets have many ways to influence foreign communications systems, none are more effective than active measures: overt and covert techniques for influencing foreign public opinion and the decision-making elite. Essentially, active measures are techniques designed to plant disinformation, ideas, and arguments favourable to the Soviet Union in foreign societies, but which do not seem to emanate from the Soviet Union.

At the outset, it should be emphasized that active measures are indeed a current reality. They are not merely a flight of fantasy, nor are they the fabrication of proponents of the western military industrial complex and "cold warriors" in general. It is one of the purposes of this study to examine the evidence of recent years that attests to the fact that the Soviet Union implements active measures as a matter of policy, i.e., active measures function as important instruments of Soviet foreign policy.

In the discussion that follows, a brief sketch of Soviet foreign policy will be provided in order to place active measures in the proper context. Following this, the fundamental principles of active measures will be introduced so as to facilitate a discussion of active measures techniques in chapter 4.

Soviet Foreign Policy

In the West, scholars, diplomats, and senior government officials currently hold a wide spectrum of opinions on the nature of Soviet foreign policy.[1] The views within this spectrum demonstrate both agreement and disagreement, and of course, there are views that defy easy classification along the spectrum. The discussion which follows is an attempt to summarize the main views within the range of opinion on Soviet foreign policy. It should become evident that the "real" nature of Soviet foreign policy remains as much a riddle as ever.[2] Any conclusions that are made about Soviet foreign policy are based on conjecture and interpretation, but this need not be of negative consequence. Conjecture can give direction to research, and interpretation can give bite to its findings.

One view of Soviet foreign policy maintains that the Soviet Union is essentially a conspiracy designed as a state. In this view all Soviet foreign policy is assumed to be subordinate to the tenets of Marxist-Leninist ideology.[3] In particular, proponents of the "conspiracy" approach claim that the Soviet leadership accepts the notion that all political activity involves conflict between the forces of capitalism and socialism. The envisioned result of this historical dialectic is, of course, the global victory of socialism.

Lenin did not share Marx's optimism that socialism could be achieved by naturally occurring historical processes. As a result, Lenin asserted that global socialism could only be attained by conscious pursuit:[4]

> We are living not merely in a state but in a system of states and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end, and before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable. That means that if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to hold sway it must prove its capacity to do so by its military organization.

For the adherent to the "conspiracy" approach, the significance of Lenin's statements above is that Lenin was openly advocating an aggressive foreign policy for the purpose of defending socialism at home and facilitating its growth abroad. Supposed anomolies or contradictions such as "peaceful coexistence" and "detente" are merely tactics designed to lull the capitalist world into virtual submission while the socialist forces prepare to serve capitalism a final and fatal blow.

It should be mentioned that the "conspiracy" approach does leave room to consider other factors that might influence Soviet foreign policy. Historical tradition (e.g., the Soviet Union is the inheritor of an expansionist and imperialist tsarist tradition), political culture, domestic and foreign economics, and prevailing international relations are by no means discounted from having some effect on Soviet foreign policy.[5] However, ideology still remains the primary explanation for Soviet foreign behavior. Thus, in the "conspiracy" approach, the Soviet Union is perceived as being a scheming, messianic state whose malign expansionism is ultimately the result of a grand design for global domination.

It can be stated almost without a doubt that the majority of western schlolarly opinions about Soviet foreign policy stand somewhat removed from the rather pessimistic "conspiracy" approach. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent success (however limited) of strategic arms talks have prompted slightly more moderate views. While not discounting the importance of Marxist-Leninist ideology, moderate interpretations of Soviet foreign policy shed slightly different light on the role of ideology in the policy-making process, in addition to placing considerably more emphasis on other domestic and external factors. The trend characteristic of this body of opinion is to realize the complex nature of the Soviet foreign policy-making process and avoid making broad generalizations which emphasize certain factors or neglect others.

One of the more convincing views within the moderate body of opinion on Soviet foreign policy is that which continues to realize the importance of ideology, but rejects any notion of a global design. Instead, ideology is seen as an "operational code": a prism that influences the actor's perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political events, his definitions and estimates of particular situations.[6] Marxism-Leninism is replete with advice on basic questions of foreign politics such as: What is the nature of politics? Are political relations essentially harmonious or conflicting? What are the prospects for achieving success in political relations?[7] In providing answers to these questions, ideology functions as a cognitive map for the decision-maker. It enables the decision-maker to assess vast amounts of information and make foreign policy decisions in the interests of the society he represents, and with which he identifies himself.[8] All domestic and foreign events, then, become influential in the policy-making process--but only after having been analyzed through the framework of the operational code.

Though there are many scholars in the West who more or less adhere to the idea that Soviet ideology functions as an operational code, there remains disagreement over the manner in which the operational code functions and the extent to which it is truly functional. For example, some scholars feel that the relationship between ideology and foreign policy is cyclical, that parts of the ideological doctrine[9]

> are continually modified to suit the needs of policy, but at the same time values and attitudes implicit in the theory [colour] the perception of Soviet policy-makers, influencing the kinds of policies they will pursue.

Others, however, believe that the relationship between ideology and policy is more linear. For example, Samuel Sharp proposes that once the ultimate goals of Soviet ideology are "circumscribed in time and scope" by considerations of what policies are in practice operative, the use of ideology simply diminishes accordingly.[10] Yet another opinion holds that ideology only functions as post facto legitimation of Soviet foreign behavior.

The debate over the practical utility of Soviet ideology has prompted other explanations for Soviet foreign policy, still within the moderate body of Western opinion. For example, there are those who qemphasize political culture as a determinant.[11] In this view, Soviet-Western antagonism is the result of misunderstanding between two diametrically opposed cultures, and it is this misunderstanding that forces the Soviet Union to pursue a characteristically aggressive foreign policy. While Soviets are presumably communal, desire authoritarian rule, are suspicious of foreign influence, and honour social stability, Westerners are presumably individualistic, pluralist, amiable to foreign influence, and honour upward social mobility.

While there may be some validity to these arguments, the weakness of using political culture as an explanation for Soviet foreign policy is twofold. First, it relies on the dubious practise of stereotyping and therefore, it demonstrates weakness in its inability to account for deviance. Second, it would be erroneous to assume Soviet-Western antagonism is only the result of cultural misunderstanding.

Another determinant suggested is historical tradition. Since the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet Union has struggled to become an accepted member of the international community. In World War One the USSR was scorned by the West for pulling out of the war. During the Soviet Civil War (1917-21), France, Britain, the United States, Canada, and Japan intervened to help the counter-revolutionary forces attempt to bring down the Bolshevik government. During World War Two the Allies kept delaying the creation of the second front much to the chagrin of the Soviet Union. Finally, in the post-war years the United States and NATO seemingly forced the Soviet Union into a costly and immoral arms race.[12] Historical tradition, then, leads one to believe that current Soviet foreign behavior is the result of historical occurrences which have unalterably conditioned Soviet attitudes to the outside world. The weakness in this theory, of course, is that attitudes are by no means unalterable. Evidence for this is provided by the fact that although the US and Japan were mortal enemies in World War Two, now they are close political and economic allies.[13]

Moving even further away from both the "conspiracy" approach and the various moderate approaches (of which only a few were mentioned above) is the body of opinion which believes Soviet foreign policy is above all, determined by national interest.[14] In its foreign policy the Soviet Union is not seen as a state subordinated to an ideology which envisions global domination, but rather, the Soviet Union is seen as[15]

> ... a typical great power whose behaviour in international politics can best be explained by the mixture of fear, greed, and stupidity that has characterized most great powers in the past as they have tried to secure their borders and pursue their interests in a world without law.

From this perspective, the world is essentially anarchic, and states, being the formal and most meaningful components, are the primary actors. States continually compete against one another for resources, territory, perceived security needs, and power. If and when peace prevails it is either superimposed by the preeminent powers, or it is necessitated by the threat of mutual destruction.[16] Proponents of macroanalytical interpretations maintain that Soviet foreign policy is formulated primarily on the basis of prevailing international conditions and particular relations between states.

Needless to say, the macroanalytical approach is not without faults. One problem is "its tendency to focus on the state as the central force in the international arena."[17] Obviously, there are many factors which transcend national boundaries (e.g., ecology, religion, ideology) that affect the policy-making process. Another problem is that macroanalysis does not sufficiently account for the influence of domestic factors.

To summarize the major Western images of Soviet foreign policy that appear above, it is sufficient to say that most of the interpretations leave one with a certain sense of dissatisfaction. As a result of this dissatisfaction one is prompted to seek views of Soviet foreign policy with greater explanatory power, that is, views which conclude that Soviet foreign policy is the result of both domestic and external factors, and that the exclusion of any partitular factor may be misleading. In addition, more explanatory views of Soviet foreign policy also focus on the Soviet Union's actual behavior and the external consequences of its policies, and not solely on the possible motivations and decisional inputs that produced the behavior.[18]

To begin, it is reasonable to believe that[19]

> ... foreign policy is a function of domestic politics--of the outlook and stability of the ruling elite, the dilemmas arising from economic, social, and ethnic problems, the contradictions between the political pressures for repression and the economic requirements for relaxation, and so forth.

In the Soviet Union's case, the most important domestic determinant is of course ideology, which conditions the Soviet leadership's outlook on the world. Mikhail Gorbachev's biographers inform us that Gorbachev was raised in a firm ideological enviroment, in particular, he matured within the confines of the Komsomol and the CPSU apparatus.[20] It is logical to assume, then, that ideology has significantly shaped

Gorbachev's perception of the world, thereby exerting influence on his decision-making capabilities. To close our eyes to the ideological source from which Gorbachev's policies stem would be a serious mistake.

Gorbachev does not conceal his adheherence to the principles of Marxism-Leninism as he writes: "Those in the West who expect us to give up socialism will be disappointed."[21] Gorbachev, and the rest of the Soviet leadership, do not take an intermediate position on the historical dialectic. At least in attitude, if not in actuality, the Soviet leadership formulates foreign policy with one ultimate goal in mind: "The victory of the socialist revolution in Russia and the subsequent formation of a world socialist system."[22]

It should be emphasized that although Soviet foreign policy is closely related to ideology, it is not a simple cause and effect relationship. Soviet foreign policy is undoubtedly affected by inputs such as: the external environment, perceived threats posed by enemies, political, military, and economic opportunity, domestic politics, and the interests and idiosyncracies of those in power. Therefore, Soviet foreign policy is inherently realpolitik, a characteristic now, more than ever, necessitated by a faltering Soviet economy and the arms race. Opportunities to expand the sphere of Soviet influence are exploited only when the potential gains are perceived to outweigh the losses.[23] This caution is manifest in Soviet expansion into Afghanistan as well as in Soviet tactical policies such as peaceful coexistence.

Finally, an attempt to find an instructive image of Soviet foreign policy must consider the record of actual Soviet behavior. It is extremely difficult to contend that the Soviet Union is conservative in its foreign policy, and that it seeks to defend socialism against capitalist encirclement. Even in light of Gorbachev's contention that the main goals of Soviet foreign policy are "peace" and "international security," such arguments are weak because "peace" as defined by the Soviets most often means the attainment of a world socialist system, and "international security" is the condition the Soviets prefer to achieve such an end.

Ultimately, Soviet behavior has demonstrated resolute aggression and expansionism, even during periods of relative relaxation of international tensions. Since World War Two the Soviet Union has dramatically increased its sphere of influence to include Hungary, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua to name but a few countries. This expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence has been achieved by political, economic, and military means, and it has been justified as a naturally occurring shift in the world correlation of forces, that is, as another victory for socialism in its historical struggle against capitalism.[24] There is little reason to believe that the future of Soviet foreign policy will be any different, unless the Soviet leadership abandons its belief in the historical dialectic which it feels compelled to accelerate.

Judging from the record of Soviet behavior in recent years, and assuming that Marxism-Leninism continues to be of significant utility to the Soviet leadership, it is reasonable to subscribe to Shultz and Godsons' views of what constitute the current broad objectives of

Soviet foreign policy:[25]

(1) Preserve, enhance, and expand security in those areas under the influence of the USSR.

(2) Divide the Western opponents of the Soviet Union by driving wedges between them and disrupting alliance systems.

(3) Retain the primacy of the USSR in the Communist world.

(4) Promote "proletarian internationalism" and those "national liberation movements" which are under communist control or serve Soviet interest.

(5) Minimize risks and avoid serious involvements on more than one front at any given time.

The current foreign policy objectives as outlined by Shultz and Godson indicate that Soviet foreign policy is active, it aims at tipping the balance of forces in favour of Soviet power. In direct relation to the focus of this study, it follows that active measures are employed abroad to support this active foreign policy. On several occasions, Soviet spokesmen have asserted that influence on foreign opinion remains a major element of Soviet foreign policy, if not one of the most important.[26]

Targets

The targets of Soviet active measures can be classified into basic geographical areas. In descending order of importance, the targets of active measures are: the United States (and Canada), Western Europe, the Far East, and the Third World.

The United States

The main target of Soviet active measures is the United States, because it is also the main Soviet foreign policy concern.[27]

Accordingly, it is alleged that Soviet intelligence services refer to the United States as the glavnyi protivnik (main adversary) or, more vehemently as the glavnyi vrag (main enemy).[28]

Mikhail Gorbachev declares that the main Soviet objective with respect to the United States is the "normalization" of Soviet-American relations. The first steps to the realization of this goal are nuclear disarmament, followed by increased technological and trade agreements.[29] It is no surprise, then, that many active measures campaigns aimed at the United States deal with disarmament, and therefore, are intrinsically combined with the international peace movement (but this is not to say that the peace movement is a Soviet conspiracy). In addition to lobbying for issues related to the peace movement, active measures aimed at the United States are designed to: (1) isolate the US from its friends and allies (especially those in NATO), (2) demonstrate that American policies are incompatible with the needs of the Third World, (3) demonstrate the US is an aggressive and militaristic state that exports counter-revolution, and (4) discredit American and NATO intelligence services.[30]

Western Europe

The Soviet Union has two main foreign policy objectives in Western Europe which dominate as themes for active measures directed at Western Europe. First, the Soviet Union hopes to exacerbate existing friction between Europe's NATO members--with the maximum goals of dissolving NATO and decreasing US influence in Western Europe. The peace movement and disarmament figure prominently in efforts to achieve these goals.

Second, the Soviet Union takes appropriate measures to lobby for a growth of mutually advantageous economic and political cooperation between the Soviet Union and Western Europe.

The Far East

According to Stanislav Levchenko, who worked in the areas of political intelligence and active measures in the Tokyo KGB residency from 1975 to 1979, there are four main Soviet objectives in the Far East.[31] First, the Soviets hope to prevent further development of US-Japanese cooperation by provoking discord over economic, political, and military issues. The second objective is to hinder good relations between Japan and the People's Republic of China. The third objective has become of increasing strategic importance in recent years: the Soviets concentrate on preventing the creation of a Washington-Peking-Tokyo triangle of cooperation which would pose a major obstacle to Soviet pursuits in Asia and the Far East. Finally, the Soviets act to create a pro-Soviet lobby in Japan that would lean toward closer economic and political ties with the Soviet Union.

The Third World

The Soviet Union's basic political objectives in the Third World have remained more or less consistent since the 1950's. The Soviets endeavor to erode American influence in the Third World and replace it with their own. The Soviet Union reacts quickly and decidedly to influence Third World struggles and "national liberation movements" in order to shift their emphasis to more "progressive" matters, i.e., socialist revolution. Posing as benign liberators, the Soviets seek to bring Third World countries into the Soviet sphere of influence by persuading them that Soviet communism offers the only viable solution to their social, economic, and political problems.[32]

Soviet Active Measures: Fundamentals

Diplomatic, economic, and military techniques constitute the traditional means of achieving foreign policy objectives. The Soviets, however, employ another method which has come to be known as "active measures" (*aktivnye meropriatiia*). Active measures are covert and consist of such things as oral and written disinformation, manipulation of foreign media, agent of influence operations, international front organizations, Soviet friendship and cultural societies, and clandestine radio broadcasting, constitute a calculated attempt to influence information, i.e., ideas, in foreign societies in order to favour the Soviet Union. As John McMahon explains:[33]

> Active measures are in essence an offensive instrument of Soviet foreign policy. They contribute effectively to the strategic Soviet purpose, central to that foreign policy, of expanding Moscow's influence and power throughout the world. In tactical application, active measures are designed specifically to influence the policies of foreign governments in favour of the Soviet Union, and thwart opposition to Soviet policies by such means as disrupting relations between other states arrayed against the Soviet Union; and values of such states; and discrediting and vilifying opponents of the USSR.

In light of the forward nature of Soviet foreign policy discussed in the early part of this chapter, active measures function in three main ways as foreign policy tools. First, active measures secretly lobby for issues that are in the Soviet Union's best interest. Second, active measures serve to confuse world opinion about Soviet global ambitions by placing distorted, biased, and patently false information in the hands of both the general public and the decision-makers. By creating a state of confusion, the Soviets hope to undermine the political resolve of nations (capitalist and communist) to protect their interests against Soviet encroachments.[34] Finally, because Soviet foreign behavior rarely, if ever, reflects Soviet pronouncements about peace, international security, and harmony among all nations, active measures help in the general attempt to justify Soviet foreign and domestic behavior.

The Environment

Active measures are conducted under the assumption that there are social, economic, and political conditions within any country that create a receptive environment for active measures. The institutions responsible for Soviet active measures are keen to exploit these inherent weaknesses to the Soviet Union's advantage.

The Third World

In the Third World, underdevelopment provides fertile ground for active measures. As Elizabeth Pond explains, the Third World is ill-equipped to defend itself against the distortions of reality, advanced by Soviet propaganda and disinformation:[35]

> ... the institutions that industrial democracies depend on to protect themselves against disinformation--including strong opposition parties, a vigorous pluralist press, and an educated, literate population-- are generally weak in the third world.

Thus, the Soviet Union is able to exploit many of the fears and concerns of individuals in the Third World who have a relatively poor understanding about the world around them. In particular, the Soviets exploit Third World hostility toward capitalist "imperialism." Though the Soviet Union is equally guilty of intervening in Third World conflicts, it claims the United States is the root of all evil in the Third World.[36] In doing so, the Soviet Union poses as a benign liberator which is more than willing to replace American influence in the Third World with its own.

The Free World

Where underdevelopment in the Third World proves to be a receptive environment for active measures, the sophistication of free world countries--high literacy rates, a pluralist press, and opposition parties--places harsh demands upon the organs responsible for active measures. Nevertheless, the Soviets still find a suitable environment for active measures in the free world, albeit in a different form than that of the Third World.

Active measures targeted at the industrialized free world are designed with the knowledge that the very pillar of democracy--free speech--provides an open forum for Soviet views. When Soviet views appear in the media of democratic countries by covert means, they are still assumed to have emanated from within the democratic body politic itself.[37] This is because most people in democratic societies ideally expect the rigorous competition of ideas in their domestic media, no matter how contrary to the principles of democracy some views may be. Thus, press material heavily influenced by Soviet disinformation frequently appears in the media of capitalist societies and goes unnoticed because it is disguised as opinion.

The success of active measures depends to a large degree on the Soviet Union's ability to exploit the open forum for Soviet views that is offered by free speech in capitalist societies. James Tyson comments on the importance of this exploitation:[38]

> The distinguishing feature of democracies is that they believe themselves to be ruled by their own public opinion....But when a nation succeeds in clandestinely introducing ideas into a democracy's public discourse, then it succeeds in gaining for itself an important share in that democracy's own government. When the Soviet Union succeeds in planting clandestine propaganda in any democratic country, it in effect diminishes the importance of that country's genuinely domestic opinion. This is the very definition of subversion. And this is what the Soviet Union is well practised at doing.

The importance of exploiting free speech is emphasized further by the fact that it is extremely difficult for the average individual in capitalist society to distinguish between disinformation and genuine opinion.[39] Ultimately the only means the average individual has to make this distinction is is an adequate understanding of Soviet disinformation and propaganda stratagems. Unfortunately, however, there are very few people who are so well-equipped.

To elaborate on the last point mentioned above, the Soviet Union uses the atmosphere of ignorance, naivety, and anxiety prevalent in capitalist societies to its own advantage. Few people in the industrialized West truly have an adequate understanding about the workings of their own government, let alone any other. Similarly, the general public has difficulty grappling with issues concerning macro-economics, military doctrine, and international politics. Such issues are only understood in simple terms, that is, events are usually reduced to simple cause and effect relationships and multiple reasons for events are generally ignored. In an effort to capitalize on this atmosphere, the Soviets disseminate disinformation that also simplifies events and ignores multiple reasons for their occurrence. As a result, the Soviets achieve astonishing success in active measures campaigns targeted at capitalist societies. As Gerstenmaier comments:[40]

> The existence of unscrupulous Soviet propaganda is not in itself astonishing; much more astonishing is the ease with which large sections of the Western public--usually influenced by the media--accept such propaganda at face value. They do not see (or do not want to see) the discrepancy between Soviet words and Soviet deeds.

Another free world environmental condition that the Soviets rightfully see as an attribute, and which they exploit to the fullest extent, is the anxiety about the threat of nuclear destruction. The Soviets go to great pains to influence the international peace movement, which consists of individuals genuinely and greatly concerned about the prospect of nuclear war, and deep in anxiety over death in a nuclear holocaust. This fear is highly exploitable. The main thrust of all Soviet disinformation about nuclear armaments is that the United States alone is responsible for the arms race, the threat of nuclear war, and the difficulties relative to the disarmament process. That this is the Soviet government's official stand is revealed openly in the official Soviet press: "Whether nuclear weapons are to be or not to be depends primarily on the United States of America: The answer is up to it."[41] Again, it can be seen how Soviet propaganda and disinformation experts simplify situations to their own advantage.

According to Sheila Gerstenmaier, another factor which makes capitalist society a receptive environment for Soviet active measures is that people generally dislike receiving negative stimuli on a consistent basis from the media.[42] In general, one can say that the Soviet Union is portrayed negatively by the Western media. Thus, when positive depictions of the Soviet Union appear in the press, for example, when the Soviet Union makes a disarmament proposal, or when it claims it is making great progress in democratization, people are more than willing to accept the depictions in good faith. That is, people are willing to ignore the discrepancy between Soviet words and deeds. Gerstenmaier, writing from Germany, concludes:[43]

> It is a distressing fact that people do not want to hear about tragic and terrible things, especially over a long period of time. It is remarkable that they are even less keen to listen if these tragedies concern the USSR and the "socialist" countries--countries that for the most part lie in Europe, at our own back door.

Though examples of specific active measures campaigns will be given in the next chapter, it is instructive to provide one example here, in order to emphasize how the Soviets attempt to exploit a relatively receptive environment for active measures in the capitalist West. The United States Peace Council is alleged to be a Soviet front organization that is affiliated with the World Peace Council.[44] In November, 1979, the United States Peace Council issued "An Urgent Appeal" to the United States government and the American public.[45] The urgent appeal in the document called for the United States to make a unilateral concession to the Soviet Union by stopping the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. The appeal placed all responsibility for the imminent threat of nuclear war and the demise of detente on the United States:[46]

> The process of detente is confronted by its gravest crisis. Pentagon politics imperil world peace....The action of the Carter Administration in organizing deployment by NATO of a new system of strategic missiles (Pershing II's and Cruise missiles) in Western Europe, with nuclear warheads targeted for the Soviet Union and with a first-strike capacity, is the most dire threat to the peoples of the world.

No mention of Soviet strategic missiles aimed at Western Europe and the United States was made in the appeal, nor was there any mention of why Pershing II and cruise missiles were being deployed in Western Europe at the request of NATO nations.[47] Evidently, the United States Peace Council was advocating that while American missiles were potentially destructive, Soviet missiles were somehow not. Thus only the United States could be held responsible for threatening world peace and detente. How ironic that the United States Peace Council issued its "Urgent Appeal" in November, 1979, just one month before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.

Explicit in the example of the "Urgent Appeal" is that the Soviets took full advantage of the environment of the free world. First, the Soviets issued their appeal in the open forum provided by free speech. This is important, because the open forum provided the Soviet Union with an additional channel (i.e., in addition to regular diplomatic channels and the official Soviet press) by which it could lobby against the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles. Second, the Soviets were able to issue the appeal through the United States Peace Council which, although being a Soviet front organization, still consisted of many individuals genuinely concerned about the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet Union effectively exploited the anxieties these people had about nuclear destruction. Third, the very fact that the Soviets convinced individuals in the United States Peace Council to disseminate the over-simplified and crude document (in that it blamed only the United States for the destruction of peace and detente) demonstrates how the Soviets exploited Western ignorance and naivety about the complex issues of armaments. One might add, in hindsight, that the simplicity of the above interpretation of arms control was also revealed in the recent INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) negotiations, in particular, the discussion over the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (see chapter 5).

Agents

Though the Soviets make the best use possible of the environment described thus far, the implementation of active measures is also dependent on the ability to induce individuals in the target nation to act as agents, or purveyors of disinformation.[48] Undoubtedly, some of the best agents are those individuals who have been recruited without their knowledge. While serving Soviet interests, unwitting agents genuinely believe they act entirely out of their own convictions.

Individuals become unwitting agents of Soviet disinformation for a variety of reasons. First, unwitting agents are the unfortunate victims of Soviet disinformation themselves. Ignorance of the information they receive from a presumably trustworthy source, naivety about Soviet foreign policy objectives and behavior, and blind devotion to the principle of egalitarianism are good conditions for causing an individual to serve Soviet interests. Second, unwitting agents of disinformation may simply be individuals with a negative attitude toward a given country (usually their own), institution, or individual. When opportunities arise to discredit the target of discontent, these agents sieze the opportunity--neatly provided by the Soviet Union--thinking that their actions serve only their own interests.

Hollander notes that unwitting agents are frequently recruited from amongst individuals who visit Soviet bloc countries (or client states) and participate in various "guided" tours.[49] The aim of these tours is to show foreigners positive examples of socialism and convince them of the great progress being made by socialist societies. The hope, of course, is that upon the foreigner's return to his country of origin he will advance views favourable to the Soviet bloc (or client states). Hollander cites the remarks of a recent traveller to Nicaragua:[50]

> The prison we visited was the first of seven prison farms. Former national guardsmen willing to cooperate are moved through a series of more and more relaxed prison settings. The prison we saw had 38 inmates, no armed guards, conjugal visits....The [prisoner] speaking had high praise for the government and said if freed he would go to fight for the FSLN in the north. Money from crops is put back into improvements for the prison....as part of the routine the men attend classes in literature and agriculture. Many who previously had no skill but shooting a gun now have plans to become farmers.

Unwitting agents of disinformation may also be individuals with a negative attitude toward a given country (usually their own), institution, or individual. When opportunities arise to discredit the target of discontent, these agents sieze the opportunity--neatly provided by the Soviet Union--thinking that their actions serve only

their own interests. There is a large reservoir of opinion in western countries that is alienated from and hostile to western governments. The Soviet Union considers this body of opinion one of three socio-political forces in the world that can actively attempt to tip the balance of power in favour of the Soviet Union (the other two forces being socialist countries, and the developing countries and "national liberation movements" of the Third World).[51] Accordingly, the Soviet Union makes every attempt to mobilize this force.

Finally, unwitting agents might be individuals who find it is more fulfilling to be positive about the Soviet Union and its activities than it is to be negative. Such individuals inevitably find themselves closing their eyes to the reality of Soviet authoritarian rule as they try and equate the Soviet political system with democratic-pluralist systems of the West.[52]

In addition to unwitting agents of Soviet disinformation there are, of course, individuals who are fully aware that they are the vehicles of Soviet disinformation. An individual can assume the role of a witting agent of disinformation by choice, or he can be persuaded or coerced into cooperation. Tyson notes that there are six major recruitment appeals: idealism, ambition, money, sex, alcohol, and blackmail.[53] These appeals will be elaborated upon in chapter 4 in the context of active measures techniques.

At this point in the discussion, it is sufficient to note that the Soviet Union attaches great importance to the recruitment of individuals who, out of political orientation or personal idiosyncracies, are easily encouraged to disseminate Soviet disinformation.

Though it is impossible to assess the actual number of witting agents in the free world, it is fair to assert that the Soviets have ample supply of willing purveyors of disinformation.

This assertion is corroborated by Stanislav Levchenko, the most recent Soviet defector with a first-hand knowledge of Soviet active measures and the control of agents.[54] Stanislav Levchenko worked as a case officer in the Tokyo residency of the KGB from 1975 to 1978. In early 1979, he became chief of the Tokyo residency's section responsible for active measures. Levchenko claims that prior to his October, 1979, defection to the United States, the KGB had a network of over 100 agents in Japan that were utilized for the purposes of active measures, and political and technological espionage. Levchenko periodically received orders from Moscow detailing specific operations, and he was also provided with a list of agents and exploitable contacts that allowed him to determine who could best discharge individual operations.[55] What follow are a few excerpts of the list of agents and exploitable contacts Levchenko was provided with:[56]

> Hoover (true name: Hirohide Ishida)--former Minister of Labor, Liberal Democratic member of parliament; chairman of the Japanese-Soviet Parliamentary Freindship Association, the leadership of which is KGB-controlled; sponsors bulletin subsidized by KGB.
>
> Kant (Takuji Yamane)--assistant managing editor of Sankei, conservative newspaper with circulation of 2.2 million; intimate and adviser to conservative publisher; can manipulate views of publisher, plant disinformation in papers and governmental circles.
>
> Atos (Tamotsu Sato)--General Secretary of Society of Marxism, the core of the [Japanese Socialist Party]; another channel of influencing JSP leadership.

Fen-Foking--a Liberal Democratic Party member who can exert influence on leadership of one faction; potential for insinuating disinformation in Liberal Democratic Party.

Kamus--jounalist employed by Tokyo Shimbun; specialist on Korean affairs; can place articles.

Mukhin (Kaneji Miura)--executive of popular television channel Asahi Terebi; not an agent but a "friendly contact" who can help slant programs and influence other television personalities.

Sandomir (Koji Sugimori)--secretary general of the Japanese society for External Cultural Promotion; cooperates with International Department and unwittingly with KGB.

Judging from Levchenko's experiences in Japan one can justifiably imagine that the total sum of Soviet agents and exploitable contacts that operate in the free world must be staggering. There is ample evidence provided by Soviet defectors and Western intelligence that verifies there are many in the free world who function as Soviet agents of influence. As the famous Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov has said:[57]

> People in the West have been bought by Soviet agencies in the most direct sense of the word...These include political figures, businessman, and a great many writers and journalists, government advisors, and heads of the press and television.

Cumulative Effect

Regardless of the success of an individual disinformation campaign or any other specific active measures operation, Soviet active measures are conducted under the assumption that "a single covert action, however precisely designed and skillfully executed, cannot tip the balance of power between the Western Alliance and the Communist bloc."[58] Soviet active measures:[59]

> achieve their objectives through the cumulative effect of many separate episodes covering several years and, though there may be a sudden climax which appears to be spectacular, it is the planned result of a long campaign waged with ruthlessness, patience and ingenuity to make the terminal event possible.

Active measures operations vary in duration. First, there are long-term campaigns which entail major objectives, but do not specify the means of achieving them at the outset.[60] An example of a long-term active measures campaign is the on-going attempt to isolate the United States from its allies in the West, the Far East, and the Third World. Another example is the international peace campaign, that is, the Soviet effort to exert influence on it. Second, there are short and medium-term campaigns, which have specific objectives within the framework of long-term active measures objectives. An example of a medium-term campaign is the anti-neutron bomb campaign of the late 1970's. In this instance, the Soviet Union's specific objective was to prevent the United States from deploying an enhanced radiation weapon, colloquially known as the "neutron bomb".[61] Finally, there are short-term active measures operations. These are the individual operations implemented to achieve medium and long-term active measures. The surfacing of a forgery , the dissemination of a specific rumour, and the appearance of Soviet-inspired articles in the foreign media are all examples of short-term active measures operations.

Active measures campaigns rarely consist of only one technique. Campaigns are "invariably complex and organized so that they can be applied at different points using several techniques designed to combine with maximum impact at the most suitable time."[62] It is entirely conceivable that for most campaigns, the Soviet Union will try to use simultaneously as many techniques as possible in order to ensure the campaign's ultimate success. This practise is known as kombinatsiia (combination) in the Soviet active measures lexicon.[63]

Another feature of Soviet active measures is the recycling, or replay of active measures techniques. Though individual operations may fail to achieve the desired result on the first try, this does not deter the Soviets from attempting the operation again.[64] Many forgeries, rumours, and clandestinely placed press items strain credulity at first, but replay often succeeds in making the distortions more acceptable.

One such instance of the replay technique occurred with the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II by Mehmet Ali Agca in May, 1981.[65] Immediately after the assassination attempt, Soviet forgeries and disinformation reached the West through various means and infiltrated the Western press. Soviet disinformation maintained that the CIA was behind the assassination attempt.

The details surrounding the Agca case were more complex than imagined at first, and therefore, the case was conducive to Soviet disinformation. During the nineteen month investigation into the case, the Soviets consistently maintained that the CIA was behind the plot to kill the Pope. Though few people in the West were inclined to believe the disinformation, it nonetheless succeeded in convincing some people that Moscow's hands were clean--despite the fact that when Agca was first arrested he told reporters that he had been trained for terrorist activity in Bulgaria and Syria by Bulgarian intelligence and Soviet KGB.

By the time the Italian State Prosecutor, Dr. Antonio Albano, decided "that the plot originated with and had been paid for by the Bulgarian secret services" (thus implicating the Soviet KGB), the world's attention had long since shifted to other matters.[66] Though it is difficult to say why Western governments were reluctant to pursue the issue, Soviet disinformation undoubtedly provides a partial explanation. As a result of the consistent replay of disinformation the Soviet Union not only succeeded in shielding itself from criticism for its alleged role in the assassination attempt, it also succeeded in slandering the CIA, thus, contributing to the larger effort to discredit the United States before all its allies. In this case, replay significantly increased the effectiveness of active measures.

Conclusions

The preceding discussion has attempted to introduce and outline the fundamental principles of Soviet active measures, and clarify their role as instruments of Soviet foreign policy. It was argued that by lobbying for issues, seeking to confuse world opinion about the nature of Soviet foreign policy, and in attempting to justify Soviet foreign behavior, active measures contribute significantly in efforts to achieve Soviet foreign policy. It was also suggested that active measures are targeted at generally receptive environments, and this partially explains their success. What can be concluded from the preceding discussion is that active measures, in their inherently subversive nature, are craftily designed and skillfully implemented in order to create the most favourable conditions possible for the attainment of Soviet foreign policy goals.

The next chapter will examine the apparatus and techniques of Soviet active measures, and will provide examples of the way active measures have helped achieve certain goals of Soviet foreign policy. The discussion will further illustrate the importance the Soviet leadership attaches to influencing ideas abroad by means of active measures.

ENDNOTES

[1] There are several works on Soviet Foreign policy which present a variety of different views. For example, see Eric P. Hoffmann and Fredric J. Fleron, ed. The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1972); Curtis Keeble, ed. The Soviet State: Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Gomer Publishing Company, 1985); and Eric P. Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird, ed. Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1986).

[2] Alvin Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global (Cambridge: Winthrop Publisher, 1981), p. 282.

[3] On Marxist-Leninist ideology see V.I. Lenin, "What is To Be Done?" in V. I. Lenin. Collected Works, vol. 5 (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1961), pp. 347-530; R. N. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of Communism (New York: MacMillan Co., 1957); Gustav Wetter, Sowjetideologie Heute (Soviet Ideology Today), trans. Peter Heath (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966); A. A. Gromyko and B. Ponomarev, Soviet Foreign Policy (Moscow: Progress Publishing,1981); R. Judson Mitchell, Ideology of a Superpower: Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on International Relations (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982); and The Program Of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Approved March 1, 1986 (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986).

[4] Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), p. 22.

[5] For example, see Richard Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy," Commentary 69 (April 1980), pp. 31-39.

[6] The concept of "operational code" was first set forth in Nathan Lietes, A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953). For a more recent and intelligible discussion see Alexander George, " The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making," in The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, Hoffmann and Fleron, pp. 165-90.

[7] Nogee and Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, p. 33.

[8] George, "The Operational Code," p. 173.

[9] Nogee and Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, p. 33.

[10] Samuel Sharp, "National Interest: Key to Soviet Politics," in The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, Hoffmann and Fleron, p. 112.

[11] Coit D. Blacker, Reluctant Warriors (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1987), pp. 10-14.

[12] Ibid., pp. 10-11.

[13] Ibid., p. 14.

[14] For example, see Samuel Sharp, "National Interest: Key to Soviet Politics," pp. 108-117; William Zimmerman, "Elite Perspectives and the Explanation of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Hoffmann and Fleron, pp. 18-30; and on the "Realist School" see Blacker, Reluctant Warriors, pp. 6-10.

[15] Barry R. Posen, "Competing Images of the Soviet Union," World Politics 39 (July 1987), p. 579.

[16] Blacker, Reluctant Warriors, pp. 6-10.

[17] Ibid., p. 9.

[18] Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, p. vii.

[19] Ibid., p. 284.

[20] Zhores A. Medvedev, Gorbachev (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1986).

[21] Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1987), p. 37.

[22] "Restructuring and the fate of Socialism," (original in Russian: A. Bovin, Izvestiia, 11 July 1987, p. 6) Current Digest of the Soviet Press 39, no. 28 (12 August 1987), p. 5.

[23] This is called "optimizing strategy" by Alexander George. See George, "The Operational Code," pp. 177-85.

[24] On the correlation of forces see A. Sergiyev, "Leninsm on the Correlation of Forces as a Factor of International Relations," International Affairs (Moscow) (May 1975), pp. 99-107; and Mitchell, Ideology of a Superpower, pp. 10-14, 54-70.

[25] Richard H. Shultz, Jr., and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: The Strategy of Soviet Disinformation (New York: Berkley Books, 1986), pp. 10-11.

[26] "A New Philosophy of Foreign Policy," (orignial in Russian: Ye. Primakov, Pravda, 10 July 1987, p. 1) Current Digest of the Soviet Press 39. no. 28 (12 August 1987), pp. 1-4; "Restructuring and the Fate of Socialism," (orignial in Russian: A. Bovin, Izvestiia, 11 July 1987, p. 1) Current Digest of the Soviet Press 39 no. 28 (12 August 1987), pp. 5-6; "New Gains For Soviet Foreign Policy," (original in Russian: Ye. Primakov, Pravda, 8 January 1988, p. 1) Current Digest of the Soviet Press 40, no. 1 (3 February 1988), pp. 1-4.

[27] Canada is a target associated with the United States because of their similar societies, culture, and closely integrated military policy, and access to the United States.

[28] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Active Measures, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982, p. 33.

[29] Gorbachev, Perestroika, pp. 210-52.

[30] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 44; and U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Active Measures, 97th Cong., 2d sess., p. 33.

[31] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 173; and U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Active Measures, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982, p. 142.

[32] Orah Cooper and Carol Fogarty, "Soviet Economic and Military Aid to the Less Developed Countries, 1954-78," in Soviet Policy in Less Developed Countries, ed. W. Raymond Duncan (Huntington: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1981), p. 11.

[33] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Active Measures, 97th Cong., 2d sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, p. 33.

[34] John Barron, The KGB Today: The Hidden Hand (New York: Berkley Books, 1983), p. 210.

[35] Elizabeth Pond, "Soviet Disinformation," Christian Science Monitor, 27 February 1985.

[36] Richard R. Shultz, Jr., "Soviet Strategy and Organization: Active Measures and Insurgency," in Dennis L. Bark, ed., The Red Orchestra (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 49.

[37] James Tyson, Target America (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1981), p. 7.

[38] Ibid., p. 15.

[39] Elizabeth Pond, "Soviet Disinformation," Christian Science Monitor 28 February 1985.

[40] Sheila Gerstenmaier, "The Influence of Soviet Propaganda on the Western Media," Survey 29 (August 1985), p. 31.

[41] "TASS Statement on Arms Negotiations," (original in Russian: Pravda, 16 August 1987, p. 5) Current Digest of the Soviet Press 39, no. 33 (16 September 1987), p. 12.

[42] Gertsenmaier, "The Influence of Soviet Propaganda on the Western Media," p. 33.

[43] Ibid., p. 34.

[44] This allegation is documented in Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, pp. 111-15; and Pincher, Secret Offensive, p. 234.

[45] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive), 96th Cong., 2d sess., February 6 and 19, 1980, p. 271.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Nogee and Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, p. 323.

[48] Tyson, Target America, p. 25.

[49] See Paul Hollander, Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); and Paul Hollander, "The Newest Political Pilgrims," Commentary 80 (August 1985), pp. 37-41.

[50] Hollander, "The Newest Political Pilgrims," pp. 39-40.

[51] A. Sergiyev, "Leninism on the Correlation of Forces," p. 105.

[52] John Lenczowski, "Soviet Disinformation: An Overview," Political Communication and Persuasion 4 (Fall 1987), p. 33.

[53] Tyson, Target America, pp. 28-32.

[54] Levchenko's KGB activities are documented by John Barron, KGB Today: The Hidden Hand (New York: Berkley Books, 1983), pp. 32-159.

[55] Ibid., p. 140.

[56] Ibid., pp. 141-42.

[57] Cited by Chapman Pincher, Secret Offensive, p. 45.

[58] Ladislav Bittman, The KGB and Soviet Disinformation (New York: Pergamon-Brassey International Defense Publishers, 1985), p. 45.

[59] Pincher, Secret Offensive, p. 41.

[60] Bittman, The KGB and Soviet Disinformation, p. 46.

[61] Pincher, Secret Offensive, p. 246.

[62] Ibid., p. 40.

[63] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 130.

[64] Pincher, Secret Offensive, p. 185.

[65] Sources on the Agca case are as follows: Paul B. Henze, The Plot to Kill the Pope (New York: Scribner's, 1983); David Shiflet, "Solving the Plot to Kill the Pope," Reader's Digest (October 1984), pp. 83-89; Claire Sterling, The Time of the Assassins (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston Publishers, 1983); and Report of the State Prosecutor's Office, Appeals Court, 28 March 1984, English trans., (Rome: Appeals Court, 28 March 1984).

[66] Report of the State Prosecutor's Office, Appeals Court, 28 March 1984, English trans. (Rome: Appeals Court, 28 March 1984), p. 76, cited by Richard F. Staar, USSR Foreign Policies After Detente (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), pp. 104-05.

CHAPTER IV

ACTIVE MEASURES: APPARATUS AND TECHNIQUES

Soviet expertise in formulating and implementing active measures is the direct result of experience, which dates back to the Bolshevik Revolution, and various types of deceptive activity were employed up through World War Two.[1] Current analysis indicates that the apparatus for the formulation and coordination of active measures, and the techniques for their implementation have changed very little since the 1950's, except by way of improvement and refinement.

In the following discussion, the key components of the contemporary Soviet active measures apparatus, and the techniques utilized for the implementation of active measures will be examined. The discussion will demonstrate the manner and the extent to which the Soviet Union attempts to influence foreign societies by means of active measures in order to create favourable conditions for the attainment of Soviet foreign policy.

Apparatus

The Politburo

It is generally accepted that the CPSU determines Soviet policy, which is then carried out by the Soviet government and the Party. Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU, confirms this suspicion in official pronouncements, stating that perestroika--the current Soviet reform policy--was initiated and is led by the CPSU.[2]

The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee is considered the apex of the CPSU decision-making apparatus, and therefore, the apex of the

Soviet decision-making apparatus. Operating under the principle of collective leadership and claiming to represent the interests of the proletariat, the Politburo is the ultimate authority on all foreign and domestic policy matters, even though it must solicit advice, information, and feedback from Central Committee Departments, Ministries, State Committees specializing in certain areas of policy, and other sources.

Although the Politburo is theoretically "elected" by the Central Committee of the CPSU, in reality, the Politburo appears to be a self-perpetuating body. It is the Politburo that determines the membership of the Central Committee and eclipses its functions, and not vice-versa.[3] According to Reshetar:[4]

> Central Committee resolutions usually reflect Politburo decisions and the Politburo also issues directives to the various government ministries and agencies. It takes up urgent problems brought before it by the departments of the Party Secretariat, by a Ministry, or by the Council of Ministers.

In view of the Politburo's central role in the decision-making process it is only logical to conclude that the Politburo has considerable control over active measures. The Politburo's function with respect to active measures is to approve the general policies and themes that guide major active measures campaigns which are suggested to the Politburo by the various organs responsible for active measures. The Politburo is ultimately responsible for the decision to undertake active measures operations. It tries to ensure that the operations reflect the interests of Soviet foreign policy and contribute positively to the attainment of strategic policy objectives.

Accordingly, the Politburo also reviews the outcome and effectiveness of active measures campaigns.[5]

To facilitate its decision-making responsibility with respect to active measures, the Politburo relies heavily on information and advice provided by those Party and governmental organs directly responsible for the formulation and implementation of active measures. These organs are: the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and Service A of the KGB's First Chief Directorate.

The International Department

The International Department's primary function with respect to active measures is to formulate and suggest active measures operations to the Politburo. If the operations are approved, the International Department must coordinate and implement the operations with the assistance of other elements of the active measures apparatus.[6]

The International Department of the CPSU was created in 1957. As Chapman Pincher unequivocally states, it is the lineal descendant of the Comintern, "the worldwide subversive organization set up by Lenin to promote Soviet style revolutions in as many countries as possible."[7] The International Department has since become "the element in the Soviet decision-making process that gathers information on foreign policy, briefs the Politburo, and thereby exercises, subject to the Politburo, decisive influence on Soviet active measures."[8]

With respect to the matter of which organs propose ideas of possible active measures campaigns, Stanislav Levchenko claims that itself, the International Department, the Propaganda Department, the KGB, or otherwise, it is the International Department which is primarily responsible. The International Department sets the themes for overt and covert operations, subject to approval from the Politburo. These themes are strictly adhered to by the other cooperating elements in the apparatus.[9] The International Department, then, is of paramount importance to Soviet active measures.

In its capacity as the primary initiator of foreign overt and covert propaganda and disinformation themes, the International Department relies on the services of numerous other organizations such as: the Propaganda Department, the various branches of the Soviet intelligence services, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, international front organizations and foreign communist parties, Soviet news agencies, and various research institutes under the USSR Academy of Sciences.[10] With respect to research institutes, the International Department makes particular use of the Institute for U.S.A. and Canada, supervised by Georgi Arbatov (Director) and Radomir Bogdanov (Deputy Director). This institution has significant utility for the International Department because it not only acts as a major source of information on American and Canadian politics and society, but also, it actively participates in the dissemination of Soviet propaganda and disinformation.[11]

In addition to policy formulation, the International Department has numerous other responsibilities. It acts as a liaison to the Soviet bloc, foreign communist parties, leftist but non-communist [illegible] "progressive", i.e., pro-Soviet, tendencies. The International Department also has representatives in Soviet embassies in order to gather information on current political trends, and to establish contacts with "progressive" groups and individuals.[12]

The International Department coordinates and finances the activities of Soviet friendship and cultural societies (e.g., "peace crusades", conferences, appeals, study programs, and the publication of Moscow News). The International Department gives this support in an overt effort to create a favourable attitude toward the Soviet Union in foreign countries.

The International Department is also responsible for "administering, funding, and coordinating well over a dozen major, ostensibly non-governmental, international front organizations established since World War Two."[13] According to the testimony of Stanislav Levchenko, Moscow does not influence fronts. Rather, it controls these organizations through the International Department. The main products of fronts (appeals, conferences, publications, etc.) are decided on and crafted by the International Department.[14] Finally, the International Department is responsible for overseeing the operations of various clandestine radio broadcasts which disseminate Soviet propaganda and disinformation.

The present chief of the International Department is Anatolii Dobrynin. Dobrynin has been a member of the CPSU since 1945, and at present, he is a member of the Secretariat. In his former portfolios Dobrynin had been responsible for relations with non-ruling communist

Ambassador to the United States from 1962 to 1986.[15] Although he is not a Politburo member (unlike his predecessor Boris Ponomarev), Dobrynin's experience in the United States makes him an important person as a member of the Secretariat. His appointment to his present post on 6 March 1986, supports the view that General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev desires those who have had experience abroad to figure prominently in his new policy apparatus. Moreover, Dobrynin's appointment suggests that the International Department will see to it that the CPSU's relations with foreign communist parties and international front organizations--the International Department's two major functions--more than ever be undertaken in the context of the Soviet-American relationship, i.e., the U.S. is likely to remain the main target of Soviet active measures.[16]

The Propaganda Department

Until 1978, Soviet overt propaganda was under the control of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In 1978 the Propaganda Department was relieved of these duties, which were taken over by the newly-created International Information Department. Brezhnev had created the International Information Department in an effort "to improve foreign propaganda through more centralized and efficient integration of the wide range of vehicles employed."[17] However, after just eight years of existence, the International Information Department was dissolved by Mikhail Gorbachev, supposedly because he was extremely dissatisfied with the Department's performance under the direction of Leonard Zamyatin.[18] Once again, the Propaganda

Department has been given the responsibility of overseeing overt foreign propaganda.

The Propaganda Department falls under the control of Aleksandr Yakovlev, former Ambassador to Canada, 1973-1983.[19] Yakovlev has divided the Propaganda Department into two sectors: one responsible for domestic propaganda, directed by First Deputy Chief Petr Slezko; and the other responsible for foreign propaganda, directed by First Deputy Chief Al'bert Vlasov.[20]

Though very little information is available on the foreign sector of the Propaganda Department, it undoubtedly carries out the same activities that the International Information Department did, except that increased attention is given to US-USSR relations. With respect to active measures, these activities entail improving the timing, responsiveness, and coordination of Soviet overt propaganda with covert propaganda, disinformation, and other active measures. The Propaganda Department, then, oversees the activities of those organs engaged in overt foreign propaganda and disinformation such as: TASS, Novosti (APN), international broadcasting (e.g., Radio Moscow, and Radio Peace and Progress), prestige publications (e.g., Pravda and Literaturnaia Gazeta), periodicals, and the Embassy Information Department.[21]

Overt communication channels such as these are important to the active measures effort because the basic themes that active measures serve to reinforce first appear in overt communication channels.[22] The organs responsible for overt communications do, however, implement covert activities as well. For example, the composition of their and espionage. According to Stanislav Levchenko, a former KGB officer, ten out of the twelve Soviet "journalists" who worked with Levchenko on the Soviet publication in Japan, New Times, were actually KGB officers. These individuals concealed their true identities by posing as legitimate Soviet foreign correspondents (as was the case with Levchenko himself).[23] TASS and Novosti (APN) are undoubtedly staffed in a similar fashion.

Within the context of the general active measures effort, the vast amount of resources the Politburo allocates to overt propaganda channels is extremely significant and indicates the value of their contribution. In 1978 the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that the annual average expenditure of the key Soviet foreign propaganda and disinformation outlets in the late 1970's was over $2 billion (US).[24]

Committee for State Security (KGB)

In the Soviet Union's active measures apparatus the KGB is responsible for the overall implementation of active measures operations. The KGB is subordinate and responsive to the basic guidelines it receives from the Politburo and the International Department regarding the various themes of active measures and the activities to be carried out. However, the KGB is ultimately in charge of the specific details of the following operations: manipulation of foreign media assets, oral and written disinformation, agent of influence operations, forgeries, and paramilitary operations.[25]

The KGB often recommends changes in orders and guidelines that it feels would increase the effectiveness of [illegible]. Though these

Department, the KGB usually receives a quick response, depending on the nature and importance of the operation, which enables the KGB to implement changes as quickly as possible.[26]

The KGB maintains a liaison (KGB officials acting under the guise of being diplomats, journalists, and embassy staff) throughout the Soviet Bloc, and in Soviet residencies and embassies abroad in order to have direct control over active measures operations. The KGB closely monitors all active measures operations, the agents involved, and the relative success or failure of the operations. The KGB also prepares a daily bulletin on the progress of active measures for members of the Politburo and the International Department.[27]

Within the KGB, the responsibility for implementing active measures rests with Service A of the First Chief Directorate. As in the case of the International Department, Service A is the result of a process of organizational evolution and expansion. In the 1950's, disinformation and other political influence operations were conducted by Department D ("D" representing _dezinformatsiia_ or disinformation) of the KGB. In 1968 Department D was upgraded to Department A. Finally, in the 1970's, Department A was upgraded to the stature of a Service.[28]

One source suggests that the initiatives behind this succession of upgradings first began with the appointment of Aleksandr Shelepin to the post of KGB Chief in 1958. Shelepin was concerned about the KGB's changing role as the Soviet Union in the 1950's had unalterably gained superpower status. With respect to active measures Shelepin felt that:[29]

> Party leadership, and with a much more important role being given to disinformation aimed at distorting Western perceptions of the Soviet Union's real intentions.

Shelepin's concerns were first pronounced at a KGB conference held in Moscow, in May 1959, after which began the series of upgradings of the active measures apparatus, indicated above.[30] Ever since, Service A has continued to play a crucial role in the implementation of Soviet active measures.

Auxiliary Services

In addition to the elements already discussed, there are many other auxiliary services to the active measures apparatus. First, as in the case of the Soviet domestic media control structure, one must assume that various Ministries and Departments provide advice on matters concerning their area of expertise. Moreover, all foreign elements of the CPSU and the governmental bureaucracy have the capacity to assist in active measures operations if they are directed to do so. With respect to Soviet agents, associations, and representatives abroad, elements that might be called upon for assistance include: embassies, missions (trade, cultural, and economic), Soviet citizens residing abroad (e.g., official Soviet delegates to the United Nations, and , Soviet "illegals"), correspondents, scholars, and Aeroflot and shipping personnel.[31]

Of the auxiliary services cited above, in terms of active measures the scholars--representatives from the Soviet Academy of Sciences--probably offer the most assistance. Research institutes under the and Radomir Bogdanov of the Institute for USA and Canada are frequently seen on Western television, quoted in Western newspapers, and asked to speak at conferences sponsored by Western universities and various interest groups. Though their messages are both extremely tendentious and propagandistic, and as such are insufficient to influence individuals with a fair understanding of Soviet propaganda stratagems, Arbatov and Bogdanov nonetheless succeed in presenting the Soviet perspective of international relations to the general public.

Soviet active measures also rely on the cooperation of the intelligence services of the Soviet Union's satellite countries and proxy assets in the Third World. Of the Soviet satellite countries, most often it is the Czechoslovakian and East German services that are exploited for the purposes of active measures, but Poland's and Bulgaria's services are also utilized to a considerable extent.[32] These auxiliary intelligence services are directly controlled by the KGB. According to Ladislav Bittman, the former Czechoslovakian intelligence officer and Deputy Chief of the Czechoslovakian Disinformation Department from 1964 to 1966, control is exercised in the following manner:[33]

> Long-term directives from Moscow are usually passed to commanding officers in official correspondence or at regular consultations between the KGB and satellite representatives, and Soviet advisors participate in day to day supervision.

Active measures operations conducted on the KGB's behalf by Soviet proxies (e.g., Cuba) in the Third World are controlled by the KGB in much the same fashion as in satellite countries.[34]

Auxiliary services are important to the general active measures effort because Western observers often either fail to recognize KGB and International Department control over them, or, they underestimate the extent of this control. By appearing to be less of a threat than the KGB and International Department, auxiliary services inevitably encounter more opportunities for conducting espionage and active measures activity. As Bittman notes, Congressional staff members are far more willing to have lunch with Hungarian or Polish "diplomats" than with official Soviet representatives.[35]

One final advantage to utilizing auxiliary services--particularly auxiliary intelligence services--is that active measures (and espionage) conducted by these services generally receive less attention and criticism when exposed than do active measures implemented by the Soviet Union proper. Somehow, the covert operations of Soviet auxiliary intelligence services are perceived in the West as being less subversive and malicious than those same activities implemented directly by the KGB.

Concluding Remarks on the Apparatus

In the discussion above, the key components of the Soviet active measures apparatus have been examined. The main components of this apparatus have been identified as the International Department, the Propaganda Department, and Service A of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, in addition to various auxiliary elements. It should be mentioned that although the Politburo, the International Department, and coordination, and implementation), there is undoubtedly a certain degree of overlap, particularly between the International Department and Service A of the KGB.

The process of evolution and expansion the apparatus for active measures has experienced since the 1950's indicates both the institutionalization of active measures as instruments of foreign policy, and the increasing importance attached to active measures by the Soviet leadership.

Classic Active Measures Techniques

The following section describes the key techniques of active measures: disinformation, manipulation and control of foreign media assets, forgery, agents of influence, international front organizations, use of foreign communist parties, friendship and cultural societies, and clandestine radio broadcasting. Before proceeding with the course of the discussion, there are a few points about active measures previously alluded to that warrant repetition.

First, the various active measures techniques are not necessarily employed on an exclusive basis. Several or all of the techniques may be employed simultaneously (i.e., in combination or kombinatsiia) in order to facilitate the greatest impact.[36] Moreover, active measures are always used in coordination with Soviet overt propaganda, in addition to traditional diplomatic, economic, and military means of achieving foreign policy objectives. Finally, when one speaks of [illegible] Soviet Union proper, [illegible]

Disinformation

There is no other word in active measures parlance that evokes more semantic discussion than "disinformation" (dezinformatsiia). Prior to the 1960's this word was loosely used in the Soviet Union and abroad to describe what is now termed "active measures".[37] In contemporary times "disinformation" it used to refer to but one type of active measures technique, although it is often a component of other active measures techniques.[38] To provide an analysis of the wide variety of definitions to which the term disinformation is subjected would detract from the importance of the technique itself. For the purposes of this study, a rather general working definition of disinformation will suffice.

Disinformation is any communication containing deliberately false or misleading information (which is designed not only by commission, but also, by omission) that is planted in a political opponent's communication system with the purpose of influencing the decision-making elite or the general public. Defined as such, Soviet disinformation can be disseminated through overt and covert channels. The following constitute the major covert means for this dissemination: manipulation and control of foreign media, forgeries, international front organizations, foreign communist parties, binational Soviet friendship and cultural societies, and clandestine radio broadcasts.

The primary objective of disinformation is "to lead the target to believe in the veracity of the material presented and consequently to act in the interests of the nation conducting the disinformation operation."[39] Like all active measures techniques, then, disinformation lobbies for issues beneficial to the Soviet Union and against issues that are not. Disinformation is also disseminated to confuse foreign public and elite opinion about Soviet foreign policy objectives. With respect to confusing foreign public and elite opinion, in certain instances disinformation is employed simply to steer attention away from the Soviet Union's behavior. Finally, disinformation is employed to help justify Soviet ~~foreign~~ and domestic behavior.

The ultimate success of Soviet disinformation is dependent upon the relative sophistication of the target audience, the timing and concentration of the disinformation campaign, and most importantly, the plausibility of the disinformation. With respect to the latter, some Soviet disinformation campaigns fail simply because the disinformation is not believed by the target audience.

A most recent example of this is the Soviet disinformation campaign about AIDS (Acquired Immunity Deficiency Syndrome). In 1985 the Soviet Union mounted an extensive campaign to convince foreign audiences that the AIDS virus had been "manufactured" as a result of genetic engineering experiments commissioned by the United States government.[40] The campaign has by and large failed because of the doubtfulness of the Soviet accusation, but this does not stop the Soviet Union from repeating its claims in the Soviet press and in the Third World--especially in Africa. The point to notice here is that for any disinformation to succeed it must entail certain criteria, especially a degree of plausibility:[41]

> In order to succeed, every disinformation message must at least partially correspond to reality or generally

> accepted views, especially when the intended victim is a seasoned veteran of such propaganda practices. Without a considerable degree of plausible, verifiable information, it is difficult to gain the victim's confidence.

Examples of Soviet disinformation are so numerous that if one were to list all of them, the result would be a work of several volumes. Soviet disinformation themes range from everyday matters (such as material well-being, health, and entertainment), to the ridiculous (e.g., the Petri dish is called the Ivanov dish in the Soviet Union because the Soviets claim it was a Russian invention), to very serious matters about national and international affairs.[42] The most effective Soviet disinformation campaigns, however, are usually related to the complex issues of international affairs--in recent years, especially the arms race and disarmament--which are often beyond the comprehension of the general public.

The Neutron Bomb Example

One example of a Soviet disinformation campaign dealing with the complexities of the arms race and disarmament is the Soviet campaign against the "neutron" bomb. This campaign is often regarded as one of the most successful Soviet disinformation campaigns of all time.

Although the "neutron" bomb campaign is thought of as an occurrence of the late 1970's, the campaign really began much earlier, in the 1960's. In the early 1960's American scientists developed a tactical nuclear weapon with reduced blast and heat effects, but with greater radiation of neurons. The idea behind the weapon was to concentrate its effects on combat troops, and minimalize the effects on civilian populations and property.[43] Because of the weapon's enhanced radiation effects, it was formally called the Enhanced Radiation Weapon (ERW), but was colloquially known as the "neutron" bomb.

The initial Soviet reaction to the ERW once it was revealed in the scientific press, was as could be expected. The Soviet Union was resolutely against the research, production, and deployment of the ERW because it could severely diminish the effectiveness of Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe. Though the Soviet Union was primarily against the ERW for tactical and strategical reasons, such concerns were generally not expressed in Soviet attacks against the ERW. Instead, this is how Nikita Khrushchev, General Secrectary of the CPSU, spoke about the ERW:[44]

> The neutron bomb as conceived by American scientists should kill everything living but leave material assets intact. So, comrades, this is how these people are thinking. They are acting as robbers who want to murder a man without staining his suit with blood so as to be able to use this suit.

The Soviet Union began an official campaign against the ERW. This campaign consisted of three main attitudes toward the ERW, all of which would characterize the anti-neutron bomb campaign in the late 1970's:[45]

> (1) the neutron bomb is a "killer" weapon that destroys people; (2) it produces death by radiation, which is somehow more horrible than death from other weapons; and (3) it is an "imperialist" bomb, designed to preserve material things.

The 1960's anti-neutron bomb campaign was characterized by a great deal of sloganeering. The sloganeering was essential to the campaign because the simple messages conveyed by the slogans exploited people's ignorance and played upon their anxieties about nuclear war. The Soviet Union and various Soviet front organizations lobbying against the ERW utilized slogans such as: "Ban the Killer Bomb", "Imperialist

Weapon: Kills People, Saves Property", and "Stop the Anti-Human Weapon".[46]

As the slogans cited above demonstrate, Soviet disinformation was purporting that the ERW was "anti-human" while other military weapons were somehow not. Soviet disinformation, then, was advancing the view that the ERW was immoral. The sloganeering and appeals to morality that characterized the anti-neutron bomb campaign were sufficient to mobilize thousands of people against the ERW. However, in the 1960's the ERW was still in developmental stages. The United States government as yet had no dire need to deploy the weapon. As a result, the United States held off production of the ERW. Accordingly, the Soviet anti-neutron bomb campaign subsided, that is, at least until the mid-1970's.

Despite the illusion of relaxed tensions created by detente, by 1976 the Soviet Union had amassed some 20,000 tanks in Eastern Europe, as opposed to NATO's 7,000 tanks in Western Europe and conventional ground forces that were numerically outnumbered by those of the Soviet Union by a ratio of three to one.[47] In order to counter the Soviet Union's strategic forces in Eastern Europe, NATO accepted the idea of deploying American-made ERW's in West Germany. This strategic manoeuver would "in one fell swoop render the masses of Soviet tanks menacing NATO by and large useless, politically and militarily."[48] Thus, one of the largest and most successful Soviet propaganda and disinfomation campaigns of all time began. It had but one primary goal, and that was to prevent the deployment of the ERW in Western Europe.

Encompassing the principles of the anti-neutron bomb campaign of the 1960's, the campaign of the late 1970's took on greater international dimensions than did its predecessor. The Soviet Union made great use of its overt propaganda apparatus, in addition to a variety of active measures techniques--especially Soviet international front organizations, foreign communist parties, and foreign media assets.

The international campaign was spearheaded by the main Soviet international front organization, the World Peace Council (WPC).[49] The WPC, which was directly funded by the Soviet government, arranged and coordinated a series of mass demonstrations, protests, and appeals against the "neutron bomb" throughout the 1976-1978 period. These activities consistently echoed the Soviet line which called for the United States to make unilateral concessions, i.e., a committment not to deploy the ERW. The WPC's concerns were repeated by the world's leftist political parties, and by their partisan press. Most strikingly, however, was the fact that the Soviet line on the ERW found sympathy in the Western press, especially in the United States.[50] Here is where one may be justified in discerning between simple propaganda and active measures. Manipulation of the foreign press is an age-old Soviet active measures technique (which will be examined below). The Soviet Union made great efforts to clandestinely confuse the American public on the complex issues of the ERW. This was achieved by a variety of means, but undoubtedly, manipulation of the American press was the most important method.

As a result of pressures from the American public and some of the decision-making elite, in April, 1978, President Carter cancelled production of the ERW and announced the decision to defer deployment of the ERW in Western Europe indefinitely.[51] There was no Soviet concession, for example, like a withdrawal of some of its conventional forces in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the Soviet Union had successfully achieved its primary goal of preventing deployment of the ERW in Western Europe. In addition, the Soviet Union succeeded in: (1) darkening the image of the United States, (2) providing an excuse for massive Soviet military build-up, and (3) creating further distrust between the United States and its allies in Western Europe (West Germany was deeply incensed by President Carter's decision not to deploy the ERW).[52]

In the words of Janos Berecz, Chief of the International Department of Hungary, "the campaign against the neutron bomb was one of the most significant and most successful campaigns since World War II."[53] The Soviet Union very effectively exploited the fear and ignorance of Western populations by means of both officially sanctioned overt propaganda and active measures.

The remainder of this discussion will illustrate other examples of Soviet disinformation and disinformation campaigns, which will underline the manner in which the Soviet Union obtains its foreign policy goals by the sheer power of words alone.

Manipulation of the Foreign Media

Thomas Jefferson once said, "the man who never looks i~~nto~~ a newspaper is better informed than he who reads them, in as-much-as he who knows nothing is nearer the truth than he whose mind is filled with falsehoods and errors."[54] The evidence that the Soviets have influenced the media of Western and other countries today is well documented. The press is a virtual playground for manipulation by the Soviets, and indeed, the Soviets are well aware of this fact. While all the instruments of active measures are regarded by the apparatus responsible for active measures as being important, the manipulation of the foreign media is perhaps the most important and most productive in exerting influence on public opinion. This is because the media form the main channel through which the general public receives information.[55]

The Soviet Union's manipulation of the foreign media is dependent on its ability to induce journalists, editors, producers and publishers to advance, through the media, views that are favourable to the Soviet Union. Soviet authored or inspired (usually the latter) reports are placed in the foreign media by individuals who function as witting and unwitting purveyors of Soviet propaganda and disinformation. Of course, denial is the instinctive journalistic reaction to the allegation that the media are not only susceptible to disinformation, but they actually disseminate it. Nevertheless, Ralph K. Bennet, senior editor of the Washington Bureau of Reader's Digest admits journalists are indeed susceptible to disinformation:[56]

> We are susceptible to disinformation and subterfuge, indeed highly so. We journalists are no different than other people, and in some ways some things that may seem virtues of journalism may be vices from the perspective of penetration by the Soviets. We have a way of compartmentalizing information. We have a way of wanting to believe some things, but not believe others...It is a very strange kind of blindsightedness that we journalists often have.

The methods of recruiting witting agents in the foreign media parallel the techniques used for recruiting agents of influence and espionage.[57] The most reliable method entails securing the cooperation of individuals who openly sympathize with the Soviet cause. There have been a considerable number of journalists in the free world who were dedicated communists and willingly propounded Soviet propaganda and disinformation.

One of the most successful agents who advanced Soviet propaganda and disinformation for over forty years was the Australian-born journalist Wilfred Burchett, who died in 1983 at the age of seventy-two.[58] A dedicated communist, Burchett was first recruited by the KGB in 1947. Throughout his career as a journalist, Burchett wrote and placed Soviet propaganda and disinformation in prestigous publications such as the London Daily Express, the French communist newspaper L'Humanite, and the New York Times. Burchett is described as:[59]

> ... a prime example of the success the communists have had in insinuating their propaganda into the media of the Free World. Even though he had been exposed as having been on the KGB payroll and had, notoriously, served the communists during both the Korean and Vietnam wars, Burchett had many friends among the Free World journalists and was able to get his articles placed in influential publications such as the New York Times.

There are numerous other examples of witting agents in the free world media. Chapman Pincher cites Whittaker Chambers (Time magazine), Cedric Parker (the Capitol Times), Winston Burdett (a correspondent for CBS television), Alden Whitman (New York Times), Pierre-Charles Pathe (Synthesis), and Arne Herlov Peterson of Denmark, among others, as journalists who have consciously placed pro-Soviet articles in the free world press on the Soviet Union's behalf.[60]

Another method of recruiting individuals to wittingly advance Soviet disinformation in the foreign media involves money. Soviet officers responsible for recruiting and managing agents know very well that money can be used first, to attract potential agents and second, if necessary, to blackmail them into further cooperation. According to a KGB manual seen by John Barron, a typical method of using money as a recruitment appeal is as follows. First, the victim is "hooked" into writing what seem to be harmless analytical articles for real or imagined Soviet publications for payment. Then, with signed receipts in hand, the target is in the position to be blackmailed into further cooperation.[61]

In addition to the desire for money, there are many other characteristics an individual might have that can be exploited by Soviet officers endeavoring to recruit agents in the foreign media. Sexual habits, alcoholism, drug addiction, and other personal idiosyncracies can be used to either convince or coerce (i.e., blackmail) journalists into disseminating Soviet disinformation in the foreign media.[62] With respect to blackmail, Stanislav Levchenko ascertains that there is always some degree of risk involved when using blackmail as a means to recruit agents in the foreign media. Blackmail invariably carries the risk of driving the victim into the hands of his nation's counter-intelligence agency.[63] When this happens, the entire operation is doomed to failure. For this reason, when recruiting those who will inevitably become witting agents, the Soviets generally prefer to rely on the target's willingness to cooperate, rather than his vulnerability to blackmail.[64]

To ensure that the products of witting journalistic agents are coordinated effectively with other active measures and overt propaganda, agents are provided with press material by their Soviet control officers. However, according to Levchenko, usually only the themes and information necessary to write an article are provided for the agent. This is because the agent is usually expected to write the article himself, in his own style, in order to conceal the true origin of the information and views contained in the article.[65]

The Soviets also disseminate disinformation and propaganda in the foreign media by manipulating journalists without their knowledge. There are several reasons why journalists in particular are vulnerable to Soviet manipulation. One of the foremost factors that renders journalists open to manipulation is the lack of knowledge they have about the subjects they write on. In most cases, journalists are not educated in such a way that they can claim expertise on a given subject (for example, the Soviet Union) or, that they have a deep understanding of international relations. Instead, journalists are trained to be generalists because they inevitably have to cover a great variety of subjects. As a result, journalists are just as susceptible to Soviet manipulation as is the public they write for.

There are both overt and covert ways in which the Soviet Union manipulates the foreign media. Perhaps the most overt manner of manipulation is the steady stream of information fed to the foreign media by Soviet news agencies (TASS and Novosti), foreign correspondents, and government officials. Based on the information provided by these sources, the media advance stories which essentially reflect the Soviet point of view. Additionally, Soviet representatives abroad establish contacts with journalists, editors, and publishing houses. Through these channels, the Soviets place articles written from the Soviet point of view in the foreign media.[66] The purpose of this overt interaction with the foreign media, of course, is to create a more positive perception of the Soviet Union in foreign countries.[67]

Another typical method of manipulation is facilitated by the fact that most foreign journalists in Moscow have no knowledge of the Russian language. As a result, journalists have to hire interpreters, translators, and secretaries among the Soviet citizens. All such employees are coopted by the KGB and try to plant disinformation into the foreign media through foreign correspondents.[68]

The Soviets also exploit the periodic "informational hunger" journalists experience, especially in Moscow.[69] Journalists in Moscow are intentionally blocked from potential sources of information so that they become desperate for a good "scoop." The Soviet KGB monitors foreign correspondents for signs of "informational hunger," knowing full well that at some point the journalist might be willing to shirk his or her responsibility for the authentication of the material and sources of a potential story. At such a point, the KGB or the International Department conveniently provide the desperate journalist with a "source".

Levchenko notes that a "source" can be any Soviet official, like Georgi Arbatov (Director of the Institute of USA and Canada), a senior government or CPSU official, an academician, or a Soviet journalist.[70] Many Soviet officials give interviews to the foreign media overtly, that is, on the record. Once in a while, they also conduct "confidential" and "private" conversations with foreign correspondents under the condition that the "source" not be named in any article. In both cases, the majority of journalists unfortunately lack the skills and knowledge to see through dubious information designed by Soviet propaganda and disinformation experts. "Sources" like Georgi Arbatov clearly function as propagandists, yet, journalists treat them as authentic "independent" spokesmen for the Soviet Union.[71] Accordingly, they provide them with a channel by which to disseminate Soviet propaganda and disinformation.

Whether Soviet propaganda and disinformation penetrate the foreign media by means of witting or unwitting agents, the success of Soviet manipulation of the foreign media is that Soviet views can appear in the foreign media to be undistinguishable from the genuine opinion of journalists and editors.[72] Even if the disinformation and propaganda seem to echo the Soviet line, they are not entirely dismissed by the public because all views have the right to be expressed in pluralist societies. The Western media, then, are fertile ground for Soviet propaganda and disinformation. The overall effect of Soviet efforts to exploit the forum provided by the Western media is, of course, difficult to assess. Nevertheless, the climate observable in the Western media today (see chapter 5) indicates that the Soviet active measures experts have a highly exploitable medium at their disposal.

Forgery

Forgery is an age-old political warfare technique that has been utilized by all great powers at one time or another to deceive and discredit political opponents. The Soviet Union is no exception. The

Soviet Union, since its founding, has steadily refined its production and dissemination of forgeries to combat its opponents, real and imagined, domestic and foreign.

Although foreign countries are well aware of the Soviet forgery offensive, they cannot totally negate its effects. The KGB, which is responsible for producing forgeries and placing them in the hands of journalists and politicians, operates under the principle that no denial will ever completely offset the damage inflicted by forgeries--especially new stories based on forgeries.[73] Because forgeries usually contain negative information intended to descredit and deceive opponents, and because most people dwell on and remember negative stimuli, Soviet forgeries achieve reasonably good success even when they are quickly detected and exposed.

According to a selection of Soviet forgeries that appeared during the 1960-1982 period, published in a record of 1982 U.S. Congressional Hearings, many of the forged documents that have been declassified by the CIA in the report were targeted at the United States and NATO, although they arose elsewhere.[74] The forgeries revealed in the report fell into two general categories: (1) altered versions of authentic U.S. government documents obtained by means of Soviet espionage, and (2) totally fabricated government or personal documents.[75] The high level of sophistication encountered in the forgeries leads to the conclusion that they originate from the Soviet bloc. The reasoning behind such a conclusion is that among the intelligence services hostile to the United States and NATO, only the KGB, and the Czechoslovakian, and East German intelligence services have the resources to produce and surface high quality forgeries.[76]

Shultz and Godson ascertain that since 1976, "the main thrust of Soviet forgeries has been directed at compromising the position of the United States in Western Europe, and at provoking disharmony in the Western alliance."[77] Soviet forgeries attempt to achieve these foreign policy objectives by demonstrating that the United States' presence in Western Europe is lethal. One of the most oft-cited examples of a Soviet attempt to disrupt the Western alliance was the resurfacing of a number of forgeries that first appeared in the 1960's, and then again in the early 1970's. The forgeries appeared in a pamphlet entitled "Holocaust Again in Europe."[78]

The pamphlet presented forgeries regarding alleged US and NATO nuclear strategy in Western Europe. The forgeries provided "evidence" to support the Soviet accusation that the United States and NATO were willing to sacrifice Western Europe in the event of a nuclear war in order to ensure the United State's survival. According to the unidentified authors of the pamphlet, American and NATO plans for modernizing NATO's intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe were motivated purely by the desire to make Europe a self-contained theater for nuclear war. The conclusion of the pamphlet was that the threat of nuclear destruction in Europe emanated entirely from the United States: "there is no Soviet threat, there is a real American threat to Europe."[79]

A more recent Soviet forgery that surfaced in the mid-1970's was the "Top Secret" U.S. Army Field Manual FM30-31B.[80] Based on authentic U.S. army field manuals (FM30-31 and FM30-31A), the Soviet forgery proposed that wherever U.S. military forces or advisors are stationed, they are to interfere with the domestic affairs of the host country in order to prevent the growth of leftist and communist political currents. In extreme cases the American forces are to incite ultra-left groups to violence in order to provoke the host government into militant retaliatory action.[81]

Although the document's first appearances were virtually ineffective, its reoccurrence eventually proved beneficial to the USSR. In 1978 the Soviet Union decided to exploit the radical leftist ~~Red~~ Brigade's abduction and assassination of Aldo Moro, President of the Italian Christian Democratic Party. Moro was a stabilizing force in Italian politics and, as such, was an asset to the United States. But this did not prevent the Soviets from proposing that the United States was behind Moro's abduction and subsequent assassination--presumably for the purpose of inciting right-wing conservative reaction. With opportunity knocking at its door, the KGB arranged to redistribute the forged US Army Field Manual. Through its use of Soviet bloc countries, non-ruling Communist parties, Soviet international front organizations, foreign media assets, and agents of influence, the KGB managed to plant the forgery in the press of over twenty nations. In doing so, the Soviet Union provided "evidence" in support of their accusations against the United States.[82]

The value of using forgeries for the purpose of eroding the United State's influence in the non-communist world certainly outweighs the high costs (monetary and moral) of producing and disseminating high quality forgeries. As of 1982, CIA Deputy Director John McMahon stated that the CIA was detecting new forgeries at a rate of one per month.[83] Though further research is required to corroborate McMahon's claims, the most recent appearance of Soviet forgeries in 1986 and 1987 does indicate that the Soviet Union is continuing its forgery offensive.

In an effort to heighten awareness of Soviet forgeries in target countries, the US Department of State periodically exposes Soviet forgeries in a publication entitled Foreign Affairs Note. In the November, 1986 issue, three Soviet forgeries which appeared in a four month period (between July and November of 1986) were examined.[84] More recently, the July, 1987 issue exposes four new Soviet forgeries.[85] The content of all seven of the recent forgeries exposed in Foreign Affairs Note follows the major themes carried in the Soviet media, and, one underlying theme is common to all:[86]

> ...the United States will carry out foreign political, military, and economic activities in complete disregard of foreign public opinion and often at the expense of its allies around the world, particularly its NATO partners.

The exposure of recent Soviet forgeries serves to validate the claim that Soviet attitudes toward deception and political warfare, i.e., active measures, have remained consistent, despite the current peace offensive of General Secretary Gorbachev. An analysis of one of the recent Soviet forgeries that appeared in the July, 1987 issue of Foreign Affairs Note will be cited here in full:[87]

> **Greece: State Department Cable**
>
> **Description.** The forgery is purportedly the test of a US Department of State cable dated November 10, 1983, informing US officials that the Turkish Cypriots would soon issue a unilateral declaration of independence (they did so on November 15, 1983). In the forgery, the Ambassador is instructed to condemn the declaration of independence and call for a just solution to the Cyprus

issue. He also is asked for his opinion on the consequences of the Turkish Cypriot action, and the cable notes that the new "self-declared state" could serve as an alternative to Greece should Greece decide to leave NATO and close US bases on its territory. The Embassy is instructed, given "the global US interests in the area," to maintain good relations with the "Denktash regime." (Rauf Denktash is the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community.) Only the text of the cable has surfaced; no copy of the cable has ever appeared.

Purpose. The cable text seeks to show that the United States knew in advance of Turkish Cypriot intentions to establish an independent country and, while hypocritically condemning the action, was, in fact, interested in the new state as a possible military base.

Surfacing. The text of the purported cable was published by the Athens daily I Proti on April 6, 1987. Although the source of the forgery is unknown, the I Proti is owned and managed by the pro-Moscow Communist Party of Greece. moreover, the forgery surfaced:

* In the wake of the recent Aegean crisis between Greece and Turkey over seabed claims;

* One day after the Greek Communist Party daily Rizopastis published an interview with the Soviet Ambassador to Greece, Viktor Stukalin, who declared Soviet support for Greece in the Aegean crisis, noted Moscow's "altruistic" interest in settling the Cyprus issue, and expressed Soviet concern over "continued interventions" by "certain states" in Greece's internal affairs;

* Approximately 2 weeks before a conference on "Cyprus and World Peace," staged in Sofia (April 21-23). The conference was opened by Indian Communist Party member Romesh Chandra, president of the World Peace Council, a well-known Soviet front group. Chandra was described by the Bulgarian news agency as president of the "International Committee of Solidarity with Cyprus." The conference's final communique endorsed the USSR's January 20, 1986, Cyprus proposals and criticized Turkey's "ruling circles" who, with US "support," were said to be increasing the Turkish military presence on the island.

The US Embassy in Athens denounced the forgery as soon as the fabricated cable surfaced. As a result, it received little attention outside of the leftist media. The Embassy response to the story prompted I Proti and other leftist papers to accuse the Embassy of "unacceptable

> intervention" in "attacking" the Greek press. The leftist papers called for editorial support, but other than in the leftist-controlled press, none was forthcoming. The Government of Greece and the Greek Journalists' Union also declined leftist appeals for comment on the Embassy's actions.

As this example demonstates, the Soviet art of forgery is a very delicate and complicated one. The importance the Soviet leadership attaches to the use of forgeries is very significant, and it is likely to continue.

Agents of Influence

Ladislav Bittman (see p. 82) maintains that in Soviet intelligence circles an agent of influence is:[88]

> ... one who occupies an important position in the governmental, economic, journalistic, scientific, or social hierarchy of the target country and, in one way or another, is capable of influencing the decision-making process or public opinion.

Such an individual is normally thought of as being a resident of a foreign country, yet, this is not always the case. "Illegals"--Soviet citizens who illegally reside in a foreign country (and therefore have no diplomatic immunity) for the purpose of conducting espionage and influence operations--also act as agents of influence.

With respect to individuals of foreign countries who are recruited as agents of influence, they can be recruited in various capacities: unwitting but manipulated individuals, trusted contacts, and witting agents.[89] However, the witting agent of influence is undoubtedly the most dangerous type of agent, for his directives come straight from Moscow, through the field officers of Service A of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. The various appeals used to recruit witting agents of influence parallel the techniques used to recruit other types of agents (in the press, or those who engage in espionage). These recruitment techniques have been discussed earlier in several instances (e.g., pp. 57-61, 91-93), and therefore require no repetition here.

The methods used by agents of influence to conduct their operations include the entire arsenal of active measures. The cumulative impact of an agent of influence's operations seems to be directly proportional to the period over which the agent conducts his activities. The importance of the individual acting as an agent (i.e., his access to the decision-making elite and the media) also determines the success of agent of influence operations.

Many agent of influence operations have been detected in recent years. In 1974, Gunther Guillaume and his wife Christl were arrested in West Germany for conducting espionage and influence operations. Gunther and Christl were "illegals" who had entered West Germany sometime after World War Two. The Guillaumes joined the German Social Democratic Party and by 1970 Christl had become a high ranking secretary, while Gunther had become an advisor and personal confident to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt.[90] Contact between the Guillaumes and the KGB was maintained by Christl, who met couriers (probably East German) and delivered information to dead-letter boxes (hiding spots for the transfer of information obtained through espionage, and for instructions).

In recognition of their espionage and agent of influence operations, the Guillaumes are generally held responsible for

Chancellor Brandt's desire to resume friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Brandt consistently[91]

> ... played down the threat from Moscow, accepted Soviet war gains, the division of Germany and the sovereignty of East Germany, which was formally recognized by him as a separate state in a treaty which he signed with the Soviet Union in August, 1970.

The effect the Guillaumes had on West German foreign policy was so immense that Chancellor Brandt found it only proper to resign from his post after he learned of the Guillaumes' real identities when they were indicted in 1974.

The Guillaume case illustrates just how much manipulation the Soviets are capable of. Willy Brandt was so disgraced by the fact that he was manipulated (despite the protection his intelligence services rendered) he decided to resign as Chancellor of the FRG. If a figure as important as Brandt could be manipulated, one could assume that the Soviets are capable of manipulating a great number of people in foreign countries who are undoubtedly less-informed about Soviet covert activities than Brandt was.

The case of Arne Treholt serves as another example of agent of influence activity.[92] In 1985 Arne Treholt was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for his espionage and agent of influence activity in Norway. Treholt's espionage activities primarily involved his providing the KGB with classified Norwegian and NATO information (in 1982-1983 Treholt attended the Defense Institute--Norway's equivalent to the US National War College--and therefore had access to secret information).

In his capacity as an agent of influence, Treholt was extremely influential over the left wing of the Norwegian Labor Party, the dominant socialist party in Norway, that has governed for most of the postwar period.[93] Treholt exerted influence on Norway's decision-making elite by means of various important posts he held in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry since 1973 (Treholt was Deputy Chief spokesman for the Foreign Ministry at the time of his arrest), in addition to his role as Norwegian delegate to the United Nations from 1979 till 1982. Treholt was known to openly advocate the adoption of policies that would prove favourable to the Soviet Union. In particular, Treholt is thought to have facilitated Norway's adoption of the Soviet-sponsored Nordic nuclear-free zone proposal, i.e., the Norwegian refusal to deploy NATO Pershing II and cruise missiles on its territory.[94]

Cases like that of Treholt are proof that agent of influence operations regularly occur even during relatively peaceful times like the present. They are not merely fabrications of authors of spy novels, "warmongers", or "McCarthyists". As one Norwegian government official said:[95]

> If Treholt, who enjoyed the best of Norwegian life, could [be an agent of influence], how many more like him are there who grew up in his generation, not only in Norway but in all of Europe?

Finally, there is the well-known case of Pierre-Charles Pathe. Although there have been many Soviet agents of influence who have successfully exploited democratic liberalism, Pathe is often considered to have been the most successful agent of influence of all time. He earns this honour both for the period over which he conducted his activities, and for the influence he had over the French decision-making elite.

In 1979 Pathe was arrested for the influence operations he had conducted since 1959. Writing under the pseudonym Charles Morand, Pathe wrote pro-Soviet articles in many of France's major news publications.[96] But his most influential work was disseminated through his periodical entitled Synthesis, which was published from 1976 until his arrest in 1979. According to Shultz and Godson, the value of this periodical was that its target was the intellectual and decision-making elite of France. Pathe's personal connections with the French elite--the direct result of lineage and marital ties--created the conditions for Soviet views to clandestinely reach an influential audience of French government officials, business persons, and media personalities by means of Synthesis.[97] From the seventy issues of Synthesis, Shultz and Godson differentiated eight major reoccurring themes. Not surpisingly, the themes fell into two broad categories: (1) the denigration of, and attacks on, Western attitudes and policies, and (2) defense of the USSR and its allies.[98]

International Front Organizations

Soviet international front organizations are those voluntary associations of individuals that under the guise of independence overtly and covertly advance Soviet foreign policy interests. They do this by mobilizing "those elements in foreign societies who are unwilling to join a communist party but are sympathetic to some of the principles such a party espouses."[99] The fronts are not merely influenced by Moscow, but rather, they are funded and controlled by

Moscow through the International Social Organizations Sector of the Central Committee's International Department.[100] The primary means of communication that front organizatons utilize are demonstrations, petitions, conferences, and publications.

The Soviet Union exerts its extraordinary influence over front groups by controlling the leaders of the World Peace Council (WPC)--the main Soviet front organization--and its national affiliates. According to Shultz and Godson, the leadership of the WPC is dominated "by individuals sympathetic--if not completely loyal--to the CPSU."[101]

The best example of one such individual is Romesh Chandra, President of the WPC. A member of the WPC since 1953, Chandra is also a long-standing member of the National Committee of the Communist Party of India.[102] Chandra's general political posture is extremely negative toward the U.S. and its allies; Chandra holds them responsible for threatening world peace. At the same time, Chandra holds the line that "the Soviet Union's military policy is of a purely defensive character."[103] In other words, Chandra consistently promotes the Soviet line on international relations.

Control is also exercized over fronts by funding. The funding of international front organizations is apparently the responsibility of the International Department of the CPSU and Service A of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB.[104] The vehicles of funding appear to be: (1) International Department personnel who are official members of the given front, (2) International Department officials who coordinate front activities without maintaining official membership, (3) International Department coordination and financing of communist party leaders who support Soviet postions, and (4) covert KGB contacts with front organizations.[105]

The most prominent Soviet front organizaton is the World Peace Council (WPC).[106] The WPC was created in 1949 in order "to save mankind from another world war, to isolate the warmonger clique, and to ensure peaceful cooperation among nations"--the creation ironically coincided with the Soviet Union's first atomic test.[107] The WPC has ties with affiliates and other peace groups in more than 130 nations. It also qualifies for official status with the United Nations, which enables it to participate in international conferences sponsored by the United Nations.[108] As can be expected, the WPC serves Soviet interests by continually supporting ostensible Soviet peace initiatives. All non-Soviet (but especially American) military modernization is labeled as offensive and imperialist. Yet, when the Soviet Union increases its military might, from the WPC's perspective, it is purely for security purposes because the Soviet Union has to defend itself against the forces of capitalist counter-revolution. Any internal attempt by WPC members to differ with the official WPC line is met with fervent denuciation for crimes of anti-Soviet propaganda and war-mongering.[109]

The WPC is by no means the only Soviet international front organization, it is merely the largest and the most influential. The following is a list of twelve major Soviet international front organizations in addition to the World Peace Council, brief descriptions of each, and the number of affiliates of each:[110]

International Institute for Peace (IIP), Vienna. Member organizations in 9 countries of West and East Europe. Formed in 1958 to provide a legal cover mechanism for the WPC Secretariat to circumvent the WPC's expulsion from Austria for subversive activities in that country.

Afro-Asian Peoples' Organization (AAPSO), Cairo. AAPSO Committees exist in most African and Asian countries. Formed in 1957 as an offshoot from the WPC to provide Third World channels for propaganda, political action, and support (including arms and paramilitary training) to National Liberation Movements and various political entities in opposition to their own governments.

World Federation of Trade Union (WFTU), Prague. Membership: 190 million, but 90% from communist countries. Formed in 1945 to consolidate trade unions throughout the world for the ultimate establishment of a worldwide trade union organization under Soviet control, to conduct or support strikes in non-communist nations and to serve as one of the USSR's major propaganda agencies.

World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), Budapest. Membership: 150 million in 110 countries. Formed in 1945 to support Soviet policy worldwide and to oppose activities of non-communist youth organizations, to promote Soviet disarmament in developed countries and gain local acceptance for Soviet policy in the Third World.

International Union of Students (IUS), Prauge. Membership: 118 member organizations with 10 million members. Formed to conduct among students similar activity to that of the WFDY. It works closely with the WFDY, co-sponsor events such as the world Youth Festival, a Soviet propaganda extravaganza, and supports campaigns of the WPC.

Womens' International Democratic Federation (WIDF), East Berlin. In 1966 claimed membership of "over 200 million". Formed in 1955 to support propaganda campaigns with special emphasis on women's and children's affairs.

International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), Prauge. Membership over 150,000 in 112 countries. Formed in 1952 to "further revolutionary proletarian journalism," to act as arbiter and propagandist for the Soviet Union, and to discredit international news agencies.

International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), Brussels. Membership approximately 25,000 in fifty-seven countries. Formed in 1946 to support Soviet propaganda and to issue "legal" statements and appeals on Soviet foreign policy priorities and to condemn non-communist causes.

Christian Peace Conference (CPC), Prague. Membership in forty-eight countries but no totals available. Formed in 1958 to appeal to religious leaders and communities in support of Soviet propaganda and campaigns.

International Federation of Resistance Fighters (IFRF), Vienna. Claims five million members in twenty-two countries (all but Israel are from Europe). Formed in 1951 to support Soviet initiatives on disarmament.

World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW), Paris. Claims 400,000 members, affiliated groups in thirty-one countries, mostly communist. Formed in 1946 to organize scientific activities on behalf of the Soviet Union.

International Radio and TV Organization (IRTO), Prague. Formed in 1946 in Brussels by twenty-eight radio organizations in Europe and Africa. However, it still operates from Prauge as a "non-governmental" organization aimed at influencing Third World countries.

Most of the major international fronts, such as those cited above, invariably demonstrate similar patterns of development and activity. As the descriptions of the Soviet international front organizations above demonstrate, first, all the fronts were created during the late 1940's and early 1950's. Second, the fronts have an extremely broad range of influence because of the number of national affiliates and umbrella organizations, and a combined membership of over 555,170,000. Finally, the fronts all indicate unswerving dedication to the Soviet Union's foreign policy aims, in particular, the attempt to manipulate the international peace movement. For example, at the 12th World Youth Festival in Moscow (July, 1985), an event sponsored by the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the International Union of Students, over 20,000 peace activists convened to rally for peace, and to support the most controversial of Soviet actions such as the invasion of Afghanistan and the September, 1983 downing of the Korean Jetliner Flight 007.[111]

The Peace Movement

To expand on this last point, front organizations organize and coordinate many of the public petitions, protests, demonstrations, and conferences that occur in non-communist countries and characterize the peace movement. Similar activity is noticeably absent in the Soviet Union--except for government-sponsored demonstrations and rallies such as the World Youth Festival mentioned above. This emphasizes the double standard so charactertic of the peace movement. Front organizations manipulate the peace movement to ensure that it channels its energy to unfettered and exaggerated criticism of the United States. In doing so, the peace movement assists the Soviet Union in its primary foreign policy objective, namely, to isolate the United States from its allies in NATO and Western Europe. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union is presented as the advocate of peace.

While Soviet front activity centers around the peace movement, and undoubtedly exerts considerable influence and control over it, it would be unfair to assert that the peace movement is void of any genuine expression of public will. After all, the ideal of peace is, by and large, both noble and desirable. However, participants in the peace movement fail to understand that "peace" has connotations in the Soviet Union that differ from the generally accepted Western definition. "Peace," as the Soviets understand it, is utilized for the purpose of shifting the correlation of forces in favour of the Soviet Union. Many participants in the peace movement have difficulty recognizing this fact, or, they simply choose to ignore it. As a result, the peace movement is reduced from being a noble expression of popular will to a movement that is highly manipulated by the Soviet Union.

Use of Foreign Communist Parties

Foreign communist parties function in two main capacities for the Soviet leadership. First, they provide information on current political, economic, and social trends in the given country. Second, foreign ~~communist~~ parties favourably disposed to the Soviet Union assist in the effort to achieve Soviet foreign policy goals. Therefore, foreign communist parties also assist in the implementation of active measures: they indulge in overt and covert propaganda, they disseminate written and oral disinformation, and they may even participate in paramilitary operations. The extent of the Soviet Union's relations with foreign communist parties (and leftist revolutionary movements) can be gauged from the 152 communist delegations from 113 foreign countries that attended the 27th CPSU Congress in Moscow (February 25 to March 6, 1986).[112]

It should be mentioned that delegates from several communist and socialist parties (e.g., the Japanese Socialist Party, Communist Party of China, and the Communist Party of Albania) did not attend the conference. This is indicative of the growing fragmentation of what was once thought to have been a unified communist movement. However, this does not imply that the Soviet Union has abandoned efforts to reign over the communist world--in fact, the Soviet Union has probably increased its efforts.

Foreign communist parties favourably disposed to the Soviet Union are directed by the International Department of the CPSU. High-ranking International Department officials meet with the leaders of foreign communist parties on a regular basis in an effort to ensure the subordination of local communist parties to the interests of the CPSU, and to coordinate policy, strategy, and tactics. These consultations may occur in Moscow, Eastern Europe, or locally.[113]

The International Department controls the activities of foreign communist parties in several ways. One manner of control besides regular consultation is financing. According to Elizabeth Teague, financing of foreign communist parties is often applied indirectly:[114]

> What may be a substantial source of revenues for nonruling CPs is income derived from the large numbers of CP newspapers and journals that are imported by the USSR to be sold throughout the country. These are the only foreign-language Western sources of information freely and regularly available to the Soviet population, so they are assured a steady sale. Soviet displeasure can sometimes be expressed by withdrawing these newspapers from sale; this happened, for example, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968.

Foreign communist parties can also be funded by large commissions of local party-owned or affiliated business firms, trading companies, or printing houses. For example, tourist agencies that book trips to the Soviet Union have been known to overcharge their clients and allocate the surplus to the local communist party.[115]

Finally, the International Department may choose to fund foreign communist parties directly. According to Levchenko, the former chief of the Tokyo KGB residency, the International Department often uses KGB officers stationed in Soviet embassies to transfer funds to local communist parties. For example, Levchenko claims that the International Department provided funds to the pro-Soviet Phillipine Communist Party in the late 1970's on a regular basis.[116]

Friendship and Cultural Societies

The Soviet Union also uses binational organizations for the purposes of implementing active measures. Usually called Soviet friendship or cultural societies, these organizations are operated by the International Department of the CPSU. Soviet friendship and cultural societies exist in over eighty nations. The self-proclaimed goal of friendship and cultural societies is[117]

> to spread a thorough and reliable knowledge of the culture, history, and social structure and national law, the language and economy of the Soviet Union and its significance for world peace.

In other words, Soviet friendship and cultural societies operate to ensure that the Soviet perspective of Soviet domestic affairs and international relations is brought to the attention of residents of foreign countries. The individuals who are attracted to society programs probably assume that international tension, especially Soviet-American antagonism, is merely the result of misunderstanding. By going to the Soviet Union and learning about Soviet society, these people are the forefront of the "citizens' diplomacy" movement, which operates under the principle that "peace is too important to be left to politicians."[118]

Dedicated to "peace and detente" and the promotion of "confidence and mutual understanding among world nations," Soviet friendship and cultural societies organize and fund tours, "peace crusades," seminars, and study programs to the Soviet Union for individuals from foreign countries.[119] Participants in society programs are systematically bombarded with Soviet propaganda and disinformation, fervent criticism of capitalist society, and glorification of the peace-loving Soviet people whose aim it is to liberate mankind from the evils represented by capitalism. The main topic of discussion of most friendship and cultural society programs, however, is disarmament.[120] For example, what follows is a portion of Mikhail Gorbachev's reply to letters from the participants of a recent American-Soviet Peace Walk in the USSR (a Soviet friendship and cultural society-sponsored activity), which took place from June 14 to July 8, 1987.[121]

> I share the feeling of profound concern expressed in your messages at the threat of nuclear holocaust that is looming dark over mankind and may destroy everything living on this planet. From all standpoints, including naturally the standpoint of morality, the time has come to part with nuclear thinking, to beat swords into ploughshares and devote the funds thus released to social needs and creative purposes. It is our conviction that the sole alternative to the policy of nuclear suicide and a guarantee of mankind's survival is the creation of a non-violent world, a world free of nuclear weapons.
>
> For everyone who treasures peace, the Soviet Union is a firm and staunch ally in the effort to attain these truly sacred goals of mankind. This is the substance of our entire policy. We will continue intensifying our efforts to realize the existing opportunities for progress along the lines of the abolition of nuclear weapons.
>
> I wish you and your families health, happiness and prosperity in a world without wars and weapons.
>
> Yours, Mikhail Gorbachev

Clandestine Radio Broadcasting

Clandestine radio broadcasting is "broadcasting in the language of the target audience from a station which does not admit to the origin of transmission or which attempts to mislead listeners about the origin."[122] Clandestine radio broadcasts have been sent from the

Soviet Union since World War Two. Their purpose is to disseminate Soviet propaganda and disinformation and thereby influence current events in foreign countries to the Soviet Union's advantage. In this capacity, clandestine broadcasting supplements the massive Soviet overt broadcasting effort, which is also a medium for the dissemination of propaganda and disinformation.

In order to illustrate the content and tone of Soviet clandestine radio broadcasting, an excerpt of a National Voice of Iran (NVOI) broadcast (7 November 1979) is worth a reading. Immediately following the seizure of hostages at the United States Embassy in Tehran, the Soviet Union began broadcasting propaganda and disinformation to Iran in hopes of inciting further anti-American violence:[123]

> In conditions where the United States conspires against the Iranian revolution, against Iran's independence and freedom, against the leaders of the revolution, particularly against Iman Khomeini, a number of the government's official sources, including the prime minister, consorted with the envoys of the brutal imperialism of the U.S. persons such as Brzezinski, this mad dog of imperialism and Zionism...let us remember that the security advisers of the Presidents of the United States had the greatest share in the massacre and slaughter of the Third World...At the same time that the delegation of the provisional government was holding talks with the conspirator Brzezinski, demonstrations by the Iranian people during the feast of sacrifice against the conspiracies of U.S. imperialism against the Iranian revolution were in process...We believe that the only decisive and necessary response to U.S. imperialism is the united struggle for the eradication of imperialism led by U.S. imperialism from our dear Iran. Our struggle along with the aware and heroic people of Iran in achieving this holy aim continues...

The anti-American tone of this broadcast is characteristic of other clandestine broadcasts that emanate from the Soviet Union, though not all clandestine broadcasts carry the same pupose as that cited above.

The following list consists of the four Soviet clandestine radio broadcast stations known to date:[124]

National Voice of Iran -- operated out of Baku
Radio Bha Yi -- aimed at China
Our Radio -- aimed at Turkey
Voice of Truth -- aimed at Greece

Information on whether the number of clandestine radio broadcast stations has increased since December, 1982 is at present unobtainable. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that the Soviet Union continues to exploit this useful medium.

Costs

In addition to the examples of Soviet active measures given thus far, an analysis of the resources committed to active measures provides another indication of their importance. In 1979, the CIA estimated that the overall annual Soviet expenditure for active measures exceeded $3 billion (US). This sum, is broken down in Table 1. Not included in the table are the estimated expenditures of the foreign sector of the Propaganda Department (because in 1979 overt propaganda was the responsibility of the International Information Department--which no longer exists), and Soviet friendship and cultural societies.

As Table 1 indicates, the resources committed to overt propaganda outlets such as TASS, Novosti, and Radio Moscow are extremely significant. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, however, it should be noted that the estimates given for these organs include the costs of both official propaganda activity and active measures, and do not differentiate between the two. Indeed, this is a statement about

TABLE 1[125]

Soviet Active Measures Budget, 1979

Organization/Activity	Millions ($US)
CPSU International Department	100
TASS	550
Novosti (APN)	500
Pravda	250
Izvestia	200
New Times and other periodicals	200
Radio Moscow foreign service	700
Press sections in Soviet Embassies	50
Clandestine radio broadcasts	100
International Communist Fronts	63
Subsidies to foreign Communist Parties	50
Service A of the KGB	50
Covert action by Soviet residencies	100
Support to National Liberation Fronts	200
Special campaigns in 1979, including anti-NATO TNF modernization campaign	200
TOTAL	3,313

active measures in general, which are closely intertwined with official Soviet propaganda efforts.

In any event, the relative costs of running these overt communication channels for the purposes of both official propaganda and active measures (in particular, disinformation) is rather high when one stops to consider that the resources allocated to the operation of Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, and Radio Liberty, in sum, do not even equal the estimated $150 million a year the Soviet Union spends on jamming these overt broadcasts.[126] When the costs of jamming are combined with the costs of operating Radio Moscow, TASS, Novosti (APN), the prestige publications, and clandestine radio broadcasting, the Soviet propaganda and active measures effort as espoused by these organs is staggering--approximately $2,700,000,000 (US).

The CIA estimate for the overall costs of active measures in 1982 rose to $4 billion (US).[127] This is the most recent estimate of the costs of Soviet active measures available at this time. To place this figure in perspective it is interesting to note that Soviet hard currency earnings reached a peak in 1982-83 of only $32.4 billion (US), sustaining only a marginal surplus in the hard currency balance of trade.[128] The costs incurred by active measures then, prove rather significant in a period in which the Soviet Union is struggling to maintain a positive trade balance and minimize extraneous expenditures. Judging from the estimated $4 billion (US) spent on active measures annually and official pronouncements that the influencing of foreign opinion remains a primary foreign policy objective, one must conclude that the Soviet leadership views active measures to be adequately cost-effective.

Conclusions

The preceeding discussion has examined the apparatus designed for the formation and coordination of Soviet active measures, and the techniques for the implementation of active measures. It has been established that while the Politburo is ultimately responsible for all Soviet policy, including active measures, the International Department is generally responsible for proposing active measures operations to the Politburo, and then, with the Politburo's approval, for coordinating their implementation. The actual details of the implementation of active measures are the responsibility of Service A of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. There is, of course, a considerable degree of sharing of responsibilities between the International Department, the KGB, and indeed, a great variety of other party and governmental elements in the Soviet polity. The Soviet Union also utilizes the intelligence services of Soviet bloc countries, and Soviet proxies in the Third World.

The major techniques for the implementation of Soviet active measures have been identified as disinformation, manipulation of the foreign media, forgery, agents of influence, use of international front organizations and foreign communist parties, use of Soviet friendship and cultural societies, and finally, clandestine radio broadcasting. The Soviet Union's use of these techniques requires a considerable commitment of resources, which has been estimated to exceed $4 billion (US) annually. The human resources the Soviet leadership utilizes to carry out active measures and the monetary commitment it has made underscores the importance of active measures to Soviet foreign policy.

The Soviet Union's employment of the various active measures techniques is a noticeable manifestation of the general Soviet perspective of information, that is, how the manipulation of information can be used to expand one's power and influence abroad. Soviet active measures fulfill their functions of: (1) lobbying for issues that are in the Soviet Union's best interests, (2) confusing world opinion about Soviet global ambitions, and (3) justifying Soviet foreign and domestic behavior. By doing so, active measures weaken the resolve of foreign countries to protect their interests against Soviet encroachments, and thereby, active measures create favourable conditions for the attainment of Soviet foreign policy.

ENDNOTES

[1] John Dziak notes that the "Ambassador's" or "Lockhart" Plot of 1918, the "Trust" legend of 1921-27, the "Smena Vekh" and "Eurasian" movements of the 1920's and 1930's, the United Front line of the 1930's, the Tukhachevsky Affair of 1937, and the "Max" messages of World War Two, among others, indicate the Soviets have a long history of experience in active measures. See John Dziak, "Active Measures," Problems of Communism 33 (November-December 1984), pp. 66-70; and John Dziak, "Soviet Active Measures: The Operational Tradition," Political Communication and Persuasion 4 (Fall 1987), pp. 38-41.

[2] These claims are repeated throughout Mikhail Gorbachev's new book, Perestroika: New Thinking For Our Country and the World (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1987).

[3] Jeffery T. Richelson, Sword and Shield: Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1986), p. 46.

[4] John Reshetar, The Soviet Polity, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p.125, cited by Richard H. Shultz, Jr., and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: The Strategy of Soviet Disinformation (New York: Berkley Books, 1986), p.19. This point is also made by Ioffe. See Olimpiad Solomonovich Ioffe, Soviet Law and Soviet Reality (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 49-92.

[5] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 20.

[6] For detailed treatment of the International Department see Robert W. Kitrinos, "International Department of the CPSU," Problems of Communism 33 (September-October 1984), pp. 47-75; and Wallace Spaulding, "Shifts in CPSU ID," Problems of Communism 35 (July-August 1986), pp. 80-86.

[7] Chapman Pincher, The Secret Offensive (London: Sigwick and Jackson, 1985), p. 35.

[8] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 25.

[9] Ibid., pp. 176-77. See also John Barron's documentation of the case of Stanislav Levchenko in John Barron, KGB Today: The Hidden Hand (New York: Berkley Books, 1983), pp. 32-159.

[10] Kitrinos, "International Department," pp. 50, 62-64.

[11] John Barron notes that Georgi Arbatov and other representatives of the Institute of USA and Canada figure prominently in the coordination of many active measures campaigns. He cites the Nuclear Freeze Campaign strategy conference of March 20-22, 1981 (sponsored by the Soviet front organization Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War) as an example. See Barron, KGB Today, pp. 234-36.

[12] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 25.

[13] Ibid., p. 26.

[14] Ibid., p. 177.

[15] Alexander Rahr, "The Composition of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (236/87, 26 June 1987).

[16] Spaulding, "Recents Shifts in CPSU ID," p. 80.

[17] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 29.

[18] Alexander Rahr, "Turnover in the Central Party Apparatus," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (256/87, 9 July 1987); and Von Christian Schmidt-Hauer, "Interview with Boris Yeltsin, Moscow Party Chief," (Interview mit Boris Jelzin, dem Moskauer Partichef) Die Zeit, 16 May 1986.

[19] Rahr, "The Compostion of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (236/87, 26 June 1987).

[20] Rahr, "Turnover in the Central Party Apparatus," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (256/87, 9 July 1987).

[21] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatis, p. 30.

[22] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, demonstrate that the major themes that characterize overt propaganda are consistently repeated in and reinforced by Soviet active measures.

[23] Ibid., p. 31.

[24] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive), 96th Cong., 2d sess., February 6 and 19, 1980, p. 60.

[25] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Active Measures, 97th Cong., 2d sess., July 13 and 14, 1982, p. 35.

[26] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 178.

[27] U.S. Congress, Soviet Active Measures, p. 35.

[28] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia , pp. 36-37; and Pincher, Secret Offensive, p. 38.

[29] Pincher, Secret Offensive, p.38.

[30] John Dziak, "Soviet Active Measures," Problems of Communism 33 (November-December 1984), p. 69. Dziak notes that the conference was reported in Pravda (Moscow), 18 May 1959. Another account is found in V. Minyailo, "The Conference of the State Security Organs," Bulletin: Institute For the Study of the USSR (Munich) (September 1959), pp. 21-23.

[31] U.S. Congress, Soviet Active Measures, p. 35.

[32] Ibid., p. 45. For a discussion of the relationship between the USSR and the Czechoslovakian intelligence services see Ladislav Bittman, The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare (Syracuse: Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1972).

[33] Ladislav Bittman, The KGB and Soviet Disinformation (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1985), p. 29.

[34] See Dennis L. Bark, ed. The Red Orchestra (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986). This book gives extensive treatment to the matter of Soviet covert involvement in Latin America.

[35] Bittman, KGB and Soviet Disinformation, p. 28.

[36] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 130.

[37] Ibid., p. 41.

[38]. Active measures can be divided into two categories: political and paramilitary. For a discussion on the characteristics of each, see Richard H. Shultz, Jr., "Soviet Strategy and Organization: Active Measures and Insurgency," in The Red Orchestra, ed. Dennis L. Bark, pp. 46-65.

[39] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 42.

[40] For a detailed discussion of the Soviet disinformation campaign about AIDS see "The USSR's AIDS Disinformation Campaign," Foreign Affairs Note (July 1987). See also, U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on European Affairs, Soviet Active Measures, 99 Cong., 1st sess., 1985, pp. 11-13.

[41] Bittman, The KGB and Soviet Disinformation, p. 49.

[42] The Petri dish is a small shallow dish of thin glass used for cultures in bacteriorology. It was invented by the German bacteriorologist Julius R. Petri in the early 1900's.

[43] For the technical details on the ERW see Donald Brennan, "The Neutron Bomb Controversy," Hudson Institute Paper, April 1978.

[44] James L. Tyson, Target America (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1981), p. 156.

[45] Ibid., p. 158.

[46] Ibid., p. 155; and Pincher, Secret Offensive, pp. 246-48.

[47] Barron, KGB Today, p. 223.

[48] Ibid.

[49] For details of the WPC campaign against the ERW see Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, pp. 123-27.

[50] James Tyson examines the American press' treatment of the ERW issue during the late 1970's and concludes that although some major publications presented a balanced view of the ERW (e.g., New York Times), most did not. Tyson notes that the following publications in particular consistently reflected the Soviet line on the ERW: Washington Post (especially a series of articles by Walter Pincus appearing June 7 to June 22, 1977), Newsweek, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, The New Yorker, Scientific American, and The Defense Monitor. Tyson notes that some of these organs were extensively quoted by the Soviet press. See Tyson, Target America, pp. 155-68.

[51] Ibid., p. 166.

[52] Ibid., p. 167.

[53] Cited in Pincher, Secret Offensive, p. 253.

[54] Cited in Ralph K. Bennet, "Western Journalists' Susceptibility to Disinformation," Political Communication and Persuasion 4 (Fall 1987), p. 49.

[55] Pincher, Secret Offensive, p. 111.

[56] Ralph K. Bennet, "Western Journalists' Susceptibility," p. 52.

[57] Rositzke outlines the major techniques for recruiting agents of espionage. See Harry Rositzke, The KGB: The Eyes of Russia (New York: Doubleday, 1981), pp. 77-95. The techniques for recruiting agents of influence in the press and elsewhere in foreign society are very similar. See Tyson, Target America, pp. 28-30.

[58] Pincher provides a good account of Burchett's activities. See Pincher, Secret Offensive, pp. 112-15.

[59] Ibid., p. 115.

[60] Ibid., pp. 115-38.

[61] This procedure is revealed in Barron's discussion of Stanislav Levchenko. See Barron, KGB Today, pp. 32-159.

[62] On sex as a recruitment appeal, see Rositzke, KGB: Eyes of Russia, pp. 90-94.

[63] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, pp. 171-72.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Georgi Arbatov, Radomir Bogdanov, Gennady Gerasimov, and even Mikhail Gorbachev write articles for the foreign media. For example, in 1987 arranged to have Harper and Row Publishers publish Gorbachev's new book Perestroika, in order to promote Soviet views of the world just before the December, 1987 INF Summit in Washington. After the publication and distribution of the book in North America, excerpts from the book appeared in virtually all major North American newspapers.

[67] According to Soviet offials interviewed by Lawrence Martin, the Soviet Union is currently undertaking a major offensive to "correct" what it feels are erroneous perceptions of the Soviet Union. See Lawrence Martin, "The Great East-West PR Battle," Globe and Mail, 6 February 1986, p. A7. More recent evidence of the Soviet policy of influencing foreign opinion is implicit in "New Flexibility in Soviet Foreign Policy," (original in Russian: Ye. Primakov, Pravda, 10 July 1987; A. Bovin, Izvestiia, 11 July 1987) Current Digest of the Soviet Press 38, no. 29 (12 August 1987), pp. 1-6; and "New Gains For Soviet Foreign Policy," (origninal in Russian: Ye. Primakov, Pravda, 8 January 1988), Current Digest of the Soviet Press 40, no. 1 (3 February 1988), pp. 1-4.

[68] Stanislav Levchenko, "Soviet Active Measures Directed Toward Western Media," Political Communication and Persuasion 4 (Fall 1987), p. 46.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid., p. 47.

[71] Bennet, "Western Journalists' Susceptibility," p. 51.

[72] See Joachim Maitre, "Soviet Disinformation and Media Reporting on Central America," Political Communication and Persuasion 4 (Fall 1987), p. 55.

[73] Pincher, Secret Offensive, p. 179.

[74] On the methods commonly used to identify Soviet Forgeries see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Active Measures, pp. 170-95.

[75] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 150.

[76] U.S. Congress, Soviet Active Measures, p. 37.

[77] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 151.

[78] U.S. Congress, Soviet Active Measures, pp. 74-87.

[79] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 153.

[80] Barron, KGB Today, p. 210.

[81] Ibid., p. 215.

[82] Ibid., p. 217.

[83] U.S. Congress, Soviet Active Measures, p. 8.

[84] "Recent Anti-American Forgeries," Foreign Affairs Note (November 1986).

[85] "Recent Anti-American Forgeries: An Unpdate," Foreign Affairs Note (July 1987).

[86] Ibid., p. 1.

[87] Ibid., p. 2.

[88] Bittman, KGB and Soviet Disinformation, p. 61.

[89] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 130.

[90] Pincher, Secret Offensive, pp. 193-194.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Dennis Kux notes the following sources on the Treholt case: "Norwegian Jailed as Spy was Trailed by FBI," New York Times, 28 January 1984, p.4; Jan Nordheimer, "Portrait of Spy as Golden Young Man," New York Times, 29 January 1984, p.10; "Norway Expels Five Russians," New York Times, 2 February 1984, p. 2; and for a Norwegian account see Thorleif Andreassen and Gunnar Moe, Spies and Their Objectives in Norway (Oslo: Forlaget Atheneum, ~~1984~~). These sources were cited by Dennis Kux, "Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation: Overview and Assessment," Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College 15 (Winter 1985), p. 28.

[93] Jon Nordheimer, "Portrait of Spy as Golden Young Man," New York Times, 29 February 1984, p. 10

[94] Kux, "Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation: Overview and Assessment," p. 23; and Pincher, Secret Offensive, pp. 149-51, 194-95.

[95] Jon Nordheimer, "Portrait of a Spy," New York Times, 29 February 1984, p. 10.

[96] Pathe wrote for Realite, Liberation, France-Observateur, L'Evenement, Le Nouvel Observateur, Option, and Vie Ouvrier. See Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, pp. 217-18.

[97] According to Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p.132, Synthesis included among its subscribers, 139 Senators, 299 Deputies, 41 journalists, 14 ambassadors, and only 7 private individuals. Shultz and Godson note that Pathe, then, was reaching 70 percent of the Chamber of Deputies and 47 percent of the Senate.

[98] Ibid., pp. 143-48.

[99] Kitrinos, "International Department," Problems of Communism 33 (September 1984), p. 57.

[100] Ibid., p. 58.

[101] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 109. See also Wallace Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1986," Problems Of Communism 36 (March-April 1987), p. 58-67. Spaulding lists the structure, activities, and leaders of the major Soviet international front organizations in 1986.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Romesh Chandra, "Postponing or Eliminating the Threat of Nuclear War," World Marxist Review (January 1981), p. 31-35, cited by Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 210.

[104] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 115.

[105] Ibid. The WPC in particular is also funded directly by the Soviet Peace Fund. See "Soviet Active Measures: The World Peace Council," Foreign Affairs Note (April 1985): 3.

[106] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, pp. 108-30, provide an extensive analysis of the WPC. See also "Soviet Active Measures: The World Peace Council," Foreign Affairs Note (April 1985).

[107] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 107.

[108] Jeffery Richelson, Sword and Shield: The Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus, p. 149.

[109] Ibid., p. 150.

[110] U.S. Congress, Soviet Covert Action, p. 80.

[111] "Soviet Active Measures: The 12th World Youth Festival in Moscow," Foreign Affairs Note (June 1985).

[112] Richard Staar, "Checklist of Communist Parties in 1986," Problems of Communism 36 (March-April 1987), p. 40.

[113] Kitrinos, "International Department," p. 52.

[114] Elizabeth Teague, "The Foreign Departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin Supplement 8/80 (27 October 1980), p. 15.

[115] U.S. Congress, Soviet Active Measures, p. 39.

[116] U.S. Congress, Soviet Active Measures, p. 166.

[117] Richelson, Sword and Shield, p. 152.

[118] Linda Feldman, "US-Soviet Exchanges: From Hand to Hand Flows... Trust or Manipulation?" Christian Science Monitor, 25 February 1988, p. 5.

[119] Ukraina Society, Ukraina Society--General Information and Society Activities (Kiev: Ukraina Society, 1987), pp. 1-2.

[120] Richelson, Sword and Shield, p. 153.

[121] Mikhail Gorbachev, "Reply by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to Messages From Participants in the American-Soviet Peace Walk," Moscow News, 26 July 1987. Moscow News is the official newspaper of the Union of Soviet Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

[122] "Communist Clandestine Broadcasting," Foreign Affairs Note (December 1982), p. 1.

[123] U.S. Congress, Soviet Covert Action, pp. 78-79; and "Communist Clandestine Broadcasting," Foreign Affairs Note (December 1982).

[124] Ibid.

[125] U.S. Congress, Soviet Covert Action, p. 60.

[126] Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 203. On recent Soviet jamming activities see Jonathan Eyal, "Recent Developments in the Jamming of Western Radio Stations Broadcasting to the USSR and Eastern Europe," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin Supplement 8/87 (23 September 1987).

[127] U.S. Congress, Soviet Active Measures, p. 15.

[128] Joan F. McIntyre, "The USSR's Hard Currency Trade and Payments," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 100th Cong. 2d sess., Gorbachev's Economic Plans (Washington: GPO, 1987), vol. 2, p. 477.

CHAPTER V

THE U.S. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE AND THE MEDIA

This chapter presents a case study about the press coverage of the United States' Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which is colloquially known as "Star Wars." An analysis is made of the Globe and Mail and New York Times coverage of SDI over a six month period between July and December of 1987. The research design for the analysis is modelled closely on Teun A. Van Dijk's method of "discourse analysis."[1]

The analysis was undertaken in order to see how the media treat such a complex and controversial political issue as SDI. It was assumed that the results of the analysis would, at the very least, provide some indication as to how the western media might serve the interests of the Soviet Union, if only because pluralist tradition theoretically allows all views to participate in democratic discourse, even those of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union recognizes the critical importance of and has recently reaffirmed its adherence to the principle that the influencing of foreign opinion is an instrumental part of Soviet foreign policy.[2] This analysis is only the first step toward an attempt to assess the relative efficacy of the Soviet effort to influence foreign opinion, which is part of the greater effort to achieve Soviet foreign policy objectives.

Background

On March 23, 1983, US President Ronald Reagan challenged the American scientific community to develop a defensive shield that would defend the United States against strategic ballistic missiles. From the outset, the primary goal envisioned by Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative was to create an impenetrable layered defensive shield that would render nuclear arsenals of both the US and the Soviet Union virtually "impotent and obsolete."[3] Though the policy of MAD (mutually assured destruction) had functioned as a fairly successful deterrent for over forty years, Reagan felt it was time that the United States made a move toward the development of a defensive deterrent.

Ever since the Reagan administration's announcement of March, 1983, SDI has been the subject of heated controversy both in the United States and abroad. Politicians, international relations experts, scientists, and the public disagree widely on technical and monetary aspects of SDI, in addition to the question of how SDI might affect domestic and foreign politics. On one point, however, all experts agree--the overall effects of SDI will be profound.

In the United States, there have been three major dimensions to the controversy over SDI. The first dimension concerns the technological feasibility of SDI.[4] American engineers and scientists are deeply divided on what technologies best suit the purposes of SDI, and moreover, whether a foolproof defensive shield can even be created. The second dimension in the controversy is cost. Republicans and Democrats alike are faced with the on-going task of containing the swelling US national debt. They, and other Americans, question the wisdom of an accelerated research program that was conservatively envisioned to cost $26 billion dollars in its first five years (1985-89).[5]

The third and probably most important dimension of the American debate about SDI is the very wisdom of SDI as policy. Is SDI a truly defensive system or is it a component of a first-strike nuclear offense? Could it be both? Will SDI end the arms race or accelerate it to new heights? Will SDI disrupt existing arms agreements and prohibit future negotiations or will it force the Soviet Union to the bargaining table?

The major obstacle to the acceptance of SDI in the United States is the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which was signed by the superpowers in 1972. The ABM treaty was[6]

> an acknowledgement by both sides of the futility of building terminal-stage intercept systems to guard against warheads delivered by ballistic missiles. Negotiators at some time viewed it as a major step toward stopping the arms race, since the offense would no longer be required to build more weapons to saturate the defense.

The treaty permitted each side to build antiballistic missile defenses around a single site. The Soviet site was to be near Moscow, and the American site in North Dakota. The treaty also entailed provisions restricting the upgrading of various components of ABM defense in addition to vaguely restricting research and testing of various defense technologies such as high-powered lasers, kinetic energy vehicles, and particle beam technology.[7]

Since 1972, both superpowers have laid charges that the other has violated the ABM treaty. Because SDI entails research and testing of antiballistic missile defense technology, it significantly widens the scope of the dispute over the ABM treaty. While some American experts feel the experiments explicit in SDI fall safely within the limits of the ABM treaty, others disagree. Similarly, while some experts feel the ABM treaty should be strictly abided by in order to ensure the viability of existing and future arms agreements, others feel that it is extremely contradictory for the United States to adhere to a treaty the Soviets allegedly ignore. Finally, the debate is made even more complicated by the fact that the Soviet Union has acknowledged its involvement in the same basic research as SDI--thus confirming what the Reagan Administration had claimed since 1983.[8]

Reactions to the US SDI program abroad also demonstrate considerable controversy. American allies are, by and large, in support of the SDI program. In particular, countries like Japan, West Germany, Israel, France, and Canada have acknowledged their willingness to assist in SDI research, primarily in order to reap the benefits of the expected technological spinoffs SDI will likely produce. At the same time, however, some countries--particularly in Western Europe--fear that the creation of an operational antiballistic missile defense might cause the Soviet Union to increase its conventional military forces in Eastern Europe. Such an increase would force Western Europe to bolster its own conventional forces--an undertaking that most Western European countries are reluctant to carry out for monetary reasons. As a result, SDI receives only tenuous support from its European allies.

The last perspective toward the SDI issue emanates from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's reaction to SDI soon after the Reagan Administration announced the adoption of the program was as could be expected--the Soviet Union was resolutely against the SDI program. The

Soviet line on SDI was first profiled by Yuri Andropov, then General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on March 27, 1983. Andropov stated that SDI was not defensive but clearly offensive, in as much as it was an attempt to acquire a nuclear first-strike capability "by destroying, with the help of antimissile defense, the corresponding strategic systems [of the Soviet Union]."[9] He also stated that SDI would unravel the 1972 ABM treaty, thereby "open[ing] the floodgates to an unrestrained race in all types of strategic weapons..."[10] Finally, Andropov warned that:[11]

> Although the President's speech (of March 23, 1983) related primarily to the Soviet Union, it affects the interests of all states and peoples. One must realize that the American leaders are trying to make nuclear hostages of the European countries. Washington's actions threaten the world.

The Soviet line on SDI has changed very little since Andropov's time. The Soviet Union continually charges that SDI militarizes space (though it has been militarized for over twenty years), violates the 1972 ABM treaty, is immoral because it seeks to acquire a nuclear first-strike capability, and prohibits the development of arms agreements--despite the fact that the Soviet Union is also involved in a similar research program. The Soviet Union has lobbied for a strict reading of the ABM treaty (which would effectively restrict SDI research), a commitment from the United States to observe the treaty for an agreed-upon period, and even the eventual dissolution of the SDI program. It has done this through the official Soviet press, official statements, diplomatic channels, and by active measures.

The inclusion of active measures as means by which the Soviet Union pursues its foreign policy goals with respect to SDI indicates the emphasis the Soviet leadership places on the attempt to influence foreign opinion. In its active measures campaign against SDI the Soviet Union has resorted to using disinformation, Soviet front organizations, the foreign press, and forgery.[12] For example, a forgery known as the "Weinberger Report" appeared in July, 1986, purporting to be a record of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's statements about SDI.[13] Weinberger was reported to have made a series of statements about SDI during a "confidential" meeting held on November 25, 1983. Weinberger was alleged to have said SDI would allow the US to achieve "incontestable superiority" over the Soviet Union by providing the US with the ability to "threaten the Soviet Union with a knock-out blow."[14] When the "Report" first fell into the hands of West German journalists, US officials were asked to verify its authenticity. The fact that no "confidential" meeting was ever held on November 25, 1983, and the presence of various semantic errors, verified that the "Report" was indeed a forgery. The forgery constituted a covert attempt to solicit public support for the Soviet Union's fight against the American SDI program.

It should be mentioned that the Soviet Union also uses threats in its discussion of SDI, threats which are often downplayed by the media in order to prevent the Soviet Union's positive image from being tarnished. For example, only one western reporter commented on the threats of the Soviet spokesman, Valentin Falin. Falin said that the Soviet Union will "draw the consequences" if the United States refuses to comply with Soviet demands on SDI. In a tone usually avoided by other Soviet spokesmen, Falin said:[15]

> We won't copy you any more, making planes to catch up with your planes, missiles to catch up with your missiles. We'll take asymmetrical means with new scientific principles available to us. Genetic engineering could be a hypothetical example. Things can be done for which neither side could find defenses or countermeasures, with very dangerous results.
>
> If you develop something in space, we could develop something on earth. There are not just words. I know what I'm saying.

These chilling words emphasize the importance the Soviet leadership attaches to the SDI issue, as well as the hostile nature of Soviet foreign policy intentions.

From the Soviet attitudes toward SDI mentioned above, it is clear that at the time of writing this thesis, the issue of SDI is of central importance to the Soviet Union. It was an important issue in the recent intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negotiations of December, 1987, and it may prove to be an important issue at the coming strategic arms reductions talks (May 29 to June 2, 1988) in Moscow.[16] To summarize the overall Soviet perspective of SDI for later reference, the following list indicates the major issues the Soviet Union has raised with respect to SDI:[17]

1. SDI is an offensive weapon which has the potential to provide the United States with the capabilities to launch a nuclear first-strike.
2. SDI violates the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
3. SDI militarizes space.
4. SDI threatens to unravel existing arms agreements between the superpowers, and it stands as a major obstacle to the signing of arms agreements in the future.
5. The Soviet Union demands a strict reading of the 1972 ABM treaty, and a commitment to observe the treaty for a specified period.

6. The failure to meet Soviet demands with respect to SDI will result in dangerous political and military consequences--the blame for which will rest entirely on the United States.

In conclusion, as the background provided to the SDI issue clearly indicates, there is a wide variety of opinion about the United State's SDI program, both in the United States and abroad. The controversy over SDI, particularly in the United States, provides a suitable environment for the implementation of Soviet active measures. In the discussion that follows, it will be demonstrated that the western media may constitute an important part of this receptive environment.

Research Design and Some Quantitative Results

As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the research design for this analysis is modelled closely on Van Dijk's method of "discourse analysis". Unlike traditional and more recent forms of content analysis, discourse analysis assumes that the media constitute a specific form of discourse.[18] Therefore, discourse analysis focuses its attention on the actual messages conveyed by the media, rather than on selected properties that might allow one to make contextual inferences.

On the other hand, and in keeping with traditional and more recent forms of content analysis, discourse analysis examines the phonological, morphological, syntactic, and semantic structures of isolated words, phrases, and sentences. However, discourse analysis goes a step further by examining the interrelationships and coherencies between sentences, overall topics, and schematic forms, in addition to stylistic and rhetorical characteristics.[19] By examining both the distinctive and the more general features of the media's coverage of events, discourse analysis also allows for the examination of the structural and textual relevancies of headlines and leads, as well as the organization of major themes in news stories. Finally, "discourse analysis is not limited to an explicit account of structures per se." It takes into account that "media discourse is a complex communicative event that also embodies a social context, featuring participants (and their properties) as well as production and reception processes."[20]

With respect to the media's coverage of the highly controversial social and political issue of SDI, then, it can be seen why discourse analysis is a welcome new development in communications research. It allows various dimensions of the media's coverage of events to be examined, dimensions that have previously been overlooked or simply neglected.

The case study of the media coverage of SDI focused on a selection of sixty articles that appeared in the Globe and Mail (henceforth the Globe) and the New York Times (henceforth NYT) between July and December of 1987. Thirty articles were selected from each newpaper (see Appendix). The two main criteria for the selection of articles were content and length. With respect to the latter, longer articles were chosen because they inevitably discussed more aspects of the SDI controversy than short articles. With respect to content, an attempt was made to select articles that dealt almost exclusively with SDI. However, because SDI is frequently mentioned in the context of arms negotiations, a few articles that deal only peripherally with SDI were chosen for analysis. In addition, some articles that deal with only one or two aspects of the SDI contoversy were also chosen. Nevertheless, it is felt that all the articles chosen for analysis contribute significantly to an understanding of how the Globe and the NYT cover the SDI controversy.

During the research for this analysis it became apparent that while the NYT tended to depend on its own staff of reporters to cover the SDI issue, the Globe relied heavily on articles provided by the major news agencies, in particular, Associated Press and Reuters. Of the articles selected for the analysis, 73 percent of the NYT articles were authored by NYT reporters, while 50 percent of the Globe articles originated from news agencies and only 37 percent from Globe reporters. Despite this difference, the two newspapers revealed similar attitudes toward SDI in the coverage. Distinct Canadian and American attitudes were distinguishable only in that the NYT gave more coverage to SDI, in particular, the debate in Congress over SDI, and the Reagan Administration's interpretation of the 1972 ABM treaty. This minor difference, however, is to be expected since the NYT is an American newspaper and SDI is an American research program (though other countries like Canada are involved in some SDI research).

The importance of SDI was clearly manifest in the NYT by the placement of articles. Most of the articles dealing with SDI appeared on the front page, with further coverage on inside pages. Because Canada plays little part in arms negotiations between the superpowers, the Globe generally placed articles on SDI a few pages into the first section of the newspaper, in the international news section.

The headlines of articles also indicate the importance of SDI. In both newspapers, headlines generally spread across three to four columns. In cases where headlines spread accross only one column, the vertical space utilized was still significant (though not exaggerated) --about 6 centimeters.

As previously indicated, there are many dimensions to the SDI controversy, both in the United States and abroad. Adequate understanding of the SDI controversy requires that one be exposed to the historical background and the various theoretical arguments for and against SDI. However, the Globe and the NYT tended to overlook historical background and theoretical arguments, while demonstrating the following schematic structure: (1) the Soviet Union claims SDI violates the 1972 ABM treaty, (2) SDI threatens to unravel existing arms agreements and prohibit future agreements, (3) the Soviet Union demands the United States observe the "traditional" or "narrow" interpretation of the ABM treaty, (4) the Reagan administration has adopted a "broad" interpretation of the ABM treaty in order to justify SDI, and (5) SDI threatens to escalate the arms race on land and in space.

Few of the articles examined in this analysis provide an adequate background to the SDI controversy. Still fewer articles acknowledge information about alleged Soviet violations of the 1972 ABM treaty--information which considerably alters the context and style of discussion about SDI. American allegations that the Soviet Union has violated the ABM treaty are reported in a total of 6 articles, 5 from the Globe and only one from the NYT.

Another issue that went almost unnoticed in the press, was the interview conducted by NBC with Mikhail Gorbachev on November 30, 1987. During the interview Gorbachev acknowledged what American officials had been contending all along (and which the press had been reluctant to mention)--the Soviet Union is engaged in research similar to that conducted by the United States in its SDI program. During the interview Gorbachev stated:[21]

> ... let me react to your remark that the Soviet Union is engaged in things similar to SDI. Well, it's really hard to say what the Soviet Union is not doing. Practically, the Soviet Union is doing all that the United States is doing, and I guess we are engaged in research, basic research, which relates to those aspects which are covered by the SDI of the United States.

One would assume that after months of advancing claims that SDI violates the ABM treaty and threatens to derail the disarmament process, the media would recognize the weight of General Secretary Gorbachev's statements. Yet, the media were reluctant to mention Gorbachev's statements, much less change the style of their coverage of SDI. For example, of the three articles in the NYT that mentioned the NBC-Gorbachev interview, only one acknowledged Gorbachev's disclosure about Soviet space-based missile defense research--and the article was a selection of excerpts from the interview.[22] The Soviet disclosure was not mentioned again in any of the NYT articles to the end of December, 1987. Similarly, the Globe carried four articles that dealt with the NBC-Gorbachev interview, only three of which mentioned Gorbachev's remarks about Soviet SDI research, but which emphasized that Gorbachev also stated: "But we will not build an SDI, we will not deploy SDI."[23]

The conclusions that can be drawn from these first results are clear. Both the NYT and the Globe defined the SDI controversy in terms of its strategic importance in arms negotiations. The newspapers emphasized Soviet demands that SDI research be conducted in full observance of the ABM treaty. Only then, according to the Soviet Union, could successful arms agreements be reached. In other words, the difficulties relative to the disarmament process were attributed to the United States' seemingly inflexible commitment to SDI. Meanwhile, as the description of the overall schematic structure of the press indicated, alleged Soviet violations of the ABM treaty and Soviet parallel research in space-based missile defense were somehow overlooked by the press.

Thematic Structure

Most of the articles selected for analysis dealt with approximately seven themes, some of which overlapped:

(1) "Linkage": SDI, and the Reagan administration's interpretation of the 1972 ABM treaty are obstacles to the signing of arms agreements with the Soviet Union. Soviet and American negotiators are in a deadlock over SDI.

(2) Insincerity: The Soviet Union, and some American officials claim the United States violates the ABM treaty and, therefore, that it demonstrates an unwillingness to simplify the disarmament process.

(3) Compliance: The Soviet Union, and some American officials demand that the United States adopt the "traditional" or "narrow" interpretation of the ABM treaty, and agree to comply with the treaty for an agree-upon period.

(4) Congressional Debate: The United States Congress is debating how SDI can or cannot be justified under the restrictions of the ABM treaty.

(5) Inflexibility: American President Ronald Reagan has consistently reaffirmed his commitment to SDI and he refuses to let it be conceded as a "bargaining chip" to the Soviet Union.

(6) Technology: Some American scientists doubt the technological feasibility of an operational space defense shield.

(7) Cost: The United States Congress and the American public are trying to curb excessive spendings on SDI research and development.

The first theme was the major one in terms of frequency, emphasis, and space (attributed to its discussion). Both the Globe and the NYT emphasized, and perhaps even exaggerated Soviet claims that SDI "threatens" to derail the disarmament process because it allegedly violates the ABM treaty. As previously indicated, the "linkage" theme claims that the United States "go[es] beyond the definition of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty," and demands that the United States observe the ABM treaty "as signed and as ratified," all seem less valid in light of Soviet research in space-based missile defense and alleged Soviet violations of the ABM treaty.[24] Nevertheless, the Globe and the NYT continued to advance these major themes even after the signing of the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) treaty on December 8, 1987. The signing of the INF treaty should have been a signal to the press that SDI is a less contentious issue than they had been reporting. Yet, after the signing of the INF treaty, the press began to report that SDI now constituted an obstacle to an agreement on long-range nuclear missiles and "could quickly undo the [INF] summit's gains."[25]

The seven themes noted above were presented in a fairly consistent and hierarchical order in both the Globe and the NYT (i.e., in articles which covered most of the themes). The first three themes generally appeared first, followed either by reports of the debate in Congress over SDI, or by reports of the Reagan administration's firm commitment to SDI. The remaining themes usually appeared at the end of articles, or, they appeared in short articles that dealt exclusively with those aspects of the SDI controversy.

The order in which main themes appear in articles in the press is usually important, regardless of the topic, because it illustrates how articles are designed to have an emotional impact on the reader.[26] This appears to be true for the articles selected for this analysis. By indicating first that nuclear arms negotiations are at an impasse because of SDI, people's natural fears and anxieties about nuclear war are aroused. Then, by mentioning that the Reagan Administration is firm in its commitment to SDI--despite the on-going debate over it in Congress--one's frustrations are channelled toward the Reagan administration because it seems to be the root of difficulties in the disarmament process. Finally, the reader is disturbed even more to discover that scientists disagree whether an effective space-based missile defense can even be developed, at any cost.

Headlines

The headlines of most of the articles signal the thematic structures indicated above. In general, most articles about SDI have headlines that explicitly and implicitly convey a negative attitude toward SDI. For example, "Star Wars Could Stop A Test Ban," "Don't Buy The SDI Soap," "Senate Votes For A Check On Star Wars," "The Dangerous Politics of SDI," and "Gorbachev Rejects Summit Unless U.S. Kills Star Wars" all convey negative messages about SDI.[27] Secondary headlines, which appeared quite often in the NYT, tended to be more negative than the primary headline. For example, the secondary headline "Reagan's Program Jeopardizes Gains From the ABM Treaty" is clearly more demonstrative of bias than the primary headline "'Star Wars' vs. A New Era."[28]

In headlines that made direct reference to the American SDI program, the tendency was to refer to SDI as "Star Wars." According to Van Cleave, the term "Star Wars" came from a political attack by Senator Edward Kennedy on President Reagan's initial SDI speech of March 23, 1983. Kennedy referred to Reagan's SDI proposals as "reckless Star Wars schemes."[29] An intentionally derogatory term, "Star Wars" immediately focuses attention on "war" rather on the attempt to prevent it--the presumed intent of SDI. In addition, "Star Wars" evokes a sense of fantasy because it is the title of the famous 1977 George Lucas film, that pitted forces of good against evil warriors in fierce space battles. Despite the derogatory nature of the term "Star Wars," the media immediately adopted the term against the request of the Reagan administration, which consistently refers to its research program by its official name, Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Of the NYT articles which referred to SDI in their headlines either by its official name or "Star Wars," 91 percent (twenty out of twenty-two) used the term "Star Wars." In the Globe the figure is slightly lower, 83 percent (twelve out of fourteen). Of particular interest in the Globe articles, however, are the headlines of two separate articles (both written by Associated Press) which appeared on the same day: "Soviets Will Not Build An SDI" and "Reagan Reaffirms Commitment to Push Ahead With Star Wars."[30] The use of the derogatory term "Star Wars" to refer to the American research program and the neutral term "SDI" to the Soviet counterpart implies a negative bias against the American SDI. In addition, the two headlines also demonstrate the device of rhetorical contrast. The Soviet Union is portrayed as less of a threat because Gorbachev vows not to deploy SDI, while Reagan is firm in his commitment to SDI. Finally, it should be noted that the Gorbachev headline is slightly misleading in that: (1) there is no indication that the Soviet Union actually engages in SDI research (the focus of the article itself), and (2) it mistakingly implies that costly military research entailed by both the Soviet and American SDI programs can be conducted without the ultimate aim of deployment.

Leads

The summary of events, usually given in the lead sections of the articles, conformed with thematic structures and the headlines. The most frequently encountered lead (i.e., the introductory paragraph) conveyed information about the on-going dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union about disarmament, which sometimes included the "linkage" theme. Though the headlines tended to convey negative messages about SDI, the leads did not demonstrate a similar pattern. In general, leads tended to be fairly neutral, and commented on the relative progress or lack thereof in arms negotiations. Secondary leads, however, usually commented on SDI--that it was a formidable obstacle to any arms agreement in light of Soviet-American polarization over the issue. It should be mentioned that although most leads were neutral, some subtly negative leads did appear, particularly in the Globe. For example, compare the two following leads, which comment on Gorbachev's insistance that the SDI debate between the United States and the USSR be resolved before the superpowers meet for a summit:

> Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev refused yesterday to go to a Washington summit and signalled he would not meet President Ronald Reagan until the US leader dropped his Star Wars space-based missile defense project. (Globe and Mail, 24 October 1987, p.1)
>
> Mikhail Gorbachev refused today to set a date for a summit meeting with President Reagan unexpectedly insisting that differences over the development of space-based defensive weapons be resolved first. (New York Times, 24 October 1987, p.1)

Note that the Globe lead says Gorbachev was refusing to meet with Reagan until he "dropped" SDI, while the NYT lead only mentioned that Gorbachev insisted that differences be resolved. There were several examples of this pattern.

Perspective

According to Van Dijk, in the description of events in a newspaper,[31]

> perspective is an important discourse feature of language use. This does not only mean that the events are described from the point of view of the reporter but also that the points of view of others may or may not be represented or emphasized.

In the Globe there was a tendency to allot Soviet spokesmen more speaking space--i.e., direct quotation--than their American counterparts. Of the thirty Globe articles selected for analysis Soviet spokesmen were quoted directly (in the absence of American speaking space) in thirteen articles. American spokesmen were quoted in only six articles (in the absence of Soviet speaking space). American and Soviet spokesmen were quoted together for the purposes of contrast and objectivity in only two articles. In sum, Soviet spoksmen were quoted in 187 lines, while American spokesmen were quoted in 121 lines. In the Globe, then, the official Soviet perspective of SDI was given significantly more attention than the American.

In the NYT, speaking space alone is not sufficient to determine from what perspective the SDI issue was reported. Soviet and American spokesmen were alloted more or less equal speaking space.[32] However, the NYT still tended to emphasize the views of those who feel SDI is an obstacle to the signing of arms agreements. This was done, in part, by the tendency of NYT reporters to advance (by means of exposition rather than acredited quotation) the views of identified and often unidentified sources (Soviet and American) opposed to SDI. A typical reference to unidentified sources begins as follows: "experts outside the government say...."[33]

Style

Another feature of discourse that proves to be revealing about the press coverage of SDI is style.[34] The choice of words used to denote SDI, for example, may signal journalists' attitudes toward SDI. In most articles, initial reference to SDI consists of first, either the official name Strategic Defense Initiative or something to the effect of "space-based missile defense" research, followed by "also known as Star Wars." Almost all subsequent references to SDI use the term "Star Wars." As previously indicated, the term "Star Wars" entails several negative connotations. Nevertheless, the press insists on using the term, although one may ask whether such usage meets the canon of journalistic objectivity.

The words used to denote SDI can, at times, be even more negative than the familiar term "Star Wars." For example, SDI is referred to in several instances as Reagan's "dream," "scheme," or "obsession." In other instances, SDI is even called a "hoax," a "pie-in-the-eye fantasy," and "threatening space-strike arms." It should be emphasized that these same descriptions were not applied to the Soviet SDI program. In the Soviet Union's case, the Globe and the NYT preferred to talk about a Soviet "space-based missile defense" project, or, simply "Soviet SDI"--if they spoke about it at all.[35]

With respect to the style of reporting in the press, it should be mentioned that the Globe and the NYT demonstrate an amazing consistency to talk about SDI in terms of what might be called ownership. The press consistently refers to SDI as "President Reagan's" program. Whether the newspapers intended it or not (but one would have to assume they did), the message implied in such wording is that SDI is a program that is being forced upon the American people against their will and without any justifiable reason (Reagan's selfishness is not a justifiable reason). This implication is clearer in relatively stronger references to SDI like the following: "President Reagan's misguided commitment to the Star Wars crash program," "Reagan's obsession with Star Wars," "Mr. Reagan's beloved strategic defense initiative, Star Wars," and "Mr. Reagan's foolish and dangerous game with SDI."[36]

What can be concluded from the style of language used by the Globe and the NYT to report on SDI, then, is that the choice of language indicates a less than objective description of SDI. Further linguistic analysis would serve to substantiate this claim, but this is outside the scope of the current study.

Rhetoric

Van Dijk notes that,[37]

> News reports may use words that function as hyperboles (overstatements, exaggerations) or understatements, or word and sentence meanings that establish contrast or build a climax. These structures further contribute to a tighter organization of news information and thus may lead to a better memorization by the reader and hence to enhanced persuasion. They may also activate particular scripts or attitudes ...

An analysis of the media's coverage of SDI reveals several examples of rhetorical features of the news, such as exaggeration and contrast. In general, the use of exaggerated, hyperbolic forms of rhetoric was more evident in the Globe than in the NYT (except in the case of letters or op-ed articles). This can probably be explained, in part, by the fact that the Globe depended heavily (50 percent) on news services for articles on SDI and arms negotiations.[38] In contrast, the NYT depended on its own reporters for articles about SDI.

Exaggeration

Despite attempts to avoid exaggeration, the press nevertheless provides several examples. One of the noticeable and reoccurring exaggerations is that SDI "clearly violates" the 1972 ABM treaty. As both American and Soviet negotiators have stated on several occasions, the wording of the ABM is rather ambiguous--as demonstrated by the different Soviet and American interpretations of the treaty. Despite the ambiguity of the ABM treaty, some journalists hesitate to write about "alleged" or "potential" "claims" of American violations. Instead of distancing themselves from the allegations by using modal expressions similar to those above, some journalists prefer to state unequivocally that the American SDI violates the ABM treaty. For example, it was posited that "the ABM treaty outlaws SDI," that Washington "go[es] beyond the definition of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty," and that President Reagan has adopted a "legally sinful and dangerous new reading of the ABM treaty."[39]

One final example of an exaggeration that appeared in the Globe is the report that "Moscow says [SDI] is an attempt to establish world domination."[40] The author of this statement did not put these remarks in quotations but still attributed them to Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev is generally known to be a very careful and effective speaker who clearly understands the value of moderate language. Such a statement about SDI, in the context of arms negotiations would probably be dismissed by U.S. negotiators as rhetoric. It seems apparent that the statement is an exaggeration.

Contrast

In the description of the conflict between the US and the Soviet Union over SDI and other difficulties relative to the disarmament process, it was expected that the rhetorical device of contrast could be found. In the description of the SDI controversy the Reagan administration is consistently portrayed as unflexible, unconciliatory, and even hostile. President Reagan "refuses" to give up SDI and has[41]

> ... consistently rejected a Soviet proposal that the two sides agree to adhere to the traditional strict interpretation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty which strictly limits the testing and deployment of anti-missile systems.

In contrast, Mikhail Gorbachev is portrayed as being flexible, conciliatory, and deeply concerned about obtaining lasting peace in a "nuclear-free world" (undoubtedly Reagan's concern also).[42] For example, compare the following contrasting perspectives:[43]

> On arms control, the Gorbachev moves to denuclearize the planet are too familiar to repeat here. Any claims of a Soviet quest for hegemony must be measured against his demonstrated effort to peel back on all forms of armaments, against the most conciliatory negotiating approach undertaken by any Soviet leader, against his granting of more liberty to his own people and neighbors, against credible peace initiatives preferred for almost every area of the globe, against his plan to rebuild the strength of the United Nations....
>
> ....Mr. Gorbachev hasn't been getting much help from the other superpower in his depolarization campaign. By breaking with SALT II -- the Strategic Arms Limitations talks -- by going beyond the definition of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, by ignoring Moscow's nuclear test moratorium, by opening the vault for new arms-spending records, Washington has not exactly been acting as envisaged in a new East-West era.

The press is replete with other examples of contrast, though most are more subtle than the example illustrated above. Contrasts are evident in the photographic evidence. Although pictures accompany articles about SDI in only ten of the sixty articles examined, they do nevertheless demonstrate the rhetorical device of contrast. The two persons that appear in pictures most frequently (and disproportionately) are Mikhail Gorbachev (appearing in nine pictures) and Ronald Reagan (appearing in four pictures). In addition, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze appears in two pictures while US Secretary of State George Shultz appears in only one. The two Soviet personalities are usually shown with good posture and smiles or grins on their faces, while Reagan and Shultz appear to have poor posture and are usually very serious. To be more precise, in seven of the nine pictures featuring Gorbachev, he is either smiling broadly or simply grinning. Reagan, however, appears very serious in two of the four pictures he is featured in. In the other two pictures, Reagan is smiling, but he is off-center, behind, and seemingly bowing to an upright and sturdy Mikhail Gorbachev. The implication of these pictures, however subtle, is that the Soviet officials are more amiable and optimistic than their American counterparts, and therefore, their intentions are more trustworthy. This contrast was also conveyed verbally. For example, one article emphasizes the fact that "gloom-laden" George Shultz said that negotiations on the SDI and disarmament had yielded "No agreement." Meanwhile, Shevardnadze, "who appeared in a relatively jovial mood," was quoted to have said that negotiations had achieved "some results and some success."[44]

Militarization of Space

One final rhetorical device demonstrated in the Globe and the NYT is the tendency of some journalists to advance the familiar, yet empty, claim that SDI "militarizes space" and threatens to start a debilitating arms race in space.[45] The United States is frequently accused of militarizing space by both Soviet officials and American "experts" because it insists on researching, developing, and deploying "threatening space-strike weapons."[46] The media have demonstrated little hesitation to advance this claim despite the fact space has been militarized for over twenty years. The vast majority of Soviet and American space launches are military in nature, as are the numerous spy-satellites deployed by the superpowers. Van Cleave adds, rather critically, that charges of American militarization of space are extremely contradictory in light of the deployment of Soviet anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), and Soviet research in SDI technology.[47]

The few examples provided above of hyperbolic, contrastive, and other forms of rhetoric that can be found in press accounts of the SDI controversy indicate the human nature of the media in general. The media are not without judgement, nor do they hide their attitudes toward given issues such as SDI, which is negative overall.

The Case of Lawrence Martin

Before concluding, it is instructive to make a few comments about the Globe's Moscow correspondent, Lawrence Martin. Even a cursory examination of Martin's reporting on the Soviet Union serves to illustrate that he is both a partisan reporter as well as somewhat naive. Martin's position with respect to SDI (which is negative), American foreign policy (also negative), and Soviet foreign policy (which tends to be positive) has been demonstrated above in the section dealing with the topic of contrast. In order to demonstrate even further the manner in which Martin reveals his political biases, it is sufficient to analyze an article titled "The Fast Track to Gorbachev's Dream," which appeared in the Globe on November 18, 1987.[48] The article deals with Martin's personal opinions about the current political initiatives of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

At the outset of the article, the headline "The Fast Track to Gorbachev's Dream," which can only be understood in the context of the article itself, demonstrates Martin's supportive position with respect to Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policies. The "fast track" refers specifically to: (1) the moderate or "pragmatic" approach Gorbachev has about domestic reform, which according to Martin is manifest in the dismissal of the more radical reformer Boris Yeltsin, and (2) ostensible peace initiatives which Martin feels will result in the realization of "Gorbachev's Dream" of a "depolarized world." While shedding positive light on Gorbachev's initiatives, the headline simultaneously ignores the possibility that Yeltsin's dismissal might indicate that Gorbachev's reforms are limited by powerful conservative forces in the Soviet Union. Martin downplays the force of Soviet conservatives later in the text when he says that there was not a "whimper" out of conservatives about Gorbachev's international initiative. More importantly, the headline also dismisses the argument that in the context of Marxist-Leninist ideology and its interpretation of the historical dialectic, a "depolarized world" can only refer to the establishment of a world socialist system. Undoubtedly, the acknowledgement of such arguments would encourage rational and cautious discussion of Gorbachev's current reform policies, rather than unbridled enthusiasm.

Martin's style of writing provides several examples of political bias. His position with respect to Gorbachev's so-called "dream" is particularly illustrative. Martin unequivocally states Gorbachev's "dream" as being "the biggest story of our day--a depolarized world."

Martin goes further to explain:

> ...Mr. Gorbachev is not just seeking a new era of detente. Detente is small potatoes for this big thinker. What he is really pursuing is the demise of a world of two fundamentally opposed blocks.

Though Martin notes that Gorbachev (i.e., the "big thinker") is faced with obstacles which initially make him seem like "a man trying to do the impossible," Martin claims that Gorbachev is "trying to tackle them all." This gives Gorbachev an obvious vote of confidence. Martin proceeds to claim that Gorbachev continually "matches words with deeds" and as a result is "gaining credibility." Indeed, "[it] is hard to find a leader since John F. Kennedy who has captured the public imagination as much." Is this an attempt to equate Soviet authoritarian leaders with the leaders of democratic countries? If so, it is misleading. Martin adds to this apparent comparison by stating that "no Soviet leader has ever enjoyed such global lack of scorn as Mr. Gorbachev," and this "worries" U.S. officials that believe Gorbachev is becoming a "cult hero."

Martin's examination of Gorbachev's policies show other signs of bias, especially through exaggeration. For example, Martin comments that Gorbachev's policy of glasnost' "welcomes a degree of openness and free criticism." Martin is exaggerating in the sense that no criticism in official Soviet public discourse is "free"--criticism is expected to be carried out in a purely ideological manner as well as in the spirit of partiinost' (Party-mindedness). Moreover, Martin fails to put "openness" in the proper context by neglecting to consider that Soviet "openness" should not be confused with the western notions of democratic discourse. Other examples of Martin's exaggeration are evident in his statement that "dramatic decentralization is occurring" in the economy (in which case the suitability of the words "dramatic" and "decentralization" can be questioned), that "Mr. Gorbachev is boldly introducing a multi-candidate system that does offer the voter some choice," that with respect to foreign policy "the Iron Curtain is being lifted," and that "Much foreign radio programming is no longer jammed" (whatever "much" means).

Another feature of Martin's reporting that illustrates his apparent naivete about Soviet politics is his effort to put Gorbachev's current policies in particularly favourable light by equating them with the former Czechoslovakian leader Alexander Dubcek's attempt to create "socialism with a human face." Martin states that Gorbachev's own program "rings" (thus making the connection to bells which can have a particularly positive connotation) of what Dubcek tried to do in 1968. By making this comparison, which is slightly misleading because the Prague Spring also constituted an attempt to attain Czechoslovakian independence, Martin is clearly demonstrating his own excessive euphoria about glasnost'.

One final example of Martin's style of reporting is the questionable choice of words he uses to discuss Afghanistan. Martin refers to Afghanistan as the Soviet Union's "sore point." This implies that Afghanistan is a wound, presumably inflicted by someone else and not by the Soviet Union's own decision to invade the country in December, 1979. Martin also contends that "everyone here," whoever that might be, "is convinced of Mr. Gorbachev's determination to get out..."

Martin refrains from using modal expressions such as Gorbachev's "apparent" or "seeming" determination, which might give his reporting a more objective tone.

Though numerous other examples of Lawrence Martin's biased reporting of the Soviet Union could be drawn from the pages of the Globe, it is sufficient to conclude at this point that regardless of the reasons for his style of reporting, he must certainly be regarded by the Soviet leadership as a welcome addition to the foreign press in Moscow. Martin demonstrates a remarkable willingness to give the Soviet Union consistently positive coverage while tending to ignore the less desirable elements of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Wittingly or not, he provides the Soviet Union with a forum for Soviet views, and one might argue that he thereby contributes to the overall Soviet effort to influence foreign opinion.

Conclusions

The conclusions that can be made from the analysis of the Globe and Mail and the New York Times coverage of SDI are suggested in nearly every dimension of the analysis. On the whole, the media impart a negative attitude toward SDI, and therefore, the foreign policy intentions of the United States. The attitude is expressed by the choice of thematic structures, style, and the rhetoric of lexical expressions and photography.

Negativity to SDI is also manifest in the general positive attitude of the press to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign policy initiatives. At times, the press conveys this very explicitly.

In most cases, however, the positive attitude the press has to the Soviet Union is demonstrated by the hesitation to discuss allegations of Soviet violations of the 1972 ABM treaty, the reluctance to mention the Soviet acknowledgement of a Soviet SDI, and by the failure to apply the same criticism to both American and Soviet SDI programs. In other words, by neglecting to weigh all the arguments pertinent to the SDI issue, the press demonstrates a noticeable lack of balance in its reporting.

The attitude the Globe and Mail and the New York Times display toward SDI are, by and large, the same. Though the New York Times gives slightly more attention to the SDI issue overall, especially the debate in Congress over SDI, this was to be expected since SDI is an American issue and the United States is a primary actor in nuclear arms negotiations. However, the analysis of the Globe and Mail and the New York Times has not revealed particular "Canadian" and "American" attitudes toward SDI. Instead, the analysis has revealed that both newspapers demonstrate a consensus that SDI is undesirable because it might be an obstacle to arms agreements. Of course, the blame for this potential obstacle is placed on the United States, as though contradictory Soviet demands do not contribute to the difficulties of disarmament. Such an attitude toward SDI and the United States must surely be welcomed by the Soviet Union.

What this all says about the larger matter of the Soviet attempt to influence foreign opinion should be obvious. If the Globe and Mail and the New York Times are characteristic of the western media in general, the western media are fertile ground for circulating Soviet views. This becomes particularly evident when one compares the points raised by the Soviet Union with respect to SDI (see pp. 136-138), to the major themes that appear in the western press as represented by the Globe and the NYT (see p. 143). On the whole, there is an amazing degree of similarity between the Soviet viewpoint on SDI and what appears in the western press. Judging from the importance the Soviet leadership officially attaches to influencing foreign opinion, it would not be entirely surprising to discover that in this instance, the western press had been touched by Soviet efforts. Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine whether the manner of Soviet influence on the press is clandestine, i.e., the result of active measures alone, or simply the result of overt, yet sophisticated Soviet propaganda such as that disseminated during Soviet press conferences, or both. In either event, the point to be emphasized by the Soviet Union's campaign against SDI is that the Soviet Union actively attempts to influence foreign opinion, and in particular, the foreign media. The findings of this initial analysis of the western press suggest that Soviet efforts are showing signs of success.

ENDNOTES

[1] Teun A. Van Dijk, News Analysis: Case Studies of International and National News in the Press (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1988).

[2] See "New Flexibility in Soviet Foreign Policy," (original in Russian: Ye. Primakov, Pravda, 10 July 1987, p. 1) Current Digest of the Soviet Press 39, no. 28 (12 August 1987), pp. 1-4; and "New Gains For Soviet Foreign Policy," (original in Russian: Ye. Primakov, Pravda, 8 January 1988, p. 1) Current Digest of the Soviet Press 40, no. 1 (3 February 1988), pp. 1-4.

[3] Donald Christiansen, ed., The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (An IEEE Spectrum Compendium) (New York: IEEE Spectrum, 1985), p. 55.

[4] The various technical implications about SDI appear in the IEEE compendium cited above.

[5] Ibid., p. 56.

[6] Ibid., p. 60.

[7] William R. Van Cleave, Fortress USSR: The Soviet Strategic Defense Initiative and the U.S. Strategic Defense Response (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), pp. 7-15, 35-38.

[8] Mikhail Gorbachev ackowledged Soviet research in SDI technology in a television interview conducted by NBC on November 30, 1987.

[9] "Yu. V. Andropov Answers Questions From a Pravda Correspondent," (original in Russian: Pravda and Izvestia, 27 March 1983, p. 1) Current Digest of the Soviet Press 35, no. 13 (27 April 1983), p. 4.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid., p. 5.

[12] Evidence of a Soviet active measures campaign against SDI is provided by the U.S. State Department in "Soviet Active Measures: The World Peace Council," Foreign Affairs Note (April 1985); "Recent Anti-American Forgeries," Foreign Affairs Note (November 1986); and by Chapman Pincher, The Secret Offensive (London: Sigwick and Jackson Publishers, 1985), pp. 271-78.

[13] "Recent Anti-American Forgeries," Foreign Affairs Note (November 1986), p. 2.

[14] Ibid., p. 3.

[15] Falin was interviewed by Flora Lewis prior to the December, 1987, INF Summit. See Flora Lewis, "Moscow at a Crossroads," New York Times, 11 December 1987, p. A39.

[16] See Charlotte Saikowski, "Back in Geneva: Now the Hard Bargaining STARTS," Christian Science Monitor, 14 January 1988; and Elizabeth Pond, "Shultz Reports Small Steps Forward on Superpower Arms Control," Christian Science Monitor, 24 February 1988, p. 7.

[17] These points have been drawn from a reading of Moscow News and Current Digest of the Soviet Press articles between July, 1987, and January, 1988.

[18] Van Dijk, News Analysis, p. 1.

[19] Ibid., p. 2.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Excerpts of the NBC-Gorbachev interview have appeared in various newspapers. For example, see "The CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev to the American NBC Television Company on the Eve of His Trip to the United States," Moscow News, 6 December 1987, pp. 3-5.

[22] "Gorbachev Interview: The Arms Agreement, Nicaragua and Human Rights," New York Times, 30 November 1987, p. A12.

[23] For example, see Associated Press, "Soviets Will Not Build and SDI, Gorbachev Vows," Globe and Mail, 1 December 1987, p. A1.

[24] Lawrence Martin, "The Fast Track to Gorbachev's Dream," Globe and Mail, 13 November 1987, p. A7; Michael R. Gordon, "A Shift By Soviet Toward Subtlety on Arms Forseen," New York Times, 1 November 1987, p. A1.

[25] Philip Taubman, "Gorbachev Irritated By U.S. Assertions on 'Star Wars'," New York Times, 15 December 1987, p. A8.

[26] Van Dijk notes that the thematic and schematic organization of any news report may reveal bias. See Van Dijk, News Analysis, pp. 13-16.

[27] Thomas A. Halsted, "'Star Wars' Could Stop A Test Ban," NYT, 11 October 1987, section 4, p. E26; Howard Ris, "Don't Buy The SDI Soap," NYT, 31 August 1987, p. A19; Associated Press, "Senate Votes For Check on Star Wars," Globe, 18 September 1987, p. A7; "The Dangerous Politics of SDI," Globe, 18 December 1987, p. A6; Reuter, "Gorbachev Rejects Summit Unless U.S. Kills Star Wars," Globe, 24 October 1987, p. A1.

[28] Gerard C. Smith and David Riley, "'Star Wars' vs. a New Era," New York Times, 2 October 1987, p. A35.

[29] Van Cleave, Fortress USSR, p. 2.

[30] Associated Press, "Soviets Will Not Build an SDI, Gorbachev Vows," Globe, 1 December 1987, p. A1; Associated Press, "Reagan Reaffirms Commitment to Push Ahead With Star Wars," Globe, 1 December 1987, p. A14.

[31] Van Dijk, News Analysis, p. 272.

[32] American spokesmen were quoted in ten articles, Soviet spokesmen in eight articles, and both in four articles. The slight advantage American spokesmen appear to have over their Soviet counterparts is offset by the fact that the latter were quoted in 303 lines, while the Americans were quoted in only 253 lines.

[33] For example, see "The Wages of Arms Control Sin," NYT, 8 September 1987, p. A22; Michael R. Gordon, "Congress Reaches Arms Compromise With White House," NYT, 18 December 1987, p. A1.

[34] Van Dijk, News Analysis, pp. 276-77.

[35] Associated Press, "Soviets Will Not Build SDI, Gorbachev Vows," Globe, 1 December 1987, p. A1; "Political Weapons," Globe, 4 December 1987, p. A6.

[36] Gerard C. Smith and David Riley, "'Star Wars' vs. a New Era," NYT; Thomas A. Halsted, "'Star Wars' Could Stop a Test Ban," NYT, 11 October 1987, section 4, p. E26; Colin Mackenzie, "Shultz Setting Sights on ICBM Reductions," Globe, 22 October 1987, p. A1; "The Dangerous Politics of SDI," Globe, 18 December 1987, p. A6.

[37] Van Dijk, News Analysis, p. 16.

[38] Though articles produced by new agencies generally tend to be more neutral than those of correspondents hired by individual newspapers, with respect to SDI the opposite seemed to be true. On news agencies see O. Boyd-Barret, The International News Agencies (London: Sage-Constable Publishers, 1980).

[39] Associated Press, "Superpower Summit is Likely This Year, Soviet Says," Globe, 30 October 1987, p. A1; Lawrence Martin, "The Fast Track To Gorbachev's Dream," Globe, 13 November 1987, p. A7; "The Wages of Arms Control Sin," NYT, 8 September 1987, p. A22.

[40] Reuter, "Gorbachev Rejects Summit Unless U.S. Kills Star Wars," Globe, 24 October 1987, p. A1.

[41] David Shipler, "Gorbachev Demanding Change on 'Star Wars', Bars Summit Talks Now," NYT, 24 October 1987, p. A1.

[42] Lawrence Martin, "Accord Viewed As First Step Toward Gorbachev's Dream," Globe, 19 September 1987, p. A11.

[43] Lawrence Martin, "The Fast Track To Gorbachev's Dream," Globe, 13 November 1987, p. A7.

[44] Reuter, "Gorbachev Rejects Summit Unless U.S. Kills Star Wars," Globe, 24 October 1987, p. A1.

[45] For example, see Clayton C. Ruby, "A Peaceful Swap," Globe, 5 November 1987, p. A6; Associated Press, "Soviets Will Not Build an SDI, Gorbachev Vows," Globe, 1 December 1987, p. A1; Bill Keller, "Soviet Marshall Sees 'Star Wars' Giving U.S. Edge," NYT, 30 October 1987, p. A1.

[46] Micheal R. Gordon, "A Shift By Soviet Toward Subtlety on Arms Forseen," NYT, 1 November 1987, p. A1.

[47] Van Cleave, Fortress USSR, pp. 1-5.

[48] Lawrence Martin, "The Fast Track To Gorbachev's Dream," Globe, 13 November 1987, p. A7

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

The major finding of this study is that the Soviet leadership considers the manipulation and control of information to be of central importance in efforts to maintain power at home and to expand Soviet influence abroad. As adjuncts to traditional diplomatic techniques, the Soviet leadership employs a wide variety of techniques known as "active measures," in addition to the sophisticated courtship of the western media, in a broad effort to exert influence on foreign communication systems and foreign opinion. Active measures are employed to clandestinely lobby for issues on the Soviet Union's behalf, to confuse foreign governments and societies about Soviet foreign policy objectives, and to justify Soviet domestic and foreign behavior. The underlying purpose of active measures then, is to create favourable conditions for the attainment of Soviet foreign policy.

The Soviet Union has a long history of experience in manipulating and controlling the flow of information that dates back to the Bolshevik Revolution. Indeed, the success of the Bolshevik Revolution is explained, in part, by the Bolsheviks' skillful management of information and by their use of propaganda and disinformation. Once Bolshevik power was consolidated, Lenin and all subsequent Soviet leaders continued to recognize the strategic importance of information--the skillful management of which can facilitate political stability and control for the leadership within the Soviet Union, while increasing Soviet power and influence abroad.

The current Soviet leadership is no less reliant upon the management of information than were previous leaderships. In fact, there is substantial evidence to document the claim that the current Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev is even more sensitive than predecessors to the political importance of managing the flow of information. The rapidly growing disciplines of communications and communications technology are not overlooked by the Soviet leadership. It recognizes both the political opportunities, as well as the potential dangers that the proliferation of mass communications offers. As a result, the current Soviet leadership has confirmed its adherence to the principle that the careful management of the flow of information must form a central part of Soviet domestic and foreign policy.

In chapter 2 of this thesis we began to demonstrate the importance the current Soviet leadership attaches to information by briefly describing the organization and administration of the Soviet media system. The discussion indicated that the Soviet media are controlled by the CPSU in a highly centralized and authoritarian manner which is justified by Marxist-Leninist ideology. The CPSU's complete control over the media gives it a virtual monopoly of information in the Soviet Union and it serves to facilitate the CPSU's rule. Unlike the western media, which are intended to function as the voice of the public and are expected to protect the public from the arbitrary use of power by government and other institutions (though it can be argued that the western media fall short of fulfilling these ideals), the Soviet media function as powerful instruments of political persuasion and control for the Soviet leadership. The Soviet media consistently defend, explain, and promote the policies of the Soviet leadership (i.e., the CPSU) while trying to discredit, censor, and eliminate alternate views.

Though it was indicated in chapter 2 that there are some alternate sources of information in the Soviet Union that are beginning to challenge the CPSU's monopoly of information, it was concluded that the strength of this opposition is insufficient to counter the official media system. The Soviet media then, are successful in serving the needs of the Soviet leadership, that is, they serve to enhance Soviet authoritarian rule.

In chapter 3 we proceeded to demonstrate that the Soviet leadership applies the lessons it has learnt from domestic politics with respect to information abroad. Having determined that Soviet foreign policy is active, that is, it is aimed at shifting the world correlation of forces to the Soviet Union's advantage, it was then noted that Soviet active measures constitute a valuable addition to traditional diplomatic, economic, and military means of achieving Soviet foreign policy goals. In outlining the fundamental operating principles of active measures, it was concluded that the success of active measures depends, to a large degree, upon the environment they are targeted for.

Perhaps the most important conclusion that can be drawn from the discussion in chapter 3 is that the free world and especially western democracies are generally receptive to Soviet active measures. The principle of democratic-pluralism maintains that all ideas, viewpoints, and ideologies, however popular or unpopular, have the right to exist in fair competition. The very existence of democracies depends upon the coexistence and tolerance of competing views, unfettered criticism of the policies and decisions of institutions and governments, and the wide circulation of news, information, and opinion from all sources. From the democratic-pluralist's perspective, this realm of public discourse--which is based on the conviction that in open competition truth will always win out--is considered to be democracy's greatest strength, though in reality democratic discourse proves to be somewhat less than ideal.

At the same time, however, the principles upon which democratic societies are founded render democracies vulnerable to Soviet exploitation. Soviet propaganda and disinformation experts are well aware of the open forum democracies provide for Soviet views. They attempt to influence the realm of democratic discourse by a variety of means, which include active measures. As indicated in chapter 4, the Soviets attempt to exert influence on foreign opinion by means of oral and written disinformation, manipulation of the foreign media, forgery, agents of influence, Soviet international front organizations, foreign communist parties, Soviet binational friendship and cultural societies, and clandestine radio broadcasting. These techniques constitute a covert attempt to tip the balance of forces in the Soviet Union's favour, and this is what makes Soviet active measures so distasteful to individuals committed to democratic principles.

The existence of Soviet views in democratic discourse is not a threat by itself, that is, when they are openly identified as Soviet views. Soviet views have to be considered, for one reason because we negotiate with the Soviet Union in order to reach international arms agreements, and also because the principles of democratic-pluralism demand it. However, when Soviet views are interjected into democratic discourse by means of active measures, we find them reprehensible. This is because we expect honesty in democratic discourse. Disinformation is dishonest. We do not allow dishonesty in our leaders, and we fervently criticize them when we detect it. For example, notice the criticism the Reagan administration has been subjected to as a result of the Iran-contra affair. Scandals arising from dishonest behavior are just as devastating to Canadian leaders as well. Moreover, before we consider one's viewpoint on a given issue, no matter how popular it might be, we want to know the origin of one's information--especially if the individual is a member of the journalistic community. When the western media advance opinions based on Soviet sources as facts, and when they criticize the policies of democratic institutions on the basis of information (and disinformation) provided by undisclosed but probably Soviet sources, we find this unacceptable. In sum then, our dislike for subversive Soviet tactics such as active measures does not stem from some unreasonable and unjustifiable anti-Soviet attitude, but rather, it stems from our standards set for free and responsibile media.

Whereas chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis emphasized the importance the Soviet leadership attaches to active measures in its overall policy of attempting to influence foreign opinion, chapter 5 took a slightly different direction. Chapter 5 constituted an initial attempt to assess the relative success of Soviet efforts to influence foreign opinion. It examined the Globe and Mail and the New York Times for their coverage of the controversy over the American Strategic Defense

Initiative (SDI) over a six month period between July and December, 1987. In general, it was concluded that the western media, as represented by the Globe and the NYT, displayed a negative attitude toward SDI, and hence, toward the foreign policy intentions of the United States in general. By advancing views that more or less reflected Soviet attitudes to SDI the media effectively joined in the Soviet chorus of complaints about SDI, and by doing so, served Soviet interests.

The main conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of the media's coverage of the SDI issue is that the western media are fertile ground for circulating Soviet views. The Soviet Union undoubtedly exploits this situation. Precisely how Soviet views get into the western press is difficult to determine. Judging from the importance the Soviet leadership attaches to active measures, it would not be surprising if it were discovered that active measures had covertly influenced the media's coverage of SDI by means of active measures. However, it is just as likely that the media's coverage of SDI can be explained, in part, by the Soviet leadership's sophisticated, yet, overt propaganda stratagems. In either event, an initial examination of the western press indicates that the overall Soviet effort to influence foreign opinion shows some success.

Indeed, this thesis has provided ample evidence to substantiate this claim. Soviet active measures have achieved a variety of successes for Soviet foreign policy. It has been demonstrated that in some cases, active measures have helped to achieve specific short-term foreign policy objectives. The American decision to prevent the production and deployment of the Enhanced Radiation Weapon (the "neutron bomb") in the 1970's, the diversion of attention away from the Soviet Union regarding the assassination attempt on the Pope in 1981, and the Norwegian decision in the mid-1980s to forbid the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Norway, among other examples, serve to illustrate the success active measures have in helping to achieve specific Soviet foreign policy objectives. It was also demonstrated that Soviet active measures have contributed significantly to longer-term Soviet attempts to exacerbate existing fissures between the countries of the free world, to alienate the United States from its allies in NATO and the Third World, and to enhance the image and power of the Soviet Union abroad. Finally, even when Soviet active measures fail to be entirely successful, as demonstrated by the Soviet disinformation campaign about AIDS, they still prove rewarding for their psychological impact. Active measures invite people to question the values and intentions of their governments beyond reasonable justification. This often results in confusion, distrust, and even hostility toward the very institutions we expect to defend our own principles. This can only help produce favourable conditions for the attainment of Soviet foreign policy.

The implications Soviet active measures hold for the free world are disturbing. Justified by Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Soviet Union is able to wage a dramatic ideological battle against the free world while simultaneously posing as the dove of peace. The free world, however, is unable to respond adequately to Soviet active measures because it is often assumed that the principles of democratic-pluralism prohibit any defensive action. Individuals and institutions are reluctant to focus attention on the Soviet attempt to influence foreign opinion because they fear their efforts will simply fall prey to accusations of "warmongering" and "McCarthyism." But surely, the Soviet efforts warrant serious discussion, if only because they might contribute to our understanding of the Soviet Union. This is extremely important if we wish to negotiate with the Soviet Union in a rational way, while still protecting our interests as free societies. The Soviet Union, after all, is not a member of the free world. Therefore, it is not against the principles of democratic-pluralism to strengthen our resolve to protect our own style of public discourse.

The only means we have at our disposal to counter Soviet active measures is an entirely open, rational examination of events, and this presupposes high standards from our own media. Rather than simply reacting to Soviet initiatives, we need to discuss the existence of active measures before they occur, and we need to expose active measures when they are detected. In other words, we need to be informed about the nature and conduct of Soviet foreign policy, and we need to clarify in our own minds that the principles of democratic-pluralism justify defensive action against distortion. Only then can we even hope to minimize the impact of Soviet active measures while simultaneously promoting the principles of democratic-pluralism. Democracy is a fragile flower to cultivate, and it needs to be nurtured carefully.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"A New Philosophy of Foreign Policy" (original in Russian: Ye. Primakov, *Pravda*, 10 July 1987, p. 1). *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 39, no. 28 (12 August 1987), pp. 1-4.

Andreassen, Thorleif, and Moe, Gunnar. *Spies and Their Objectives in Norway*. Oslo: Forlaget Atheneum, 1984.

Bark, Dennis L., ed. *The Red Orchestra*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986.

Barron, John. *The KGB Today: The Hidden Hand*. New York: Berkley Books, 1983.

Bennet, Ralph K. "Western Journalists' Susceptibility to Disinformation." *Political Communication and Persuasion* 4 (Fall 1987), pp. 49-52.

Bittman, Ladislav. *The Deception Game: Czechoslovakian Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1972.

________. "Soviet Bloc Disinformation and Other Active Measures." In *Intelligence Policy and National Security*, pp. 212-28. Edited by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Uri Ra'anan, and Warren Milberg. Washington: National Strategy and Information Center, 1981.

________. *The KGB and Soviet Disinformation*. New York: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1985.

Blacker, Coit D. *Reluctant Warriors*. New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1987.

Buzek, Anthony. *How the Communist Press Works*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1964.

Chandra, Romesh. "Postponing or Eliminating the Threat of Nuclear War." *World Marxist Review* (January 1981), pp. 31-35.

Christiansen, Donald, ed. *The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative* (An IEEE *Spectrum* Compendium). New York: IEEE *Spectrum*, 1985.

"Communist Clandestine Broadcasting." *Foreign Affairs Note* (December 1982).

"Conference in the CPSU Central Committee" (original in Russian: *Pravda*, 17 September 1987, p. 2). *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 39, no. 37 (14 October 1987), p. 1.

"Conviction is the Bulwark of Restructuring" (original in Russian: Pravda, 14 February 1987, pp. 1-2). Current Digest of the Soviet Press 39, no. 7 (18 March 1987), p. 6.

Cooper, Orah, and Fogarty, Carol. "Soviet Economic and Military Aid to the Less Developed Countries, 1954-78." In Soviet Policy in Less Developed Countries, pp. 6-29. Edited by W. Raymond Duncan. Huntington: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1981.

Dewhirst, Martin, and Farrel, Robert, eds. The Soviet Censorship. Metuchen: Scarecrow Press, 1973.

Dziak, John J. "Soviet Intelligence and Security Services in the 1980's: The Paramilitary Dimension." In Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Countermeasures, pp. 95-124. Edited by Roy Godson. Washington: National Strategy Information Center, 1980.

________. "Active Measures." Problems of Communism 33 (November-December 1984), pp. 66-70.

________. "Soviet Active Measures: The Operational Tradition." Political Communication and Persuasion 4 (Fall 1987), pp. 38-41.

Dzirkals, Lilita; Thane, Gustafson; and Ross A. Johnson, eds. The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR. Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, R-2869, September 1982.

Eyal, Jonathon. "Recent Developments in the Jamming of Western Radio Stations Broadcasting to the USSR and Eastern Europe." Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (Supplement 8/87, 23 September 1987).

Fainsod, Merle. Smolensk Under Soviet Rule. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958.

Feldman, Linda. "Revelations Amid the Rhetoric: Glasnost' at One Soviet Paper." Christian Science Monitor, 15 September 1987, pp. 9-10.

________. "US-Soviet Exchanges: From Hand to Hand Flows...Trust or Manipulation?" Christian Science Monitor, 25 February 1988, p. 5.

George, Alexander. "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making." In The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 165-90. Edited by Eric P. Hoffmann and Fredric J. Fleron. New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1972.

Gerstenmaier, Sheila. "The Influence of Soviet Propaganda on the Western Media." Survey 29 (August 1985), pp. 31-34.

Ginsurg, Alexander. "Vnachale byl 'Golos'....," Russkaia Mysl', 19 February 1988, pp. 1-2.

Gorbachev, Mikhail. Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1987.

________. "Reply by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to Messages From Participants in the American-Soviet Peace Walk." Moscow News, 26 July 1987.

Gromyko, A. A., and Ponomarev, B. Soviet Foreign Policy. Moscow: Progress Publishing, 1981.

Hannah, Gayle Durham. Soviet Information Networks. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1977.

Harasymiw, Bohdan. Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union. London: MacMillan Publishers, 1984.

Henze, Paul B. The Plot to Kill the Pope. New York: Scribner's, 1983.

Hoffmann, Eric P., and Fleron, Frederic J., eds. The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy. New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1972.

________., Laird, Robbin F., eds. Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World. New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1986.

Hollander, Paul. Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.

________. "The Newest Political Pilgrims." Commentary 80 (August 1985), pp. 37-41.

Hopkins, Mark. Mass Media in the Soviet Union. New York: Western Publishing Company, 1970.

Hunt, R. N. Carew. The Theory and Practice of Communism. New York: MacMillan Company, 1957.

Ioffe, Olympiad S. Soviet Law and Soviet Reality. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985.

Keeble, Curtis, ed. The Soviet State: Domestic Roots of Foreign Policy. London: Gomer Publishing Company, 1985.

Kitrinos, Robert W. "International Department of the CPSU." Problems of Communism 33 (September-October 1984), pp. 47-75.

Kux, Dennis. "Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation: Overview and Assessment." Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College 15 (Winter 1985), pp. 19-30.

Lenczowski, John. "Soviet Disinformation: An Overview." Political Communication and Persuasion 4 (Fall 1987), pp. 32-38.

Lenin, Vladimir I. "What is To Be Done?" In V. I. Lenin. Collected Works, Vol. 5, pp. 347-530. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1961.

________. "Party Organization and Party Literature." In On Literature and Art, pp. 22-26. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1967.

Levchenko, Stanislav. "Soviet Active Measures Directed Toward Western Media." Political Communication and Persuasion 4 (Fall 1987), pp. 45-49.

Lewis, Flora. "Moscow at a Crossroads." New York Times, 11 December 1987, p. A39.

Leites, Nathan. A Study of Bolshevism. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953.

Maitre, Joachim. "Soviet Disinformation and Media Reporting on Central America." Political Communication and Persuasion 4 (Fall 1987), pp. 55-57.

Markham, James W. Voice of the Red Giants. Iowa: Iowa University Press, 1967.

Martin, Lawrence. "The Great East-West PR Battle." Globe and Mail, 6 February 1986.

McIntyre, Joan F. "The USSR's Hard Currency Trade and Payments." In Gorbachev's Economic Plans. vol. 2, pp. 474-88. U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. 100th Cong., 2d sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1987.

Medvedev, Zhores A. Gorbachev. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1986.

Mickiewicz, Ellen. Media and the Russian Public. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981.

________. "Policy Issues in the Soviet Media System." Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 35 (1984), pp. 113-124.

________. "The Functions of Communications Officials in the USSR: A Bibliographical Study." Slavic Review 43 (Winter 1984), pp. 641-56.

________. "Political Communication and the Soviet Media System." In Soviet Politics: Russia After Brezhnev, pp. 34-65. Edited by Joseph L. Nogee. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985.

Mitchell, R. Judson. Ideology of a Superpower: Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on International Relations. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982.

Monas, Sidney. "Censorship, Film, and Soviet Society: Some Reflections of a Russia-Watcher." Studies in Comparative Communism 17 (Fall/Winter 1984/1985), pp. 163-72.

"New Flexibility in Soviet Foreign Policy" (original in Russian: Ye. Primakov, Pravda, 10 July 1987; A. Bovin, Izvestiia, 11 July 1987). Current Digest of the Soviet Press 38, no. 29 (12 August 1987), pp. 1-6.

"New Gains For Soviet Foreign Policy" (original in Russian: Ye. Primakov, Pravda, 8 January 1988, p. 1). Current Digest of the Soviet Press 40, no. 1 (3 February 1988), pp. 1-4.

Nogee, Joseph L., and Donaldson, Robert H. Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II. New York: Pergamon Press, 1984.

Nordheimer, Jan. "Portait of Spy as Golden Young Man." New York Times, 29 January 1984, p. 10.

"On the Eve of the Poet's Centennial" (original in Russian: Literaturnaia Gazeta, 25 February 1987, p. 6). Current Digest of the Soviet Press 39, no. 9 (1 April 1987), pp. 1-3, 13.

Pincher, Chapman. The Secret Offensive. London: Sigwick and Jackson, 1986.

Pipes, Richard. "Soviet Global Strategy." Commentary 69 (April 1980), pp. 31-39.

Pond, Elizabeth. "Soviet Disinformation." Christian Science Monitor, 26, 27, 28 February, 1 March 1987.

________. "Shultz Reports Small Steps Forward on Superpower Arms Control." Christian Science Monitor, 24 February 1988, p. 7.

Posen, Barry R. "Competing Images of the Soviet Union." World Politics 39 (July 1987), pp. 579-97.

Rahr, Alexander. "The Composition of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU." Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (236/87, 26 June 1987).

________. "Turnover in the Central Party Apparatus." Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (256/87, 9 July 1987).

"Recent Anti-American Forgeries." Foreign Affairs Note (November 1986).

"Recent Anti-American Forgeries, An Update." Foreign Affairs Note (July 1987).

Remington, Thomas. "The Mass Media and Public Communication in the USSR." Journal of Politics 43 (August 1981), pp. 803-17.

Report of the State Prosecutor's Office, Appeals Court, 28 March 1984. English trans. Rome: Appeals Court, 28 March 1984.

Reshetar, John. The Soviet Polity. 2nd ed. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1978.

"Restructuring and the Fate of Socialism" (original in Russian: A. Bovin, Izvestiia, 11 July 1987, p. 6). Current Digest of the Soviet Press 39, no. 28 (12 August 1987), p. 5.

Richelson, Jeffery T. Sword and Shield: Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1986.

Rositzke, Harry. The KGB: The Eyes of Russia. New York: Doubleday, 1981.

Rubinstein, Alvin. Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global. Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1981.

Saikowski, Charlotte. "Back in Geneva: Now the Hand Bargaining STARTS." Christian Science Monitor, 14 January 1988.

Schmidt-Hauer, Von Christian. "Interview With Boris Yeltsin" (Interview mit Boris Jelzin, dem Moskauer Partichef). Die Zeit, 16 May 1986.

Schopflin, George, ed. Censorship and Political Communication in Eastern Europe. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.

Sergiyev, A. "Leninism on the Correlation of Forces as a Factor of International Relations." International Affairs (Moscow) (May 1975), pp. 99-107.

Shanor, Donald R. Behind the Lines: The Private War Against Soviet Censorship. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.

Sharp, Samuel. "National Interest: Key to Soviet Politics." In The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 108-17. Edited by Eric P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron. New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1972.

Shiflet, David. "Solving the Plot to Kill the Pope." Reader's Digest (October 1984), pp. 83-89.

Shultz, Jr., Richard H., and Godson, Roy. Dezinformatsia: The Strategy of Soviet Disinformation. New York: Berkley Books, 1986.

Shultz, Jr., Richard. "Soviet Strategy and Organization: Active Measures and Insurgencey." In The Red Orchestra, pp. 46-65. Edited by Dennis L. Bark. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986.

________. "Soviet Support for Insurgent Movements." Political Communication and Persuasion 4 (Fall 1987), pp. 43-46.

"Skillfully Propagandize the New" (original in Russian: Pravda, 24 February 1987, p. 2). Current Digest of the Soviet Press 39, no. 7 (18 March 1987), p. 8.

Smith, Hedrick. The Russians. Rev. ed. New York: Ballantine Books, 1984.

"Soviet Active Measures: The World Peace Council." Foreign Affairs Note (April 1985).

"Soviet Active Measures: The 12th World Youth Festival in Moscow." Foreign Affairs Note (June 1985).

Spaulding, Wallace. "Shifts in CPSU ID." Problems of Communism 35 (July-August 1986), pp. 80-86.

________. "Communist Fronts in 1986." Problems of Communism 36 (March-April 1987), pp. 57-68.

Staar, Richard F. USSR Foreign Policies After Detente Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985.

________. "Checklist of Communist Parties in 1986." Problems of Communism 36 (March-April 1987), pp. 40-56.

Sterling, Claire. The Time of the Assassins. New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston Publishers, 1983.

"TASS Statement on Arms Negotiations" (original in Russian: Pravda, 16 August 1987, p. 5). Current Digest of the Soviet Press 39, no. 33 (16 September 1987), p. 12.

Teague, Elizabeth. "The Foreign Departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU." Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (Supplement 8/80, 27 October 1980).

The Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Approved March 1, 1986. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986.

"The USSR's AIDS Disinformation Campaign." Foreign Affairs Note (July 1987).

Temko, Ned. "Soviet Insiders: How Power Flows in Moscow." Christian Science Monitor, 23 February 1982.

Tyson, James. Target America. Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1981.

Ukraina Society, Ukraina Society--General Information and Society Activities. Kiev: Ukraina Society, 1987.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Intelligence. Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive). 96th Cong., 2d sess., February 6 and 19, 1980. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1980.

_______. Soviet Active Measures. 97th Cong., 2d sess., July 13 and 14, 1982. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982.

U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on European Affairs. Soviet Active Measures. 99th Cong., 1st sess., September 12 and 13, 1985. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985.

Van Cleave, William R. Fortress USSR: The Soviet Strategic Defense Initiative and the U.S. Response. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986.

Van Dijk, Teun A. News Analysis: Case Sudies of International and National News in the Press. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1988.

Wetter, Gustav. Soviet Ideology Today. Translated by Peter Heath. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966.

Yassman, Viktor. "Glasnost' and Soviet Television in 1987." Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (31/88, 28 January 1988): 1-5.

"Yu. V. Andropov Answers Questions From a Pravda Correspondent" (original in Russian: Pravda and Izvestiia, 27 March 1983, p. 1). Current Digest of the Soviet Press 35, no. 13 (27 April 1983), pp. 3-4.

Zimmerman, William. "Elite Perspectives and the Explanation of Soviet Foreign Policy." In The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 18-30. Edited by Eric P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron. New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1972.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

The analysis of the Globe and Mail and New York Times coverage of the American Strategic Defense Initiative relied upon a selection of 60 articles, 30 from each newspaper. What follows is a list of the articles selected for the study (which appears in chapter 5). The 30 Globe and Mail articles will be listed first, followed by the New York Times articles. Articles will be listed chronologically, and only the primary headlines will be cited.

Globe and Mail

1. John Gellner, "Star Wars Just a Link in a Long Chain," 2 July 1987, p. A7.
2. Associated Press, "Senate Votes For Check on Star Wars," 18 September 1987, p. A7.
3. Lawrence Martin, "Accord Viewed as First Step Toward Gorbachev's Dream," 19 September 1987, p. A11.
4. Associated Press, "Pentagon Speeds Up Research on Star Wars Projects," 19 September 1987, p. A11.
5. Reuters, "Senate Vote Defeats Star Wars Cutback," 23 September 1987, p. A10.
6. Colin Mackenzie, "Shultz Setting Sites on ICBM Reductions," 22 October 1987, p. A1.
7. Reuters, "Gorbachev Rejects Summit Unless US Kills Star Wars," 24 October 1987, p. A1.
8. Associated Press, "Superpower Summit in US Likely this Year, Soviet Says," 30 October 1987, p. A1.
9. Clayton C. Ruby, "A Peaceful Swap," 5 November 1987, p. A6.
10. Lawrence Martin, "The Fast Track to Gorbachev's Dream," 13 November 1987, p. A7.
11. Reuters, "MDs, Soviets Make Deal on Satellite," 14 November 1987, p. A10.

12. New York Times Service, "US Accepts Soviet Offer on Inspection of Old Radar," 16 November 1987, p. A10.

13. New York Times Service, "Star Wars Research Projects Face Sharp Cutbacks," 23 November 1987, p. A1.

14. "Downing the Missiles," 26 November 1987, p. A6.

15. John Gellner, "Reducing the Arsenals," 26 November 1987, p. A7.

16. Associated Press, "Soviets Will Not Build an SDI," 1 December 1987, p. A1.

17. Associated Press, "Reagan Reaffirms Commitment to Push Ahead With Star Wars," 1 December 1987, p. A14.

18. Associated Press, "Reagan Says Soviets Violated Treaty," 3 December 1987, p. A5.

19. "Political Weapons," 4 December 1987, p. A6.

20. Lawrence Martin, "Learning to Play the Publicity Game," 4 December 1987, p. A7.

21. Associated Press, "US Charges Baseless, Center Negotiator Says," 4 December 1987, A3.

22. Colin Mackenzie, "The Test For Reagan: Just Keeping Up With Gorbachev," 5 December 1987, D1.

23. Lawrence Martin, "For Gorbachev: Its Building on His Success," 5 December 1987, p. D1.

24. Paul Koring, "Thatcher Gives Proposals to Gorbachev on Strategic Arms Cuts and Star Wars," 8 December 1987, p. A9.

25. Colin Mackenzie, "Sense of Disappointment as Summit Ends With Star Wars, Afghanistan Unresolved," 11 December 1987, p. A1.

26. Colin Mackenzie, "On To Moscow," 12 December 1987, p. D1.

27. New York Times Service, "Debate Over Star Wars Not Over, Gorbachev Says," 15 December 1987, p. A12.

28. Associated Press, "Star Wars test is Successful," 16 December 1987, p. A11.

29. "The Dangerous Politics of SDI," 18 December 1987, p. A6.

30. Reuters, "US Star Wars Project May Hamper Arms Cuts," 30 December 1987, p. A10.

New York Times

1. Flora Lewis, "Star Wars Self-Destruct," 13 July 1987, p. A17.

2. Howard Ris, "Don't Buy the SDI Soap," 31 August 1987, p. A19.

3. "The Wages of Arms Control Sin," 8 September 1987, p. A22.

4. David K. Shipler, "US Analyzes Soviet Views of Star Wars," 10 September 1987, p. A6.

5. Flora Lewis, "A Better Way Than Star Wars," 11 September 1987, p. A31.

6. Jonathon Fuerbringer, "Senate Begins a Debate on Arms Control Issues," 12 September 1987, p. A5.

7. Gerard C. Smith and David Riley, "Star Wars vs. a New Era," 2 October 1987, p. A35.

8. Thomas A. Halstead, "Star Wars Could Stop a Test Ban," 11 October 1987, section 4, p. E26.

9. David K. Shipler, "Gorbachev Demanding Change on Star Wars, Bars Summit Talk Now," 24 October 1987, p. A1.

10. Philip Taubman, "Moscow Move Keeps Up Pressure for Space Weapons Concessions," 24 October 1987, p. A1.

11. Michael Gordon, "Reagan Firm on Star Wars Despite Insistence By Soviet," 24 October 1987, p. A6.

12. James Markham, "Shultz Declares Missile Pact Needs No Summit Meeting," 25 October 1987, p. A1.

13. Bill Keller, "Soviet Marshal Sees Star Wars Giving US Edge," 30 October 1987, p. A1.

14. Michael Gordon, "A Shift By Soviet Toward Subtlety on Arms Forseen," 1 November 1987, p. A1.

15. Flora Lewis, "Lab Wars, Star Wars," 13 November 1987, p. A1.

16. Michael Gordon, "Congress Reaches Arms Compormise With White House," 18 November 1987, p. A1.

17. David Sanger, "Panel Denounces Cost of Missile Research," 18 November 1987, p. A7.

18. Joel Brinkley, "Reagan Reaffirms Star Wars Stand," 24 November 1987, p. A14.

19. David Shipler, "Gorbachev Mix on TV is Tough But Cooperative," 30 November 1987, p. A1.

20. Bill Keller, "The Image and Moscow Goal," 30 November 1987, p. A6.

21. Michael Gordon, "Star Wars Curbs Not Summit Issue, Soviet Aides Hint," 6 December 1987, p. A1.

22. R. W. Apple, Jr., "Reagan and Gorbachev Report Progress on Long-range Arms and Mute Star Wars Quarrel," 11 December 1987, p. A1.

23. Michael Gordon, "How the US and Soviet Officials Agreed to Disagree on Star Wars," 12 December 1987, p. A1.

24. Reuters, "Star Wars Isn't Tied to Pact," 13 December 1987, p. A10.

25. Tom Wicker, "Two Tough Issues: Mobile Missiles an Star Wars," 14 December 1987, p. A26.

26. Elaine Sciolino, "Shultz Indicates Shift in Approach in Despute on ABM," 14 December 1987, p. A1.

27. Philip Taubman, "Gorbachev Irritated By US Assertions on Star Wars," 15 December 1987, p. A8.

28. Renny Janeway and Gary Goldstein, "Star Wars Budget Is Up, Not Down," 15 December 1987, p. A26.

29. Associated Press, "Space Test is Step Toward Laser Use," 17 December 1987, p. A3.

30. David K. Shipler, "Reagan Aide Says Moscow Opposes Star Wars Tests," 30 December 1987, p. A1.